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ABSTRACT
THE BEGINNING OF INTERVENTION: A STUDY OF THE WORKING
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND
UNDERPERFORMING SCHOOLS DURING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NEW
SCHOOL ACCOUNTABILITY POLICY
SEPTEMBER 2005
SUSAN BOWLES THERRIAULT, B.B.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
AMHERST
M.ED., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
ED.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSCHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Kathryn A. McDermott

New school accountability policy alters how the state department of education (SDE) and
underperforming school interact by creating a direct connection between the two. The
“beginning of intervention” is when the SDE and the underperforming school commence
their working relationship. Challenges to the development of a relationship include
limited capacity at the SDE level and the local educators’ perceptions of new school
accountability as a deterrent policy. The working relationship is the vehicle for bridging
the state’s externally imposed and school’s internally pre-existing accountability systems;
to negotiate the implementation of the policy for the dual purpose of making sense of the
policy for the school and the SDE and meeting the end goal of the policy by improving
the educational outcomes of the school; and to alter educators’ perceptions of new school
accountability policy from that of a deterrent and threatening policy to one which is
enabling and empowering of local educators. Document analysis, observations, and
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interviews of Massachusetts state education administrators, local district administrators
and underperforming school educators were used to gain an understanding of how the
state and local levels perceive one another during intervention. Results from the
qualitative study were analyzed using Scheberle’s (1997) “Working Relationship
Typology” which uses trust and involvement levels as variables to determine the type of
working relationship between organizations. Findings indicate that the working
relationship between the SDE and the school improves during the beginning of
intervention, but remains distant. The surprising finding is that the district is seen as the
key lever for improvement by those in the underperforming school and SDE. The
existing relationship between the district and school, however, was negative, as the
elementary school educators blamed the district for neglecting their schools. Giving the
district capacity to facilitate school improvement, the SDE designed a system of early
intervention that places a “fixer” (Bardach, 1977) at the district level whose sole purpose
is to work with underperforming schools. The findings indicate that this contributed to
dramatic improvement in the working relationship between the district and the
underperforming school as well as the relationship between the SDE and the district.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

In 2001, during the first round of Massachusetts Department of Education reviews
of potentially underperforming schools, I participated as a monitor/evaluator of the
process. It was the first time the schools and the Department of Education had met under
the state mandated new school accountability policy, which was part of a comprehensive
state education reform legislation passed in 1993. I volunteered to be a monitor on the
visits because I was interested in school accountability policy, and how the Department
of Education would approach its responsibility to intervene in underperforming schools.
The experience of these pilot reviews that would become the School Panel Review visits
has stayed fresh in my mind; because I began to wonder what impact these visits really
have on the local school, and how the Department of Education would be able to manage
the support of all of the potentially underperforming schools within the state.
During these visits, principals discussed how the state review had been all over
the local newspapers and the school had become a “bad word” within the local education
system and the community. At another visit the principal and staff nearly thanked the
review panelists and were looking forward to the state’s help. The dramatically different
responses made me curious about what and how this process impacts the state and local
education system and leadership decisions within that system.
Since that time, I have been fortunate enough to work on many research projects
analyzing aspects of the Massachusetts Education Reform Act, 1993 and through this
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research have come to realize that there is a potential for some monumental changes in
how public education is delivered. I also realize that Massachusetts is not the only state
grappling with these major education reform initiatives. With the onset of the federal No
Child Left Behind Act, 2001 every state in the nation is facing some sort of alteration to

its education system. School accountability provides the context to explore the issues
that arise as the tectonic plates of public education shift.
As with any reform effort, I can feel and see the pain of change that many feel
within the system. Looking at Massachusetts public education, I find myself constantly
tom between the long-term intent of improving education for all children in all schools,
and the short-term ramifications manifested in confusion and frustration of educators
about the state’s Massachusetts Education Reform Act, 1993 and later the federal No
Child Left Behind Act, 2001. The school accountability system is just one part of
comprehensive reform legislation that reflects this stmggle. I cannot help but simply
wonder: what is good and what is bad about school accountability? Having read the
research and editorials about new school accountability, I have sometimes found a
“good” or “bad” determination without any middle ground. Naturally, the dearth of
middle ground conclusions has made me suspicious.
I can understand that the label of “underperforming” is damaging to a school and
a community. I can also understand that the additional resources that come with the label
can actually help a struggling school. Whether the response to underperformance is to
give up or to unite under a common vision of improvement is an interesting question. It
does not take research to guess that different schools will react differently. But to begin
to understand how even one school and one state department of education react and
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develop a working relationship during new school accountability policy implementation
is a beginning step. Perhaps with better understanding, there will be no need to feel tom
between the short- and long-term goals or to place the state and the school on opposite
sides of the same coin. Perhaps a humane and reasonable process can be developed in
the short-term as the school follows the path to the long-term benefits for students.
One thing is for certain. Accountability in public kindergarten through twelfth
grade education within the United States is going through a major overhaul because of a
combination of state and federal policies. Once primarily focused on a mixture of
educational inputs (such as textbooks, library books, teacher training), teachers’
professional judgment, and priorities of the local community, accountability in schools
and districts is now focused on educational outcomes (student assessment results) and
standards determined by the state. Referred to as “new school accountability,”1 the shift
in focus from internal school accountability to external state accountability standards
places much of the responsibility for the quality of public education in the hands of the
state departments of education (SDE’s) and moves the responsibility further away from
where it once resided within the local community and ultimately the teacher in the
classroom.
Internal accountability within a school is controlled and defined by the principal
and professional educators within the school and the classroom. An internal
accountability system relies on the professional judgment of teachers to set standards,
develop assessments, and measure progress. External accountability is controlled and
defined outside of the local school and establishes common learning standards and

1 Fuhrman, S. (1999) refers to “New Accountability.” This term has been modified and adapted to
specifically address the portion of accountability focused upon schools.
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assessments and measures the progress of schools towards these standards. External
accountability is often thought to be imposed upon the school from the top down, while
internal accountability is thought to be a bottom-up approach with the classroom teachers
setting the standards as professional educators.
Internal and external accountability are frequently placed on opposite poles and
reflect opposite sides of arguments for and against external, state (and federally) imposed,
new school accountability systems. The polarization of internal and external
accountability is a mistake. Rather, both are elements of a comprehensive accountability
system. Without intending to eliminate internal accountability functions entirely, new
school accountability policy uses additional, external state standards and measures to
improve the overall quality of public education and to ensure that the state’s
constitutional responsibility for ensuring an adequate education to its citizens is being
met.
“New school accountability” is the tool states use to ensure their constitutional
responsibility of providing an adequate, free, and public education is accomplished2.
Derived from Fuhrman’s (1999) “new accountability,” and applied specifically to the
school accountability system, new school accountability policy: 1) links school level
accountability measures to outcomes that are wholly or primarily determined from
student performance on state standardized tests; 2) uses the school as the unit of
measurement; 3) establishes statewide performance standards for schools to meet; 4) has
a system of interventions for schools that do not meet the established standards
(underperforming schools) that are administered by the SDE; and 5) includes a system of
2 Since the passage of the federal No Child Left Behind Act, 2001 all states are required to implement a new
school accountability system to comply with the law. Because the details of the policy are determined by
the individual state governments, there is variance in its rigor among states (Hoff, 2002).
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sanctions administered by the SDE for schools that persistently do not meet the state
standard (chronically underperforming schools).
Direct interaction between the SDE and the underperforming school during the
interventions and the sanctions challenges the very organization of the public education
system. As Elmore, Abelmann, and Fuhrman (1996) state, “Underlying the new
educational accountability is a belief that states should reorient their relations with
schools...away from passive, maintenance-oriented oversight to the active creation of
incentives for improvements in student learning” (p. 94). Beyond the goal of improving
the quality of public education, new school accountability necessitates a new kind of
intergovernmental relationship between the state department of education (SDE) and the
underperforming school. The working relationship that develops between the SDE and
the underperforming school during the beginning of intervention is the vehicle for
administering support and developing congruence between the state’s external and
school’s internal accountability systems.
By making it impossible to hide the poor quality of education in a single school,
the policy aspires to meet the explicit outcome of ensuring all children are receiving an
adequate education. Interestingly, new school accountability policy relies upon a
deterrent system (Bardach, 1977), which uses external threats like SDE (external)
intervention in an underperforming school as the incentive to conform to the criteria
within a policy. Generally, however, an external accountability policy is dependent upon
an organization that commands and controls from the top and is contrary to that of a
loosely coupled organization (Weick, 1976), which characterizes state public education
systems. Moreover, the external threat is imposed, but the underperforming school’s
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internal accountability system remains untouched and poses a challenge because state
school accountability policy will only be effective if it motivates the alignment of the
external mandates with the pre-existing internal accountability mechanisms in an
underperforming school (O’Day, 2002).
As a policy, new school accountability defines statutory powers of the SDE and
the end-goal of improving the delivery of education within underperforming schools, but
it does not dictate how improvement is realized. Between the identification and the end
goal lies an area that is ambiguous and thus creates a place for the SDE and the
underperforming school to negotiate the manner and process of implementation that best
serves the existing strengths of the school’s internal accountability system and the state’
external accountability system - new school accountability.
The alignment of accountability systems creates a middle ground and leaves room
to accommodate the unique needs of the specific school, within the constraints of
resources and skills of the SDE and school together. Switching from a deterrent to an
enabling strategy of implementation during early intervention is necessary to
accommodate the limitations of the SDE’s capacity. The working relationship between
the school and the SDE is the context and the vehicle for communicating the SDE’s
willingness to negotiate the implementation of policy and to enable the underperforming
school and district to take ownership of improvement efforts with some support from the
SDE.
Therefore, the SDE and the underperforming school follow the traditional mode
of policy implementation identified by Lipsky (1977) and Elmore (1979) in which
negotiation occurs at the level of implementation. The SDE and the underperforming
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school will negotiate school accountability policy implementation so that it: 1) makes
sense for the strengths and weakness within their organizations (Lin, 2000); 2) connects
the external and internal accountability mechanisms (O’Day, 2002); and 3) achieves the
intended goal of providing adequate educational outcomes. The working relationship
between the SDE and the underperforming school is an essential component, which
enables the underperforming school and connects the internal and external accountability
systems. Without a better understanding of early interventions the transition from a
deterrent to an enabling approach is missed, and how the foundation of the bridge
between the state external and underperforming school internal accountability
mechanisms develops remains unknown.

Conceptual Framework
Understanding the working relationship between the SDE and the
underperforming school is important to understanding the effectiveness of policy
(Agranoff & Lindsay, 1983; Scheberle, 1997; Seidman, 1980). Together the SDE and the
underperforming school are navigating a new relationship within the public education
arena. By implicitly switching from a deterrent to an enabling approach, the SDE is
attempting to share the responsibility with the underperforming school and to expand its
capacity by using the technical expertise existing among the teaching professionals
within the underperforming school and district. Understanding the evolution of the
working relationship, and its negotiation as the policy is fitted within the context of the
two organizations is critical to understanding the effectiveness of early intervention.
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To investigate the evolution of this key relationship, I use a “Working
Relationship Typology” developed by Scheberle (1997). Scheberle’s typology (1997)
conceives of categories in which a working relationship is classified in a study of the
intergovernmental relationship between the federal Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) and the state environmental agencies because “...implementation is a complex
process and ... working relationships make a difference in how implementation unfolds”
(p. 11). Lin (2000) sees a context within organizations where “institutional values and
needs are continually being reinterpreted” (p. 168), implying that relationships, especially
new relationships, are moving targets that are in a constant state of flux. Because the
SDE and the underperforming school are developing a new relationship within the new
context of new school accountability, it is important to account for the changes within
their working relationship over time. For this reason the typology throws a wide net to
capture the status of the working relationship at several points during the beginning of
intervention (identification, diagnosis, and early technical supportive assistance), to take
the temperature of the working relationship between the two organizations.
The typology relies on two variables that are crucial to the development of a
relationship: 1) involvement and 2) trust. Involvement is defined as the level of
participation between the SDE and the underperforming school within the context of
school accountability. The involvement of the SDE with the underperforming school will
naturally increase because intervention dictates greater involvement. Trust, on the other
hand, is more elusive. For the purposes of this study, trust is the degree to which each
party believes the other will cooperate to achieve the end goal of the policy, improving
the educational outcomes. I suggest that trust will increase as the deterrent approach is
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left behind and the enabling approach is fully understood by those within the
underperforming school. It is likely that the SDE and the underperforming school
commence their relationship, with low involvement and thus fall within Scheberle’s
“coming apart with avoidance” or “cooperative but autonomous” categories. As time
passes and involvement increases, the manner in which the SDE implements school
accountability policy will dictate whether the working relationship with the
underperforming school moves into the arena of “coming apart and contentious,”
“cooperative but autonomous,” or “pulling together and synergistic” (Scheberle, 1997).
Regardless of the direction the relationship takes, the SDE is at once more
powerful and more vulnerable within this new relationship with the underperforming
school. The effectiveness with which the SDE is able to convey its need to share
responsibility, use an enabling approach that depends upon the underperforming school’s
professional expertise, and build a bridge that connects the internal and external
accountability system will likely dictate the ethos and level of cooperation between the
SDE and the underperforming school. Information about the need for cooperation will be
conveyed in the early interactions between the two entities.
This qualitative study relies on the perceptions of state and school actors of one
another and about new school accountability policy as well as observations, analysis of
documents and history of the policy to tell the story of the implementation process.
Using a relationship typology and a review of the literature on trust and involvement, I
have developed the following hypotheses.
First, the working relationship between the state and the underperforming school
will change as implementation is negotiated between the two entities. By this I mean that

9

the SDE will use a “bargaining model” of implementation that is reliant on persuasion
rather than punishment (Gormley, 1998), to improve educational outcomes within the
underperforming school.
Second, due to constraints of skills and resources within the SDE (Fuhrman,
Goertz, & Duffy, 2004), the SDE is dependent upon a functioning working relationship
with the underperforming school. The SDE’s dependence on a positive working
relationship with the underperforming school is greater than that of the school because
the SDE is ultimately responsible for upholding the state’s constitutional responsibility to
provide an adequate and free public education through the framework of new school
accountability policy. Without the expertise or resources to implement such a
comprehensive policy the SDE is reliant upon the skills and resources where they exist in
the public education system, with the professional administrators and educators in the
districts, schools, and classrooms. Therefore, the SDE is dependent upon the
professionals within the underperforming school and must find a way to develop the SDE
officials’ skills to empower and focus improvement efforts of the staff within the school.
Third, initially, the underperforming school does not recognize the SDE’s
dependence. With only the deterrent language of the policy as a source of information
about new school accountability, educators within the school are likely to feel threatened
when their school is declared underperforming. Understanding new school
accountability in terms of the juxtaposition of internal versus external accountability
systems, the staff within underperforming schools may expect an SDE to take the most
extreme measures of intervention and takeover. Because of these presumptions and
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expectations within the school, the SDE must make a magnanimous initial gesture to
open the possibility of a positive working relationship with the underperforming school.
Last, if the SDE can sincerely communicate a desire to cooperate with the
underperforming school, it will improve the working relationship over time. As the
working relationship between the SDE and the underperforming school increases in trust
and involvement the relationship will become increasingly positive. If this does not
occur, the SDE may be forced to implement stronger controls that it is not necessarily
properly equipped to implement.

Study Rationale
Critical of research on policy that is primarily focused on the policymaker and
policy development, Elmore (1979) describes a process of “backward mapping” when
studying policy implementation, which

. .assumes that the closer one is to the source of

the problem; the greater one’s ability to influence it; and the problem-solving ability of
complex systems depends not on hierarchical control but on maximizing discretion at the
point where the problem is most immediate” (Elmore, 1979, p. 605). Elmore’s idea
builds on the work of Lipsky (1977), which identifies the indispensable role of the policy
implementers and the policy targets as those who must interpret and implement policy.
The manner in which the front line workers or street level bureaucrats implement policy
within the constraints of values, skills and resources they possess (Maynard Moody &
Musheno, 2003), is fundamental to the impact of policy (Lipsky, 1977).
Policy is negotiated throughout its life, from development through
implementation. Highlighting the importance of this understanding, Elmore (1979)

11

writes, “[t]he encounter of street level bureaucrats with program clients is reputed to be
the defining moment that actualizes the policy mandate” (p. 188). This element in policy
implementation is crucial to the implementation of new school accountability policy.
The SDE, lacking the command and control position that is presumed by the deterrent
policy, is more accustomed to gathering information and providing inputs while decisions
about the delivery of education reside with the districts and schools within the loosely
coupled organization of the state public education system.
Negotiating policy implementation with locally governed districts and schools as
partners is a middle ground between the hierarchical, controlling implications of new
school accountability and the existing and traditional passive, decentralized character of
public education systems within the United States. The challenge for the SDE is to
communicate the desire and need to negotiate and build a cooperative relationship with
the local district and underperforming school and for those in the underperforming school
to accept and react to this need.
The study of the beginning of intervention within the implementation of new
school accountability policy is important because it provides insight for states new to the
requirements of the policy. The beginning of intervention reveals information on how an
SDE and school commence their relationship. The early phases of new school
accountability are the formative stages when the SDE and the school negotiate the
territory between the presumed and actual implementation of the policy. The first faceto-face interaction between the SDE and the underperforming school is the moment when
the change in the state’s role and responsibility is first acted upon by the SDE and
potentially first realized by the school.
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The reason for examining the beginning of intervention is to help understand the
new context in which the SDE and the underperforming school function. Lin (2000)
finds that the context in which policy is being implemented can create varying results. If
one applies this idea to new school accountability policy implementation, studying the
working relationship is an opportunity to examine the negotiation of policy
implementation as it is fitted within the public education system context. The degree to
which the SDE is able to translate accountability policy to meet the needs of the
underperforming school and the end goal of the policy will have a profound impact on
policy outcomes. The environment of conflict surrounding new school accountability
policy makes this translation difficult for the SDE, but as Stoker (1991) notes, “The
problem is not to eliminate all conflict... but instead to create conditions in which
participants are more likely to respond to conflict with cooperation” (p. 50). Stoker
(1991) refers to the idea of incentives as motivators of cooperation, but underlying the
incentives concept is a foundation of trust within a working relationship. In the public
education system, which relies on professional integrity within its internal accountability
system, trust is an incentive. A new relationship must be developed with trust and
cooperation in mind to effectively produce the incentives for both the SDE and the
underperforming school to work together.
Additionally, the study has many interrelated purposes that may be of value to
those outside of the realm of public education. First, it is an examination of
intergovernmental relations between a state agency, the state department of education
(SDE), contractors, and a local agency, the underperforming school and district.
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Second, it is an investigation into how agents of the state (SDE) use what Lipsky
(1977) and Elmore (1979) call “discretion” in policy implementation. The SDE will
likely need to utilize discretion to meet the end goal of the policy, which presumes a
command and control style of organization within the state’s public education system. In
reality the public education system is loosely coupled and is not conducive to a command
and control style of management. Therefore, to achieve the end-goals of the policy,
implementation must include elements of negotiation and bargaining between state and
local agencies.
Third, it is an examination of the policy implementation process. Taking Lipsky’s
(1977) idea of “street level bureaucrats” using discretion at the front line of
implementation, the study looks at how negotiation and discretion are used to negotiate
between the state and “street level bureaucrats,” (a.k.a. those in the underperforming
school). Early intervention and implementation are important because it is “.. .the
defining moment that actualizes the policy mandate” (Elmore, 1979, p. 188).
Last, it recognizes what Lin (2000) found in her study of policy implementation,
namely that the unique context for implementation matters. Specifically because the
typical relationship between an SDE and the local district and school consists of low
levels of involvement and probably low levels of trust, jumping from the passive, locally
driven organization of the public education system to the centralized control of the SDE
is unlikely. The context of the public education system from that presumed in the policy
makes implementation difficult to imagine. To accommodate the difference between
policy and the organization of the education system, someone or some organization must
play the role of “fixer” (Bardach, 1977) as policy implementation is negotiated. The SDE
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is in the position to play this role with the underperforming school through the
development of a positive working relationship.
Truly improving the educational outcomes of schools is important, and the SDE is
at once more powerful and more vulnerable within its new relationship with the
underperforming school. The effectiveness with which the SDE is able to convey this
dependency and need for cooperation will likely dictate the ethos and level of
cooperation between the SDE and the underperforming school. As Stoker (1991) writes,
“[cooperation] is limited and dependent upon the uncertain and undependable inclinations
of implementation partners” (p. 15).

15

CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

This literature review lays the groundwork for examining the implementation of
the beginning of intervention as new school accountability policy is implemented. An
important facet of the examination is the challenges the SDE and the underperforming
school face, including a lack of pre-existing relationship, limitations in capacity, and
alignment and link between the state’s external accountability with the school’s internal
accountability system. The SDE and the underperforming school are forming a new
relationship and a new context during implementation of new school accountability. The
negotiation of a relationship within the new context is the focus of this study. The
negotiation is examined by combining three bodies of research. First, I examine the
available research on new school accountability policy, and how this study fits into that
body of research. Second, I look at policy implementation theory and research as it
relates to the point of implementation, and how policy is negotiated and fitted to a
particular organization. Last, I consider working relationships and the importance of trust
and involvement to cooperative relationships. Together these three areas of new school
accountability, policy implementation, and working relationships provide a rich
foundation for the examination of the beginning of intervention during the
implementation of new school accountability policy.
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The relationship that develops between the SDE and the underperforming school
is new to the educational policy arena and clearly has a heavy burden. A neutral or
positive working relationship between the SDE and the underperforming school can
simultaneously expand the capacity of both organizations, provide a bridge between the
external and internal accountability mechanisms, and change the perception of new
school accountability policy from a deterrent system to that of an enabling system of
implementation. By applying a framework of working relationships found in research on
intergovernmental relations, the discussion is informed and questions specific to the study
of new school accountability arise.
After federal and state legislators pass new school accountability laws, and after
the state board of education and the department of education officials develop the
regulations, all that is left is to implement new school accountability policy. From a
linear and hierarchical perspective, it may just be that simple. However, a closer
examination of policy implementation reveals that the tensions and negotiations during
implementation of a policy can change the impact of a policy or the very policy itself.
Implementation is when the divide between the external policymaker’s perspective and
the actual internal organization of the targets of policy is bridged. As Elmore (1979)
suggests, the moment when policy meets is target is the point “where the action is”
(Gofftnan, 1967).
In fact, while negotiating the external policy arena into the internal organization
during implementation, a policy can be dramatically altered and the original intent of the
policy transformed (Lipsky, 1977; Elmore, 1979; Lin, 2000). It is particularly true in the
case of policies targeted at the public education system because of limitations in
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resources allocated for implementation and limitations in existing capacity, often “state
and federal school policies are stated intentions, not school practices” (Cuban, 2004, p.
112). Elmore (1979), building on the work of Lipsky (1977), emphasizes implementation
as another important part of a policy cycle in which policy is negotiated and
accommodated between the implementer and the target of the policy. Bardach (1977)
identifies a role of “fixer” which facilitates the negotiations and accommodations during
implementation and Lin (2000) suggests that the “fixer” bridges the worlds of the
external policy maker and the internal targets of policy.
Like most policy implementation cycles, when new school accountability policy
reaches the underperforming school during the beginning of intervention, the hard work
of connecting the external accountability system to the internal accountability system
begins. The working relationship between the SDE and the underperforming school is
the vehicle for connecting, negotiating, and making sense of new school accountability
policy so that it fits within the context of the individual underperforming school. The
challenges of implementing any policy are many. A challenge specific to implementing
new school accountability is that public school systems within the United States are not
organized to function in a system that is over reliant upon an external accountability
system which is the measure for determining schools underperforming (O’Day, 2002).
State public education systems are loosely coupled (Weick, 1976) or fragmented
organizations characterized by decentralized decision-making at the level of the client
(students), and some degree of ambiguous (school) organizational goals and values
(Bush, 1995). Educator expertise is at the bottom of the hierarchy, where it is closest to
the students, in the classrooms. Imposing an external accountability system upon a
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highly developed, professionally controlled, internal accountability system shakes up the
premise of how schools function within the United States.
A loosely coupled organization is characterized as an organization that relies
heavily on professional integrity and expertise (Weick, 1976). Self-regulation and
accountability for educational outcomes is a hallmark of the teaching profession and, in
sum, comprises a school’s internal accountability system. Not surprisingly, the ability
and the manner with which teachers implement policy have profound influence on the
impact of policy in action (Fullan, 1991; Quartz, 1995). Therefore, to be truly effective
within public education a system of accountability must have the flexibility to bridge, to
negotiate, and to align the state’s outcome based, external accountability system (new
school accountability) with the school’s own internal accountability system (O’Day,

2002).
Negotiation and “making sense” (Weick, 2001) of policy is an inherent part of the
policy cycle. Tension between the externally imposed and pre-existing internal
accountability systems, which is present during implementation of new school
accountability policy, is the context for the negotiation of the policy. With the SDE as
the implementer and the school as the target of the policy, the study of the beginning of
SDE intervention in the underperforming schools gains in importance because the
interaction between the two becomes the foundation of their working relationship. The
relationship between the SDE and the underperforming school is the instrument for
negotiating the implementation of policy so that it fits the unique strengths and
weaknesses of the underperforming school. The working relationship is also the bridge
that can connect the external to the internal accountability systems.
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The Beginning of Intervention
When the SDE first intervenes in the underperforming school, it engages in the
first critical point of negotiation of new school accountability policy implementation.
These first meetings are referred to as “the beginning of intervention.” The beginning of
intervention is when a school meets the performance and strategic criteria and is found to
be potentially underperforming, and once a school is found to be underperforming,
transitions to the diagnostic intervention that includes the first round of state provided
technical assistance and support (Table 2.1). If policy is truly negotiated during
implementation, then new school accountability policy’s initial and formative
negotiations occur during the “early intervention” period. First impressions are lasting
and because the SDE and the school have virtually no relationship prior to the beginning
of intervention, these first interactions are highly influential to and become the
foundation of their working relationship. Negotiation of the working relationship and the
resulting new context created by new school accountability policy are the backbone of
this research.
The new working relationship developing between the SDE and the
underperforming school faces many challenges. First, there is rarely any pre-existing,
direct, personal relationship between the two organizations. Up until the point of
identification of the underperforming school, the relationship has largely been filtered
through the district. Before intervention, the essence of the relationship between the SDE
and the school is based on administration, collection of information, and disbursement of
funds, and the district is the SDE’s conduit for any needs or requirements for information
from the schools. The school functions within the local district, which is locally
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controlled and relatively autonomous. To increase the involvement between the SDE and
the school is seen as intervention and interference in the locally controlled district.
Therefore, the SDE and the underperforming school are starting their relationship from
scratch, since SDE’s generally directly interact with districts, not schools.
Second, as an organization the SDE has skills to collect information, and ensure
programmatic compliance, but is not skilled in the business of running schools. Limited
capacity within the SDE (Fuhrman & Elmore, 1990; Madsen, 1994, Lusi 1997,
McDermott, Berger, Bowles, Brooks, Churchill & Effrat, 2001; Fuhrman, Goertz, &
Duffy, 2004; Cuban, 2004) makes the role of new school accountability policy
ambassador to the school a difficult proposition.
Third, there is no single prescription for improving the educational outcomes of
schools (Fullan, 2001). Improvement efforts must be determined on a school-by-school
basis and much of the school improvement literature is based on the strength of internal
school accountability systems (e.g., Fullan, 2001; Wagner, 1994). A customized
approach costs money, takes time, and requires leadership and expertise, all of which
place added strain upon the limited resources within the SDE.
Finally, the undercurrent of new school accountability as a policy is based on
what Bardach (1977) calls a “system of deterrence,” which relies on the threat of
sanctions to motivate targets to comply with policy mandates. Herein lies the reason
implementation of new school accountability policy is particularly interesting because its
“might” is only felt by a handful of schools1. Though the target of new school
accountability policy is technically all schools within a state, the only schools that will be
1 This is particularly referring to the number of schools that are intervened in by the state. Under the No
Child Left Behind Act, many schools are found to be underperforming, but do not require the state to
intervene until later in the accountability process.

21

intervened in by the SDE are those that are found to be underperforming, generally a
smaller population of schools.
The threat of intervention in the deterrent system found within the policy is
enough motivation or incentive for most schools, because most schools will satisfy the
minimum threshold of state and federal standards, and thus will never actually feel the
intervening hand of the state (SDE) or the incremental shift of control away from local
boards to the state. For the schools that are found to be underperforming, under a
deterrent system the initial threat is over, and to continue on a deterrent system of
implementation requires tight controls over actions and standardized implementation
methods, which requires resources and capacity to maintain control (Bardach, 1977).
SDE’s do not have the ability to implement such a system due to limited resources, skills
and capacity. Without the capacity for the SDE to be highly involved in the
underperforming school (Mintrop, 2003) as required for effective deterrent systems of
implementation, the SDE needs to change its strategy. The SDE then falls back upon a
strategy traditionally found in U.S. public education systems. This strategy is what
Bardach (1977) calls an “enabling” strategy, which is characterized by “high consensus
on ... goals” and “is buttressed by a common professional identity or commitment...” (p.
113).
A shift in approach during implementation poses a challenge for the SDE and for
the underperforming school. Switching approaches requires a change in the
understanding of new school accountability policy for those in the SDE as well as those
in the underperforming school. Negotiations during implementation are the opportunity
for the change in perceptions to occur and the effectiveness of communicating the

22

necessary change is largely determined by the type and quality of the working
relationship between the SDE and the underperforming school.
The initial threats embedded in the new school accountability policy may initially
undermine or impede the ability of the SDE and the underperforming school to form a
positive working relationship. Because of the limited capacity of the SDE, it is the SDE
that will first recognize the need for a change in strategy, and will therefore need to work
to change the local educators’ perceptions of new school accountability policy. In short,
the SDE and the underperforming school must forge a new working relationship which is
made more difficult because of: 1) the limited capacity of the SDE, 2) the local hostility
and resentment toward the policy’s threatening nature, and 3) the general disregard for
the profession of education that educators perceive to be embedded in new school
accountability policy. Tension created by the shift from a deterrent to an enabling system
produces a dynamic in which the SDE has power over the underperforming school, but at
the same time the SDE needs the cooperation of those in the school because of limited
capacity. The complexity of the relationship adds to the challenges inherent in creating a
positive working relationship between the two organizations.

New School Accountability Policy
To investigate the working relationship between the SDE and the
underperforming school, it is necessary to take a closer look at a framework for new
school accountability. After scanning states through literature reviews and phone
interviews, Bowles, Churchill, Effrat, and McDermott (2002) found that states follow a
similar framework for accountability systems (see Table 2.1).
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Table 2.1: New School Accountability Framework2
PHASE

EXPLANATION

Performance criteria

Strategic criteria

Diagnostic intervention

Corrective Intervention

Target(s)

Tactic(s)
Exit Criteria

These are used as a gauge to measure and rate schools. Generally student
assessments are at the center of these criteria with some additional factors such
as attendance rates might be used.
These are developed by an SDE to make determinations about school
performance and improvement and to identify schools that may need further
supports.
This is the process of determining the reasons for low performance of a school.
The diagnostic intervention influences the direction of the corrective intervention
by identifying targets and tactics based on the strengths and weaknesses within
the local context of the school
This is determined by the capacity of the state to support, hire consultants, or
facilitate school improvement. Depending on the type of intervention and
processes the state identifies:
The targets of intervention may be practices (e.g., instructional practices),
people (e.g., educators), or organizational structures (e.g., school governance,
shared leadership) depending on the corrective intervention and strategy.
These are the strategies used for the intervention.
These are the criteria a state uses to judge whether a school has sufficiently
improved and is able to function independently.

(Bowles, et. al., 2002)
The common components of school accountability systems found in Table 2.1
define a process of identification, diagnosis and intervention aimed at improving an
underperforming school. From the point of the performance criteria to strategic criteria,
new school accountability policy is still perceived as a deterrent system that in theory
means the threats of intervention are motivators for school improvement. Once the
school is notified that it will be intervened in by the state, the working relationship
between the SDE and the underperforming school commences and the diagnostic and
corrective interventions become the first interactions between the two. If a school does
not improve after the mild interventions, or does not meet the established exit criteria, a
2 Once a school is declared underperforming, the levels of intervention may be revisited if the initial

corrective intervention does not yield improved educational outcomes. An underperforming school,
therefore, may go through several iterations of diagnostic and corrective interventions until improvement is
evident. The level of the corrective intervention is dependent on the length of time a school is found to be
underperforming and the degree to which a school responds to the initial interventions. I propose that the
initial meeting of the SDE and the underperforming school and the subsequent working relationship
developed is of great value because it sets the tone and incentive for further cooperation.
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state may revisit the diagnostic criteria, alter the corrective intervention, and take
stronger intervention measures.
Increases in levels of intervention require stronger and different diagnostic and
corrective interventions. Under new school accountability policy Brady (2003) identifies
three categories of state corrective interventions or threats of intervention: mild,
moderate, and strong. Mild interventions have the least impact on the staff and structure
of the school and include site visits, diagnosis of school problems, and additional
supports such as technical assistance and professional development. Moderate
interventions tend to impact the infrastructure or organization of the school and staff.
These types of changes are fraught with challenges because they impact school
leadership, unions, staff, and the local community, and therefore, require more intense
negotiation between these entities and the state. Because of these challenges and the
increased intensity of the interventions, moderate interventions tend to require more
resources including: time, commitment, skills, and funding. The last level is strong
intervention, characterized by loss of local control, such as reconstitution, which can
entail anything from the firing of some or all staff, and the hiring of new staff (with an
opportunity for former employees to reapply for their jobs), to school take over by the
government or some other public or private entity, to school closure. A summary of the
“graduated” typology of school accountability intervention is found in Table 2.2.
Interventions are not only typified by the level of resources necessary to
implement them, but according to Brady (2003), they reflect an increasing element of
political risk for policymakers, which, in turn, creates a higher stress situation for the
SDE implementing new school accountability policy. Visible risk in any intervention
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will likely grow with stronger intervention. However, the threat those in the educational
community feel toward any (mild, moderate, or strong) state intervention should not be
treated lightly. Any intervention by the state into the local school has risk because it
threatens the autonomy of the school and the teaching profession whether the risk is seen
publicly or remains just below the surface.

Table 2.2: School Accountability - Levels of Intervention in Underperforming Schools3
Level

Mild

Moderate3 4

Strong

Characteristics
Outside directed support that does not directly impact the
local school structure or make-up, but that may
encourage improved skills of leaders and staff aimed at
improving the delivery of education. Alterations to the
school are internally determined and driven, though the
strategies may be prescribed by an external agent (state).
Resources required are minimal.
Impact to the infrastructure of the school and
organization. This requires a more hands-on approach
from an external agent. These changes may be arrived at
collaboratively by the school staff and state. This type of
intervention requires more resources than the mild
intervention and conflict with local community is greater
because loss of control of the school is evident within
some of these strategies.
Complete or nearly complete loss of local control. Only
applied when early interventions have heeded no results.
This requires the greatest level of state resources and is
extremely controversial in the local community.

Examples
■

■
■
■
■
■
■

■
■
■
■

Diagnosis through datadriven analysis of student
test scores
Improvement planning
that is data-driven
Technical assistance
Professional development
Added school time
Reorganization of the
school
Revisions of curriculum

Replacement of the
Principal
School reconstitution
School take over
School closure

Interestingly, in the early phases of mild intervention, the implementation process
is predicated upon the cooperation of the SDE and the underperforming school. The need
for cooperation signals that there is potential conflict and is therefore an indication of the
change or conflict that arises when the SDE moves from a deterrent to an enabling
strategy during early intervention. The “beginning of intervention” includes the strategic

3 The information for this table is from Brady (2003).
4 Brady (2003) suggests that removal of the principal is a moderate intervention. In this analysis the firing
of any staff, including the principal is considered a strong intervention.
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and diagnostic phases, when the SDE and the underperforming school first come face-toface during the mild level of diagnostic/corrective intervention. During this time there
are implicit and explicit changes in strategy the SDE and the school take as new school
accountability policy is implemented. The change and negotiation occurs within the
context of their new working relationship.
Research on new school accountability policy tends to fall into four categories: 1)
research on the impact upon all schools; 2) research on strong interventions into schools;
3) research that synthesizes theory to create a theoretical framework for studying new
school accountability; and 4) research on the perspectives and products of early
intervention into schools. Each category brings forth interesting issues and perspectives
for the beginning of intervention. However, none focus particularly on the formative
stages of intervention in conjunction with the working relationship that develops between
the SDE and the underperforming school.
The first type of research looks at new school accountability policy and its impact
on all schools (e.g., Goertz, Duffy, & Le Floch, 2001; Hanushek, & Raymond, 2002).
Generally, the research is concentrated on how policy impacts all schools within a state
or looks at the perspective of certain stakeholders (e.g., principals, teachers) across a state
(e.g., Goertz, Massell, & Chun, 1998; Ladd, & Zelli, 2002; Mathers & King, 2001).
These studies are interesting because they put the voices of all of those who broadly feel
the threat of and are impacted by new school accountability policy into the forefront. The
challenge with these kinds of studies is that they examine a larger population of schools
or stakeholders and provide generalizations about new school accountability policy. The
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bulk of the stakeholders, however, will only experience the deterrent nature of the policy
and will never experience SDE intervention.
New school accountability is a deterrent policy that uses threat of state
intervention to motivate school improvement. Though the risk of state intervention is
real, the majority of schools will never feel the ramifications of state intervention. In
fact, during the 2000-2001 academic year there were 90,640 public schools in the United
States (National Center for Educational Statistics, 2002) and as of 2001, approximately
8,600 schools had been identified as underperforming5 (Brady, 2003). Less than 10% of
the schools within the United States were underperforming. Since the passage of the
federal No Child Left Behind Act, 2001 (NCLB), however, many more schools are likely
designated as “in need of improvement” (a.k.a. underperforming), yet the limited
capacity of the SDE to intervene in large numbers of schools hinders the level of state
intervention and may even lessen the ability for the SDE to help a school.
Due to limitations in state capacity and resources to hold schools accountable, the
SDE’s use strategic criteria to select a small number of schools out of the many that may
be labeled in need of improvement or that are identified for state intervention. The SDE
tends to intervene in the worst of the worse schools (e.g., Massachusetts, Maryland). The
intent of new school accountability policy is to raise the educational outcomes in all
schools, and thus a major focus is placed on the schools that are performing at the lowest
levels.
Consequently, new school accountability policy is put to the test when the SDE
intervenes in the small population of underperforming schools. The principals and

5 Based on the information on underperforming schools, it is not clear that this number is from the same
academic year as the National Center for Educational Statistics (NCES) data.
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teachers in these schools truly experience the threat of the policy and once the initial
threat is gone, must develop a theory of action with the SDE. It is these stakeholders who
provide the most insight into the impact of new school accountability policy. By
concentrating on the stakeholders at large, the small number of voices of those who
experience intervention is diluted by a majority of stakeholders, who will never
experience anything more than a threat of intervention.
A second type of research conducted on new school accountability policy
converges upon the strongest interventions (e.g., Cobum & Riley, 2000; Erlichson,
Goertz, & Turnbull, 1999; Lynn & Dreeben, 1999; Malen, Croninger, Redmund, &
Muncey, 1999; Seder, 2000; Wong, Anagnostopoulos, Rutledge, & Shen, 1999). When a
school is determined to be chronically underperforming despite mild and moderate
interventions, the drastic and politically risky move of school take over or reconstitution
is imposed by an external entity (e.g., state board of education, city mayor). The value of
this research is the insight it provides in understanding the impact of a policy, and the
strategies that are effective or not effective when implementing policy. The early
relationship between the SDE and the underperforming school, which is predicated on
mild supportive interventions, such as coaching and training of school personnel,
however, is less understood (Mintrop, 2004).
The findings of research conducted on strong interventions indicate that outside
intervention leads to limited school improvement because it simply does not impact the
“technical core” of the school, the teacher in the classroom. Until the external interveners
are able to impose external accountability measures that link to and refocus the internal
accountability mechanisms developed by professional educators within the school, strong
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interventions will continue to achieve less than desirable educational outcomes.
Arguably, at the point of take over or reconstitution the milder interventions have failed,
thus the motivation (threat of stronger intervention) of new school accountability is gone
and the policy, having lost its deterrent incentives, has failed. If strong intervention
means the policy has failed, then it is not surprising that the findings of research on the
strongest interventions into schools conclude that school improvement is not fully
realized under these circumstances.
A third type of research is the theoretical examination of new school
accountability (e.g., Bowles, Churchill, Effrat, & McDermott, 2002; Brady, 2003; Goertz,
2001; Fuhrman, Goertz, & Duffy, 2004; O’Day, 2004). From these examinations one
gains insight into the dynamics and context of schools, principals, and teachers and the
weaknesses and strengths of a state driven accountability system imposed upon the
underperforming school. The results of these analyses provide information on what is
important to consider when implementing new school accountability policy by
synthesizing existing literature on the organization of schools, school change, and school
improvement. It lends a theoretical framework for examining what each stakeholder in
the process is dealing with as they are faced with the possibility of state intervention.
The studies serve the important purpose of providing implemented and targets of policy
with a better understanding of one another, and the facets of policy implementation that
may need to be modified or prioritized to achieve positive results.
The limitation of such research is that it does not study new school accountability
in the context of implementation. The existing bodies of research on school improvement
are valuable, but generally do not approach school improvement in the context of an
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externally mandated accountability system. The important work of connecting the
external and internal accountability systems is new territory for an SDE or a city mayor.
Therefore, synthesizing existing information may lead to conclusions that new school
accountability policy does not work because the policy has a top down, deterrent nature,
which precludes the idea that real school change and improvement comes from the
bottom-up, or at least from within the school (Fullan, 2001).
Herein lies the challenge of new school accountability policy. It is understood
and perceived as a deterrent, top down policy by educational stakeholders. However,
limited resources require the SDE to partner with the most egregiously underperforming
schools during the beginning of intervention in an attempt to avoid the need for stronger
interventions, which the SDE has even less capacity to implement. This calls for a shift
in implementation style that moves away from deterrence. The SDE is more likely to
need the cooperation of the underperforming school to avoid the strong interventions, and
thus the two have a common goal. They both want to evade strong intervention. To
accomplish such a goal they must partner, collaborate, and cooperate (McRobbie, 1998)
to appease state level policy makers and affect improved educational outcomes.
The fourth type of research is conducted specifically on underperforming schools
that are being intervened in by the state (e.g., Mintrop & MacLellan, 2002; Mintrop,
MacLellan, Quintero, & Keleman, 1999). These studies examine the design and process
of implementation and the perceptions of the school stakeholders towards that process.
In just such a study, Mintrop and MacLellan (2002) found that new school accountability
systems have a “penetrating power.. .in eliciting obligations to external demands and in
shaping managerial models of change and their limitations in bringing forth broadly
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based internal development” (p. 297). However, the research tends to focus on the
experience of those within the underperforming schools and their reaction to and the
products of intervention.
Within this body of literature there is a gap. Specifically, the perspective of the
SDE or the external entity and their challenges and struggles with implementing the
policy and intervening in the underperforming school are missed. How the SDE manages
intervention into underperforming schools and how stakeholders at the state as well as the
local levels perceive the policy and its implementation are not well understood. To
neglect the role of the state during intervention is to miss an important component of new
school accountability policy. How the SDE perceives its role in and negotiates the
implementation of new school accountability policy is important because it directly
impacts the reaction and perceptions of those within the underperforming school.
Still, the findings from this research on underperforming schools provide some
initial insights into local stakeholder perceptions of new school accountability policy and
interventions. Shedding light onto new school accountability policy’s limitations
Mintrop, MacLellan, Quintero, and Kelemen (1999) examined schools that were in the
earlier stages of implementation under new school accountability type policies and found
that the degree to which the school could internalize the external accountability demands,
and the provision of a change agent responsible for bridging the divide between the
external and internal accountability mechanisms, were key elements of new school
accountability systems, an idea which is supported by the theoretical work of O’Day
(2002). A major part of early intervention is centered on the development of school
improvement plans by the school. Mintrop, et al. (1999) found that development of the
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school improvement plan is an “exercise in shoring up external legitimacy” (p. 58).
Consequently, the opportunity to internalize and customize improvement strategies for a
specific school is lost or weakened because educators are focused on proving their own
worth to the state or external entity. If the exercise of developing the school
improvement plan is indeed more for external legitimacy than internal change (Mintrop,
et al., 1999), then the role of an external agent to help to bridge the extemal/intemal
accountability divide is critical. The SDE is in the unique position to be a bridge that
connects the two.
This study of the beginning of intervention attempts to fill the gap in
understanding of how state and local entities perceive the beginning of intervention.
Therefore it fits most neatly into the fourth category of research on new school
accountability policy, though it is informed by all categories of school accountability
research. From the first broad research, the idea that new school accountability policy is
perceived by stakeholders in a state as “threatening,” is recognized, and from the second
body of research on strong interventions one gleans that this level of intervention leads to
a giving up and dismantling of any internal accountability system within the school. The
beginning of intervention is an attempt to capture the experience of individuals after the
threat and before the failure (strong interventions) of new school accountability policy.
The third category of theory based research on school accountability policy reveals the
challenges the SDE and the underperforming schools face when implementing the policy.
The strongest point made by these studies is that bridging the externally imposed with the
internally pre-existing accountability systems within the underperforming school is
essential. This idea implies that deterrence and top down, externally mandated change
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will not occur in the face of the SDE’s limited capacity, local control, and the tradition of
professionalism among educators in the public schools. Each of these entities play an
important role in accountability, and the recognition and relationship that develops from
the beginning of intervention is the bridge between the state’s external and the school’s
internal accountability systems.
As a contribution to the fourth body of research focused specifically on
underperforming schools, this study builds on the idea that the implementation of new
school accountability policy is multifaceted (Mintrop, et. al, 2002). There is a role for all
of the parties and the “shared conceptualization of school improvement and
accountability among state officials who compose the design and the districts and schools
who interpret it,” (Mintrop, et. al., 1999, p. 60) are critical to meeting the end goal of
improved educational outcomes. Though new school accountability policy may seem
like a policy that is linear and rationale and leads to a “cause and effect” relationship, the
most important finding of such research is that it is “a whole complex of interactions”
(Mintrop, et. al, 1999, p. 60) between the state and local levels. The working relationship
between the levels of government within a state’s public education system is an
important, if not the most important, facet of new school accountability policy
implementation. Together state and local educators are forming a relationship and a
theory of action. Understanding the perceptions of those in the SDE and the
underperforming school during the beginning of intervention gets closest to where the
action is, and the strategies that support school improvement.

34

Policy Implementation
Negotiation and adjustment of policy to local conditions are a fundamental and
essential part of implementation because they are how the extemal/intemal divide is
bridged. As Cuban (2004) writes, “State and federal school policies are stated intentions”
(p. 112), and more importantly “few policies are implemented as intended” (p. 113).
Negotiation and adjustment during implementation is expected. Limitations of capacity
and resources lead to deviations and make negotiations an inherent part of the policy
implementation process. Accepting the inevitability of deviations from planned policy,
other research (e.g., Elmore, 1979; Lin, 2000; Stoker, 1999) follows policy as it is being
implemented and examines the process as it is negotiated at all levels with particular
focus upon the implementer and the target of policy. Thus the study of new school
accountability takes the perspective that there is a natural and an inevitable negotiation
during implementation that occurs (Lipsky, 1977; Elmore, 1979; Maynard Moody &
Musheno, 2003).
Acceptance of deviations and negotiations during implementation points to the
idea that the context in which policy is being implemented makes a difference (Lin,
2000). However, the results after policy implementation inevitably will be varied. Lin
(2000) challenges the underlying assumption within many policy implementation theories
(e.g., Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1981; Pressman & Wildavsky, 1979) that suggest policy
goes awry during implementation. Rather than hijacking a policy, Lin suggests that the
implementers and targets are merely trying to “make sense” (Weick, 2001) of policy
within their own context. In an expression of a more sympathetic view Lin states,
...any group of staff and participants cannot be expected to
administer, carry out, or participate in any set of activities unless
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those activities serve some purpose in their understanding of the
work or life tasks they believe they must do, or unless those
activities make their lives easier.
(Lin, 2000, pp. 45-46)
This point of view of a policy allows for an understanding of the perspectives of the
targets and the implementers. Lin (2000) sheds light on the contextual factors that may
lead to different outcomes, by investigating and incorporating contextual differences into
the understanding of how policy is implemented.
Implementation choices must be matched to the type of organization in which a
policy is being applied. In a tightly bound and controlled organization, using force and
control as the method of implementation might make sense; however, in a loosely
coupled organization, the effort and resources necessary to implement policy in this
manner is draining and ill-fitting. “Standardized solutions developed at great distance
from the problem, are notoriously unreliable” (Elmore, 1979, p. 610), and in any loosely
structured organization with expertise at the bottom, there must be room for professional
discretion and adaptation to unique circumstances. Relationships and communication are
more likely a better option for the loosely coupled organization.
Bridge building between the external policy environment and the internal
organization of the target is a key element of negotiation. According to Lin (2000), the
idea of an implementation “fixer” (Bardach, 1977) is an essential element to
implementation when negotiating implementation. Lin’s perspective on the fixer role is
different than that of Bardach’s original conception of the role. Bardach (1977) describes
a policymaker as the fixer who treats a policy as her/his pet project and therefore,
continues to oversee and monitor as well as fight for resources for policy implementation.
Taking a micro perspective, Lin alters the definition slightly by referring to what is more
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likely an implementer, rather than the policymaker, who is responsible for translating and
negotiating the policy with the target. Making sense of a policy and creating the
conditions for congruence within the existing organizational structure creates a new
context for implementation the fixer facilitates the process.

Deterrence v. Enabling
In the simple model of inducements, if society penalizes an
activity, people will do it less, and if it rewards an activity, people
will do it more. In the polis, things aren’t so simple. Inducements
are usually designed by one set of people (such as policy analysts,
legislators, and regulation writers), applied by another (executive
branch bureaucrats), and received by yet a third (individuals, firms,
organizations, lower levels of government). The passage from one
set to the next is treacherous.
(Stone, 1997, p. 151)
New school accountability is based on penalizing schools that do not improve with the
threat of state intervention. From the state legislature, the state boards of education to the
SDE’s and finally to the underperforming schools and their districts, the way in which the
policy is interpreted along the way is altered. Indeed, as Stone states, “passage from one
to the next is treacherous.” With sanction based policies like new school accountability
“[t]he biggest problem is a lack of willingness to impose sanctions... on the part of
officials while meting them out” (Stone, 1997, p. 151). The SDE is unwilling or unable
to implement sanctions because of capacity limitations and is consequently dependent
upon cooperation with the underperforming school. Therefore, the SDE takes an
approach that develops a working relationship between the two rather than punishing the
underperforming school.
Adding to the treachery, there is a lack of specific guidance or understanding
about how states can improve schools. Capacity for the SDE to support and turn around
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failing schools is a challenge in nearly all states (Bowles, et.al., 2002, Goertz, et. al,
2001; Mintrop 2003; Olson, 2003). There are no hard and fast rules on what kind of
resources or the amount of resources needed to achieve improvement (Fullan, 2001).
New school accountability policy relies on the threat of intervention in the hope that it
will be motivation enough for schools to improve educational outcomes.
Negotiation during implementation also confronts the stakeholder perceptions
about new school accountability policy. The language of new school accountability
policy uses threats of mild, moderate, and strong intervention to motivate school
improvement at the local level. Research on the impact of new school accountability
upon all schools shows that the majority of stakeholders perceive the policy as
threatening; however, threats may undermine the working relationship between the SDE
and the underperforming school during the beginning of intervention. Thus, part of the
negotiation gives rise to the SDE and the underperforming school redefining new school
accountability so that it is possible to collaborate and provide support for the
improvement of educational outcomes within the underperforming school. I suggest that
this requires a negotiation or change in how new school policy is implemented and
therefore perceived, from a deterrent to an enabling system of implementation.
Bardach (1977) describes two seemingly opposite modes of implementation:
“deterrent” and “enabling.” A deterrent system of implementation is one that uses threats
of punishment (or disincentives) to motivate targets to comply with policy goals. This
type of implementation is often found in situations where uniformity and standardization
are primary goals and in situations where professional discretion and adaptation are seen
a detrimental to the policy outcomes. Paradoxically, an enabling system of
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implementation is different from the popular psychology term which refers to an enabler
as someone who supports another person’s less than desirable actions. Enabling for these
purposes is a more positive term which uses empowerment and consensus to achieve
common goals (Bardach, 1977). An enabling system is congruent with negotiating policy
implementation, fitting policy into the existing context and relying on professional
discretion and adaptation so that policy makes sense for the organization.
The Bardach (1977) description of a system of deterrence is at least partially
applicable to new school accountability policy as it is designed by legislators and
policymakers within a state. In a deterrent type of system “.. .the amount of punishment
is typically disproportionate to the degree of performance” (p. 120). The inherent
motivation within new school accountability policy is for schools to avoid SDE
intervention and maintain the status quo of professional and local autonomy. The failure
of a system of deterrence, like new school accountability policy, is that it undermines any
professional respect, trust, or common goals, which are essential in an enabling system
(Bardach, 1977). Additionally, a deterrent system creates an environment that “presumes
suspicion and alternative goals” (Bardach, 1977, p. 120). Even worse, a deterrent system
is only as good as the threat of punishment. Once an SDE is at a point where it must
administer the punishment, the incentive for the underperforming school to improve is
negligible, and the professional educators within the targeted school may feel like giving
up. The threat is more powerful than the actual punishment.
Stone (1997) finds that the tool of the deterrent system, sanctions may 1) “create
conflict between targets and givers;” 2) “harden targets’ resistance;” 3) “be sabotaged by
givers;” or 4) “hurt the people one is trying to protect instead of altering the behavior of
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the targets” (p. 281). None of these outcomes are ideal for the SDE to encounter when
working with the underperforming schools and support changing to an enabling system of
implementation. Stoker (1989) describes implementation theory as an “authority
paradigm,” which does not view policy implementation as an evolutionary process, but
rather as a process of developing policy and then implementing it as it was intended (e.g.,
Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1981; Pressman & Wildavsky, 1979). New school accountability
appears to be an example of Stoker’s authority paradigm, as it is designed to increase the
consequences or levels of punishment in a system of deterrence. These levels (mild,
moderate, and strong) of punishment may continue the system of deterrence especially
for those schools in the earliest phases of underperformance.
Loosely coupled organizations made up of authorities with what Stoker (1989)
describes as “diffuse power” can bring about confusion in expectations when a policy
demands an implementation style that does not fit the organization. Likewise, the gap
between new school accountability policy that presumes a rational, efficient, mechanistic
public education system and the reality within the loosely coupled public education
system brings about confusion about the expectations the SDE and underperforming
school have for one another. Functioning within the limitations of its skills and
resources, the SDE is best suited to implement an enabling strategy (Bardach, 1977) or
what Gormley (1998) calls a bargaining model of enforcement, which uses the power of
persuasion to improve performance, and is less reliant on control and capacity. The
ability of the SDE staff to relay the message that they want to work with the school,
rather than threaten and control the school, is essential to the implementation of this
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strategy. In the context of new school accountability policy, an enabling system is clearly
dependent upon trust and cooperation between the SDE and the underperforming school.
Lin (2000) lays out the inherent tension that exists when policy implementation is
being negotiated. The tension exists within “the choice between solidarity, force, and
control, or instead communication, individual relationships, and flexibility” (p. 47).
Interestingly, it is similar to the tension between a deterrent and an enabling approach to
implementation. The implementation “choice” between force and control versus
communication and relationships comes with capacity issues. By using a persuasive,
relationship driven approach, time and effort are needed to commence the relationship,
and after it is off to a good start, less time and effort are required. When using force and
control as a method of implementation the implementer needs high levels of capacity and
resources to maintain the force necessary and ensure compliance to the policy.
An enabling system of implementation allows for the SDE and the
underperforming school to work together to fit the policy into the public education
system and into the underperforming school by negotiating the imposed external and the
valued internal accountability systems so that it makes sense for both. This detail that is
critical to understanding how, during the mild intervention level of the
diagnostic/corrective intervention phases, the shift in strategy between the SDE and the
underperforming school is plausible, and why it may actually be effective.
The gap in perceptions has the potential to lead to extra challenges and
miscommunications during the earliest phases of new school accountability. Under new
school accountability policy the SDE and the school are required to interact and work
together in new ways to improve educational outcomes for students. Working together is
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challenged by a lack of relationship between the SDE and the school. In fact, the
relationship may be more likely characterized as negative. Cuban (2004) supports this
possibility when he describes how the organizations within the public education system
tend to act more like rivals than partners. Adding to the rivalry, the deterrent nature of
new school accountability policy does not lead one to believe that those in the SDE and
the schools will be more disposed to partnering. Consequently, working together is not
necessarily the first thing on the minds of those in the school because of the threatening
nature of new school accountability policy.
When schools are found to be underperforming, the motivation (threat) has not
worked, and the SDE, in a sense, is left “holding the bag” as the organization responsible
for guiding, supporting, and making decisions about how to improve an underperforming
school. Looking for an answer to questions about how to improve schools, one finds
general guidelines for intervention and emphasis upon the idea of taking a customized
approach to intervention focused on meeting the needs of the underperforming school
(Datnow & Stringfield, 2000; Fullan, 2001). Customization is in direct conflict with the
development of a “one best system” (Tyack, 1974) approach to improve schools, which is
a type of solution organizations such as SDE’s are best structured to implement (Tyack,
1974) and that which new school accountability policy seemingly mandates.
Recommendations such as working within the local context along with other general tips
for turning around a school do not fit the one best way mold of the SDE and contribute to
a lack of information about the effort and resources needed to improve schools.
In truth, SDE’s simply do not have the capacity (Mintrop, 2002; Lusi, 1997;
Madsen, 1994) to take over large numbers of schools that are not meeting the state
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established performance standards primarily based on student test scores (Madsen, 1994;
Lusi, 1997; Wirt & Kirst, 1997). Limited state capacity (Mintrop, 2002; Lusi, 1997;
Madsen, 1994), increased threats to local leaders in underperforming schools (Mintrop,
2002; Acker-Hocevar & Touchton, 2001), and downward spiraling fiscal situations
within states all make it critical for states and local underperforming schools to work
together, if they are to reach the end-goal of providing an adequate education to all
children within the state (Center on Education Policy, 2003).
The SDE and the underperforming school are dependent upon one another to
accomplish the goals of new school accountability policy. Elmore (1979) suggests that
the real action is where the policy meets the target and how the policy is negotiated
between the two entities. Based on that assertion, it is in the best interest of the SDE and
the underperforming school to develop a working relationship that allows room for
discretion and bargaining during the implementation process, if they are to be partners.
New school accountability policy’s external accountability strategy, as it is implemented
by the SDE, works only if it is connected to the underperforming school’s internal
accountability system. The SDE must work, with the help of the school, to make or to
build the intemal/extemal connection.
Supporting this idea, Lusi (1997) examined this new role of state education
departments and found that, like the internal and external accountability mechanisms of
the school, reform must be managed externally as well as internally. She states, “There
cannot be a disjunction between the principles and goals of the reform effort and the
principles and goals of the [SDE] because one reflects the other.. .[and] how the [SDE’s]
themselves function seems to have important implications for the success or failure of
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complex reform” (Lusi, 1997, p. 157). One of Lusi’s (1997) key findings is that complex
reform requires continual policy refining and development as it is implemented or
negotiated. “Legislation, no matter how thoughtfully written, cannot possibly foresee all
of the problems and challenges that will arise during implementation. It is up to the
[SDE], then, as the implementation arm of the state to make the intelligent adjustments
needed in the implementation process...” (Lusi, 1997, p. 158). The adjustment and
evolution of policy described during implementation makes room for the discretion and
bargaining Elmore (1979) refers to during the implementation process.
The SDE, as the new school accountability implementer, must work to “bridge the
extemal/intemal divide” (Mintrop & MacLellan, 2002, p. 297), much like the role of the
“fixer” described by Lin (2000) and first conceived of by Bardach (1979). Newman,
King, and Rigdon (1997) suggest that the greater the degree to which a reform is
internalized by those in the school community, the more likely the reform is to be
embedded into the school’s “internal accountability system,” and the better the SDE is at
mobilizing and motivating alignment between the internal and external accountability
systems, the more likely it is that stronger SDE interventions will be avoided. During the
early phases of implementation, the SDE is in the position to build individual
relationships within the school and facilitate the internalization of the accountability
system. Because those staff working in the school may only understand the threatening
nature of new school accountability policy itself, a change in understanding of the new
school accountability policy must occur if the SDE and the underperforming school are to
engage in an effective working relationship.
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The way the policy is perceived prior to intervention may make school staff
within underperforming schools feel threatened and undermined professionally (Mintrop,
2002; Acker-Hocevar & Touchton, 2001) and may lead to a throwing up of hands and
giving up or handing over responsibility of the school to the state. This is particularly
salient because the public education system relies upon the professional standards of
administrators and teachers (Meyer & Rowan, 1978; Tyack & Cuban, 1999). By
undermining this professionalism within a school, much of the capacity within the school
is weakened or lost. If the professionals within a school feel threatened, then the chance
of cooperating to bridge the internal and external accountability systems seems unlikely.
The SDE must communicate and take actions that reflect an enabling strategy, otherwise,
the new school accountability policy remains external to the school, and improvement
efforts fall victim to the pitfalls that Bardach (1977) describes in a “system of
deterrence.”

Working Relationships
As with any policy which requires intergovernmental cooperation, during the
early phases of new school accountability two organizations, the SDE and the
underperforming school, must work with one another, and, as they do this, they create a
new context during policy implementation. The context for implementation may be as
complex as the consideration of the values and priorities of each individual within an
organization, or as simple as identifying the broad values embedded within an ever
changing organization. For this reason it is important to identify a guide or framework
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for exploring the working relationship between the SDE and the underperforming school
during the implementation of new school accountability policy.
The SDE and the school lack a working relationship history (Madsen, 1994), and
they are from different organizational contexts, which bring about a variety of possible
glitches in the policy implementation process. They are both beholden to the state;
however, the school must also meet the demands of the local school board, parents, and
community. The SDE must satisfy the state politicians, governor, and legislators, as well
as those in the state board of education. The school is ultimately responsible for
implementing the policies, laws, and regulations of the federal, state, and local
governments. The SDE is responsible for providing information to inform the laws and
regulations, as well as enforcing these same laws. In the end, the SDE, the school, and
the district are all working within the public education system, but the constituencies they
serve, and the requirements of their positions within the system, make them different.
When considering these differences one expects that policy implementation may not be
as streamlined as the policymakers might presume.
The personal and individual relationships the members of the SDE and the school
develop will dictate how policy is negotiated, and whether early intervention successfully
avoids the strong interventions and leads to improvements in educational outcomes.
Indeed, Lin’s (2000) suggestions that solidarity and individual relationships encourage
cooperation and internalization of policy mandates, both come into play in the work of
Bryk and Schneider (2002), who found that a combination of individual relationships
among levels within a school system (e.g., SDE, district and school) as well as the
solidarity of interrelationships among groups (e.g., teachers) contribute to the success of
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improvement initiatives within a school. The art of balancing and appropriately placing
control and individual relationships becomes part of the new school accountability policy
context. The perceptions of the SDE implementers and the underperforming school
educators will dictate the level of cooperation and type of working relationship they will
have with one another. In a study on environmental policy implementation Scheberle
(1997) draws the conclusion that relationships among implementers are important to
policy outcomes. This finding suggests the ability of the SDE to develop a positive
relationship with the underperforming school will have a profound impact on the
implementation process.
If working relationships between the SDE and underperforming school affect the
policy implementation process, then it is necessary to develop a way to examine these
relationships. Scheberle (1997) developed a working relationship typology (Figure 2.1)
that is useful for the study of new school accountability policy for several reasons. First,
it is based on the study of public agencies (environmental protection agencies) that are
working to implement policy that is intended for the public good. Both public education
and the environment are public goods. Public education, like the protection of the
environment, is difficult to look at in purely economic terms. The long term benefits are
difficult to calculate, but are perceived to some degree to be a benefit to society. Hence,
public education is an institution of society that has a degree of public faith, priority, and
trust, which may not be as prevalent in other organizations. Second, within the public
sector the typology is designed to examine the relationship of two distinctly separate, yet
dependent organizations that many policymakers may see as naturally cooperative, and
therefore, overlook the challenges of cooperation between these organizations. Third, to
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understand how these working relationships function, the typology takes into account the
negotiation and bargaining that goes on after a policy is developed and places importance
on the study of this part of the implementation process. Though a policy may be
developed, it is still being honed during implementation, and evidence of this is found in
the working relationship between the SDE and underperforming school. Specifically, the
staff’s perceptions and levels of trust and involvement with one another dictate the type
of working relationship they have.
The key elements in the typology are involvement and trust levels within the
confines of a particular policy. Because a policy is evolving in meaning as it is
implemented (Elmore, 1979), so too are the working relationships between the SDE and
the underperforming school as new school accountability policy is being negotiated,
bargained, and fitted for this new context.
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Figure 2.1: A Typology of Federal and State Working Relationships

Scheberle (1997) designed a working relationship typology to examine just such a
working relationship (Figure 2.1). In this typology Scheberle (1997) identifies two
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essential elements to working relationships, mutual trust and involvement of both
partners. Involvement is defined as the interaction between the two entities. Trust is
defined by Scheberle as the degree to which the other is dedicated to the “intent of the
policy.” The variables of involvement and trust are examined after a policy or program
has been implemented. In the depiction, involvement and trust are the crucial variables in
characterizing a working relationship.
The four types of working relationships Scheberle (1997) identifies are: 1) pulling
together and synergistic, 2) cooperative but autonomous, 3) coming apart with avoidance,
and 4) coming apart and contentious. “Pulling together and synergistic” is high in trust
and involvement between the two entities. According to Scheberle this is the ideal
working relationship. It is characterized as a general willingness of both parties to
contribute, support, and play an active role in the implementation of policy. A
“cooperative but autonomous” relationship is “cooperative, but lonely” (Scheberle, 1997,
p. 20). “Coming apart with avoidance” is a relationship that is shallow at best and
plagued by mistrust. The “Coming apart and contentious” working relationship is
marked by low levels of trust. It requires one of the entities to dominate and relies upon
detailed reporting from the other. Missing from this type of relationship is the notion of
reciprocity, which leads to negative perceptions about one another. The negative
perceptions turn into a vicious, downward spiraling cycle in which one of the two entities
must make a move to break the cycle (Scheberle, 1997).
The variables of trust and involvement lead to identification of the type of
working relationship that exists using this typology. Taking it a step further, a
“motivation attributions model” of trust developed by Mumighan, Malhorta and Weber
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(2003) is used to take into account the uneven playing field between two potential
partners. By identifying strategies that may increase the likelihood of developing a
trusting relationship between two entities such as the SDE and the school, the motivation
attributions model provides characteristics to look for during the process of policy
implementation and the working relationship negotiation. To examine particular
elements of trust, aspects of the motivated attributions model of trust developed by
Mumighan, Malhotra and Weber (2003) specifically takes into account the characteristics
of: feelings of dependence, sincerity of trusting acts, evaluation of ambiguous
information (positively or negatively), perceived likelihood of reciprocity of the other
party, risk reducing behaviors to encourage trust, consistent and clear communication.
Involvement
Involvement in simple terms is the level of interaction between two organizations
(the SDE and the underperforming school) during policy implementation (the early
phases of new school accountability implementation). Scheberle (1997) describes the
element of involvement within the working relationship typology as being defined by
interaction between two entities within the confines of a specific program or policy. Put
in new school accountability terms, involvement is the degree to which the SDE and the
underperforming school work with one another. The assumption behind the involvement
variable is that the greater the involvement between the two during implementation, will
lead to either a cooperative or a micromanaged working relationship. On the other hand,
lower levels of involvement between the two will result in a weaker working relationship.
By adding the trust variable the integrity of involvement may be affected, this is the basic
premise for involvement when considered as part of the working relationship typology.
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Because relationships, like implementation and policy making are in a constant
state of flux or negotiation, to look at a working relationship at one point in time limits
the understanding of the implementation process and the working relationship as it
evolves. Since the SDE switches from a deterrent to an enabling approach during the
early phases of implementation, it is likely that this relationship will change as the SDE
and the underperforming schools interact and discover this change. In fact, past history
of involvement can dictate the terms on which the working relationship is functioning
(Boon & Holmes, 1991; Lindskold, 1978; Swinth, 1967). Additionally, expectations for
future involvement have been found to impact cooperation, and not surprisingly the past
relationship has a strong relationship to these expectations (Mumighan, Malhotra, &
Weber, 2003). If the past and future expectations can influence a working relationship,
then one can take a short leap and surmise that the involvement and interactions during
the actual implementation will also impact the working relationship.
Along with the past, present, and future, the duration of the working relationship
must be taken into consideration. For example, if a coworker does not particularly like a
new consultant, but she knows that the consultant is expected to be working in the office
for a long period of time, she may be more likely to cooperate with the consultant than if
the consultant’s duration at the office were a shorter period of time. Staff members from
the schools hold opinions about the state system of education of which they are a part.
Just the same, staff in the SDE also hold opinions about schools. While new school
accountability policy brings about a new dynamic between the two, it does not negate the
understanding among each that they are involved with one another even if they are only
loosely coupled. Therefore, there is a long term nature to their relationship, which will
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influence the evolution of the working relationship between the SDE and the
underperforming school. There is an expectation that the involvement between the SDE
and the underperforming school is ongoing; however, the level of involvement between
them is more intense during the early intervention portion of new school accountability
implementation.
Involvement and trust are not completely separate from one another. For
example, if involvement between two parties is positive, or at least not negative, then the
history of involvement can increase the likelihood of trust (Boon & Holmes, 1991;
Lindskold, 1978; Swinth, 1967). The history of the relationship between the SDE and the
school becomes an important factor to understanding from where the two are starting. In
fact, the perceptions that the SDE and school have of one another may or may not be
based on actual interaction with members of each others organization. Regardless, these
perceptions before and during the implementation of new school accountability policy
influence the expectations each has for the other. The time dimension of past, present,
and future within the involvement variable is particularly important to the working
relationship between the SDE and the underperforming school.
Trust

Scheberle (1997) defines the level of mutual trust as the degree to which
participants believe others “are dedicated to effectively implementing the policy” (p. 17).
Gambetta (1988) identifies trust as a key element of cooperation, and in the typology
developed by Scheberle (1997) it is trust that is at the foundation of the working
relationship. Fitting this into new school accountability terms, trust is the degree to
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which the SDE and the underperforming school believe the other is authentically working
to improve educational outcomes within the school.
It is an admittedly oversimplified notion of trust. Buck (1998) suggests that
missing from the conceptualization of trust in the Scheberle (1997) study is the idea of
reciprocity. In terms of new school accountability policy, reciprocity means the belief
that the other (SDE or underperforming school) will come through on promises
embedded in the policy (e.g., technical assistance, financial support, political support).
Thus, trust must include the concept of self-perception as well as perception of the other
as they move through early implementation. A back and forth reflection over time will
be more likely to capture the concept of reciprocity within the working relationship
between the SDE and the underperforming school.
Volumes of work on trust have attempted to develop the concept of trust and
cooperation (e.g., Gambetta, 1988; Luhmann, 1988; Axelrod, 1984; Mumighan,
Malhotra, & Weber, 2003; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995) signifying that defining
and researching trust is a prodigious task and suggesting that the Scheberle (1997)
definition may be limited by oversimplification. Still, even a simplistic definition of trust
is worthwhile because the importance of the frontline workers relationship, including
trust and cooperation, and its impact on policy implementation is paramount to the effect
of policy (Lipsky, 1977; Maynard Moody & Musheno, 2003).
Rational models of trust describe incremental acts of trust that grow a trusting
relationship; however, there are acts of trust that are not captured by this type of model
(Kelley, 1979, Kramer, 1999; Luhmann, 1979; Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985). The
switch from a deterrent to an enabling strategy does not set a solid foundation for
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incremental acts of trust over time. Rather, the switch is swift once the threat of being
identified as underperforming becomes a reality, and to take an enabling approach is
seemingly contradictory (and will likely seem like this to those in the school), to the
initial understanding of the policy. Within a short period of time the SDE and school will
need to establish the new enabling strategy and begin on a path toward improvement.
The rapid change in strategy and differences between the two strategies make it unlikely
that a rational, incremental model of trust will fit this policy implementation
circumstance, thus the alternative acts of trust may prove a better fit.
“Irrational” acts of trust occur in every day life, and prove to be an exception to
the traditional rational models. For example, why would a more dependent person make
a decision to trust someone who has more power and authority? It happens all of the
time, and beyond the idea of faith, Weber, Malhorta, and Mumighan (2003) seek to
redefine the idea that this kind of trust is irrational and call attention that “these acts,
rather than being irrational and ineffective, can be crucial to trust development” (Weber,
Malhorta, & Mumighan, 2003, Abstract) through what they call the “motivated
attributions model of trust.”
The motivated attributions model of trust calls attention to characteristics that
may be looked for during the implementation of new school accountability policy. This
model “portrays the trust development process as one that depends on each party’s
interpretations of each other’s actions and which, as a result, may be far from smooth”
(Weber, Malhorta, & Mumighan, 2003, p. 25). This is a natural fit for looking at new
school accountability policy implementation because of the change in strategy that occurs
after the threat of underperformance becomes real.
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The SDE and the underperforming school are in an asymmetrical relationship
with the policy implying that the SDE has authority over the school, while in reality the
expertise for improving the delivery of education (the end-goal of new school
accountability policy) resides within the school (trained, professional educators). So,
though the SDE is technically above the underperforming school in the hierarchy of
public education, the loosely coupled system of public education means that the
connection is not as direct as may be presumed by new school accountability policy.
Therefore, though the SDE is considered to have authority over the underperforming
school, it is actually more of a negotiated relationship between the two.
Initially, one might assume that the underperforming school is more dependent
upon the SDE, but the actual delivery of education occurs at “bottom” of the hierarchy.
The expertise for the improvement of education exists at the lowest level of the public
education system. The SDE relies upon the professionals at the (so-called) bottom of the
hierarchy, and is consequently dependent upon their expertise to improve the delivery of
education. A dynamic of one party being more dependent on the other is often found in a
relationship and the motivated attributions model proposes characteristics of how a
positive working relationship can be developed in just such a situation. Specifically, the
model proposes characteristics that motivate trust between two parties when the playing
field is less than even.
The model proposes characteristics of mutual trust being dependent upon large
acts of trust, which then spur on a mutual trusting relationship. It recognizes each
entity’s understanding of dependency of themselves and the other party, as well as the
impact of self-image and positive reinforcement. Some of the propositions within the
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model that are particularly applicable to new school accountability policy implementation
follow.
First, when there are two parties involved, the party that is most dependent upon
“mutual trust”, or perceives the greatest dependency on the other, will be “more
motivated and more likely to initiate a trusting act” (Weber, Malhotra, & Mumighan,
2003, p. 12). This is an interesting proposition because there may be some confusion, at
least initially, as to who is the more dependent between the SDE and the underperforming
school. The school staff may feel as though they have failed, lost control, and feel
dependent upon the will of the SDE and/or may feel threatened and defensive toward the
SDE during intervention. At the same time the SDE, with limited expertise, resources,
and overall capacity may actually be more dependent upon the trust and cooperation of
the underperforming school in order for the enabling strategy to work.
Second, “as their dependence increases, potential trustors will... evaluate
ambiguous information about the counterpart positively... [and] be more likely to engage
in large acts of trust” (Weber, Malhotra, & Mumighan, 2003, p. 14). As the SDE and the
underperforming school recognize their dependence upon one another and the switch to
an enabling strategy, they begin to expect the other is trustworthy and will reciprocate
acts of trust. Again, the more dependent party must initiate and establish this during
intervention, and because of the need for cooperation with the school, it will likely be the
SDE that will need to take a leap of faith and expect a trusting relationship from the
underperforming school.
Third, the perceptions of actions of the other party are essential. Weber,
Malhotra, and Mumighan, (2003) call attention to “sincere” as opposed to “calculative”
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acts of trust and the perception of the trusting parties with regards to these acts will either
increase or decrease the likelihood of reciprocity and eventually developing a positive
and trusting relationship between the SDE and the underperforming school.
Fourth, “[precipitous trusting acts will accelerate the development of mutual
trust” (Weber, Malhotra, & Mumighan, 2003, p. 17). Besides the point that the SDE is
more reliant upon cooperation and a level of mutual trust with the underperforming
school, the SDE has more experience with implementing new school accountability
policy. Therefore, the SDE is in the position to set the tone of the relationship with the
underperforming school. If the SDE representatives conduct themselves in a trusting
manner from the start, they may accelerate the potential for a positive working
relationship.
Fifth, “[Reciprocity will be more likely when it reinforces a positive self¬
impression or reduces the likelihood of negative self-impression” (Weber, Malhotra, &
Mumighan, 2003, p. 18). This is a key point when looking at the early phases of new
school accountability implementation because studies by Acker-Hocevar and Touchton
(2001) and Mathers and King (2001) report findings that principals and staff within the
underperforming school find the SDE intervention to be threatening and to lower morale
within the school. The “underperforming” designation reinforces a negative self¬
impression. Therefore, for the SDE to gain a functioning level of trust and positive
working relationship, then implementation must include strategies that reduce the initially
negative self-impression brought about by the policy and the underperforming label.
Last, “[c]lear communication can accelerate explicit understandings of each
party’s trusting actions and expectations and increase the likelihood of a mutually
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beneficial trust development process” (Weber, Malhotra, & Mumighan, 2003, p. 21).
Communication is an easy tool that the SDE representatives can use to show their
dependence upon the expertise within the underperforming school and to show
“precipitous acts of trust” to form the basis of a positive working relationship. This
characteristic is supported by the enabling strategy, which entails communication,
individual relationships, and flexibility (Lin, 200), and requires a combination of
availability, openness, and direct communication between the SDE and the
underperforming school. Again, the SDE, having participated in many early
interventions, is in the position to train staff and consultants to use this style of
communication. Clear lines of communication between the SDE and the
underperforming school during the early phases of implementation will facilitate the
potential for forming a positive working relationship.
The motivated attributions model of trust is appropriate for analyzing the working
relationship between the SDE and the underperforming school for several reasons. While
both the SDE and the underperforming school are dependent upon one another for
successful implementation, they are not on a level playing field. Initially, it seems (and
likely feels this way to school staff) that the underperforming school is in the more
vulnerable, and therefore, dependent position. New school accountability policy,
however, places greater control (and responsibility) in the hands of the SDE. The lines of
authority and responsibility to improve the delivery of education point directly to the
SDE, and presumably those in the SDE who ultimately will be held accountable to the
policymakers for achieving the end goal. Without the technical expertise or resources to
improve education and by employing an enabling strategy relying on the professional
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expertise of those within the school, in a sense, the SDE is more dependent upon the
school’s cooperation than the school is upon the SDE. The SDE technically has the most
power at the top of the hierarchy, but is also most vulnerable as the entity that is
ultimately accountable for upholding the state constitutional responsibility to ensure the
delivery of an adequate education to all students. Consequently, the SDE benefits the
most from “mutual trust,” follows proposition one of the mutual attribution model, and
initially takes the greater risk to launch a trusting relationship.
The remaining propositions of the mutual attributions model ring familiar to the
Weick (1979) definition of organization, which is when two separate parties recognize
that to get something that is out of their individual organization’s reach they need the
help of the other and decide to collaborate to accomplish this goal. In a sense,
cooperation is a less formal type of organization and trust is its foundation. Reciprocity,
sincerity, positive self-impressions, perceptions of others, clear communication, and
supporting actions all work together to create a mutually trusting, and cooperative
relationship. It is these factors that provide the framework for investigating the working
relationship between the SDE and the school change during the implementation process.
Levels of trust vary within the underperforming schools. The district’s
representation of the SDE, and the limited (if any) interactions between SDE staff and the
school both impact levels of trust. I expect that cooperation between the SDE and the
underperforming school staff will change over time for three reasons. First, the
presumptions within the new school accountability policy are so strong that initially the
locals may believe being identified as underperforming equates to a hostile take over.
Changing this mindset may be an arduous task for the SDE staff, and the SDE must not
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only talk about cooperation and support, but also take actions that reflect their talk. The
SDE is dependent on the cooperation of the school, because the SDE staff do not have the
skill, expertise, or resources to take over individual schools. Second, as the SDE staff
start being seen as individual people (and as the school staff are seen as individual
people) with expertise and skills, this familiarity improves trust levels. In most cases,
schools and SDE’s are so distant from one another in the organization of the public
education system that they do not even know each other. Last, the way the SDE staff, as
the more dependent party, approach the implementation of new school accountability
dictates the working relationship. The more able the SDE is in triggering Gouldner’s
(1969) norm of reciprocity, the better the working relationship, which may lead to
successful policy implementation.
The limitations of applying the motivated attribution model of trust are its
applications at the organizational level. Trust is a complex concept. At the
organizational level trust is based on the ideas of individuals, sub groups, larger groups
and finally the organization itself. These variables can cause a wide range of outcomes.
Weber, Malhorta, and Mumighan (2003) suggest that it is possible to apply their model at
the organizational level, but it may be difficult to obtain a single idea about the trust level
of an organization. This is where the working relationship typology (Scheberle, 1997)
comes into play. The model, with its limitations, has been applied to organizations. By
using the model to take the “temperature” of the working relationship at different points
in time, and the more detailed conceptualization of trust will help in honing in on trust
levels.
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Risk

Trust in a relationship encompasses some level of risk to the organization. In fact,
Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995) and Luhmann (1988) put forth that cooperation
does not necessarily require trust, but is rather a “willingness to take risk” (Mayer, Davis,
and Schoorman, 1995, p. 712). In the terms that trust is defined by Scheberle (1997), risk
is included in the definition. New school accountability policy implementation represents
risk especially during interventions (Brady, 2003). In fact, I suggest that this risk is
evident at the institutional, organizational, and personal/professional levels for staff
within the SDE and the underperforming school.
Institutionally, a school being thought of as “underperforming” risks undermining
the public’s faith and trust in public education as a pillar of democracy (Tyack & Cuban,
1999). An institution’s credibility largely rests on the public’s perception of its mission,
and what it offers. If the idea of public education as a public good is destabilized, then
the institution itself may be in peril. Though those in the SDE and in the
underperforming school may understand that the public education system has
imperfections, there is an overarching “logic of confidence” (Meyer & Rowan, 1978)
within the public education system, which is “the process of maintaining the other’s face
or identity and thus maintaining the plausibility and legitimacy of the organization itself’
(p. 102).
Organizationally, both the SDE and the underperforming school are at risk under
new school accountability policy. What Meyer and Rowan (1978) refer to as the
“technical core” of the school is being challenged and intervened in by virtual outsiders
(the SDE). New school accountability requires those in the SDE to be experts (Lusi,
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1997) in what goes on in the school. This is a dramatic shift from the administrative and
regulating style of the SDE, and puts the reputation of the SDE at risk of not meeting this
policy demand.
On a personal/professional level new school accountability threatens the
professional, self-regulating nature of teachers, principals and SDE public administrators
(Meyer & Rowan, 1978; Tyack & Cuban, 1999). With all of this risk, in many ways, the
SDE and the underperforming school are on the same team, but are coming from very
different perspectives. The level of risk is considerable for the SDE and the
underperforming school, and therefore trust and cooperation cannot be disentangled.
Acker-Hocevar and Touchton (2001) and Mathers and King (2001) found that reactions
of those in the school are likely to be reactionary and defensive. The profession of
teachers and schooling brings about territorial issues within the local community and
within the profession of teaching (O’Day, 2002).
Early phases of new school accountability must incorporate strategies to gain the
trust of those in the school and community, despite the risk. The reality and explanation
of the school accountability process may be overlooked for the possible end result of
strong interventions such as take over or reconstitution looming in the air. It becomes a
threatening situation for schools and may naturally hinder the collaborative spirit between
the SDE and the school.

Policy Incentives v. Contextual Trust
The idea of incentives is often found in the literature on policy and
implementation. In much of the policy literature there is an implicit, and sometimes
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explicit assumption that effective implementation of policy often has more to do with
getting the incentives right than anything else (Bardach, 1977; Stoker, 1999). Stoker
(1999) clearly identifies a need for incentives to motivate the target group or those
responsible for implementing policy to accomplish the end goals of a policy. Logically,
this makes sense, and to a degree is probably true.
While incentives may be a catalyst for change, I suggest that the longevity of a
change may additionally be dependent on the level of trust and involvement between the
implementers and the targets of policy implementation. The idea of trust between
organizations builds upon the research of Lin (2000), which suggests that incentives are
important, but additionally, the organizational context is important. The context is where
one finds trust and involvement or the working relationship. When a policy requires two
organizations to cooperate in a new way, a new context is created, and the relationship
and levels of trust between the two organizations become embedded in this new context.
Stoker (1991) emphasizes incentives as a tool to maintain policy intent. He notes
that it is incentives that will bring “reluctant partners” to the bargaining table, because the
default mode within an organization is to continue to adhere to the organization’s current
practices and values. The example he provides is the payment of federal taxes. The
assumption is that no one wants to pay taxes out of their pockets, but the desire to avoid
punishment by the Internal Revenue Service motivates people to pay their taxes to avoid
the risk of the consequences if they did not pay them. Bardach (1977) describe a similar
type of “deterrent” system which functions on disincentives if a policy is not followed.
This type of policy is like new school accountability policy. The imperative to improve
educational outcomes within a school is created by the strong desire to maintain local
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control and avoid the scrutiny of the state (SDE). The challenge that Bardach (1977)
points to is what happens once a target, in this case the school, does not meet the
improvement goals. The system of deterrence loses its incentive (or disincentive).
Stoker (1991) implies that when one is caught the swift and simple punishment of
a fine may be enough to get the taxpayer back on track. At that point, the metaphor loses
its currency when considering new school accountability, because the remedy is not
swift, nor is it simple. Once a school is underperforming the motivation from the threat
of publicly being declared underperforming is over. Therefore, a new motivation and
support must be developed for new school accountability policy to be effective. This is
the point where the legislation is less clear. Although it is true that there are increasing
levels of intervention (or threats) that lessen local control, if a school does not respond to
initial supports this may not be enough incentive for those particular schools to change or
alter their delivery of education. Motivation or incentive to change cannot only come
from the threat of further intervention, because it does nothing to empower or enable staff
in the schools. Also it creates a situation where the SDE must become increasingly more
involved in running the school, something an SDE is organizationally ill-suited to do.
Also, if a school staff had been really working to improve educational outcomes (test
scores) to no avail, the SDE intervening within the school may find a low morale, and a
deficient level of motivation among staff (Acker-Hocevar & Touchton, 2001; Mathers &
King, 2001), leading to a negative self-perception. Since the SDE needs the cooperation
and the expertise of those from within the school, the policy, which creates a scenario
where professional power is taken away and morale within the school is lowered, runs
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counter to the direction and type of working relationship the SDE will need in order to
accomplish the intended policy outcome. A change in context is needed.
Lin’s (2000) ideas about the context in which a policy is implemented become
important during the study of the beginning of intervention because an SDE is in a
position to build new incentives by translating the federal and state requirements into the
existing values and context of the underperforming school. The SDE is at once the
arbitrator, the translator, and the advocate for the underperforming school. As the SDE
achieves successes in these roles, new incentives to comply with new school
accountability policy will be created, but underlying all of these roles and incentives is
the concept of a trusting relationship between the school and the SDE. The relationship
may not be strong between the two organizations, but will likely be built on the
interpersonal relationships between the SDE representative and the underperforming
school leaders and staff. Cooperation in a working relationship between the two requires
a level of trust, common goals, shared values, and the right people forging the right
relationships (Galvin & Fauske, 2000).
In the field of policy analysis the emphasis on incentives is appropriate because
incentives are (possibly) within the domain that policymakers and implementers may
actually control. Cooperation is dependent upon levels of trust and involvement, which
are more elusive and less easy to dictate within written policy or standardized
implementation procedures. One must, therefore, look at the implementation process to
gain insight into the role of these characteristics. Incentives and cooperation within
policy are not necessarily mutually exclusive (Weber, Malhorta & Mumighan, 2003),
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without some level of trust between the policymakers and the targets, the implementation
of policy disintegrates.
Even those who believe incentives are important for policy implementation
mention trust as an element of any relationship (e.g., Bardach, 1977; Lin, 2000;
Scheberle, 1997; Stoker, 1999). Fullan (1991) calls the idea of attempting a complete
policy solution at the policy maker level a “rational fallacy.” Lin (2000) describes the
rational fallacy of incentives as moving and changing targets when she notes:
No magic bullet exists for implementation. No particular set of
values or incentives is best suited to the successful implementation
of programs... in general. Instead, the ability of any particular set
of organizational practices and beliefs to foster the successful
implementation of a program can only be measured in terms of
incentives it provides, at any particular time, for staff & clients to
participate in the program, and in terms of the match between
existing institutional values and the program activities they will
justify.
(Lin, 2000, p. 128)
While policy is often heralded as successful due to the tangible incentives, it does
not preclude the need for the intangible trust, especially in a context that is without (at
least initially) any real financial, professional, or organizational (as it exists before state
intervention) incentives to cooperate with the SDE. On the other hand, there are
organizational and possibly even professional incentives for members of the SDE to
participate. The limited capacity of the SDE to take over a school is incentive enough to
build on any existing strengths within the school in order to avoid having to take the most
drastic of actions of strong interventions, which requires resources and capacity the SDE
is unlikely to possess and implies a failure of the deterrent policy. The more those within
the SDE recognize the need to avert takeovers, the stronger the incentive or
organizational value and priority placed upon cooperating with those in the school to
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improve educational outcomes. As Hanushek and Raymond (2002) note, “[m]uch less
information is available about the range and scope of reactions to improve
performance.. .the exact nature of the response.. .is uncertain” (pp. 30-31). The missing
variable within any context for implementation is the understanding of the individual and
unique situation.

Conclusion
The dynamics of the working relationship between the school and the SDE are
essential to understanding the process of implementing “new accountability” systems.
Kelley (2000) asserts that, “... in practice, the student, the classroom, the school, the
district, and the policy environment are co-equal and interdependent partners in the
education and policy system” (p. 79). However, Cuban (2004) finds that the history of
the U.S. public education system reveals a loosely structured organization in which these
entities (SDE, district, and school) are more prone to act as rivals rather than partners.
New school accountability requires state control over the school, and compliance and
commitment from the school educators, both of which the SDE does not have the
perceived authority or capacity to accomplish alone.
The gap between the policy assumptions about the structure of the education
system, and the reality of how it is organized requires the SDE and the underperforming
school to move from a deterrent strategy to an enabling strategy that uses the assets of the
individual school. This change to an enabling strategy relies upon the collaboration of
the underperforming school in order to have a functioning working relationship.
Limitations of information during the early phases of new school accountability
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contribute to the complexity of implementation. Further, Giroux (1992) states that
participants in collaboration...
[m]ust be encouraged to cross ideological and political borders as a
way of furthering the limits of their own understanding in a setting
that is pedagogically safe and socially nurturing rather than
authoritarian and infused with suffocating smugness of certain
political correctness.
(Giroux, 1992, p. 33)
Creating this environment takes time and resources the SDE and the
underperforming school may not have under the short timelines for improvement in the
state and federal (NCLB) guidelines. Lin (2000) identifies the need for what Bardach
(1977) calls a “fixer,” or what might be better described as an ambassador of the policy,
as essential to implementing policy. The foundation for this role is a trusting relationship
between the SDE (ambassador/translator) and the underperforming school (target). Lin
(2000) notes:
The challenge this points to is that of creating trust between those
who ... monitor the policy and ...the target groups who feel its
effects. Staff and policy targets do not resist policy, or each other,
simply out of natural orneriness. Instead they do so because,
directly or indirectly, program mandates or sanctions force them to
abandon coping strategies that at least have the virtues of
familiarity and predictability.
(Lin, 2000, p. 166)
Every state in the union is developing and implementing new school
accountability policy. Yet, we know very little about how an SDE and a school function
under such policy. It is time to shed some light upon the implementation of new school
accountability policy. If early strategic and diagnostic interventions of a school
accountability system are built around these known assumptions about collaboration and
unique characteristics of individual organizations within the public education system,
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then moving underperforming schools into the strongest interventions may be averted.
Because of the established limited capacity of the SDE's (Mintrop, 2002; Lusi, 1997;
Madsen, 1994), it is in the state’s best interest to have successful mild and moderate
interventions requiring fewer of the scarce SDE’s accountability resources.
Overcoming the threat of the policy and facing the reality of the capacity of the
state and the structure of the public education system sums up the challenges of
implementing new school accountability policy. The coercive nature of a “new
accountability’ system adds to the difficulty (Mintrop, 2002). Becher (1989) states:
Coercion would seem a prompt and efficient means of putting any
proposal into effect...[but] those who are required to carry out the
resulting policies have no sense of ownership of them.... They
may elect to ignore them or at best to interest them in ways that
serve their own interests.
(Becher, 1989, p. 54)
School ownership of the goals of new school accountability policy is essential because is
it is more likely to impact the “technical core” of the school that is created and controlled
by the professional educators with the school and classrooms.
Efficiency is the cornerstone of the bureaucratic assumptions within the policy,
but it may not yield intended result of an improved, high quality system of education6.
O’Day (2002) adds to this idea by specifically addressing the innate challenge of new
school accountability policy.
The heart of the issue is the problematic relationship between
external and internal sources of control and the implications of this
relationship for the organizational learning and improvement.
Organizational systems have several mechanisms at their disposal
to control the behavior of individuals and subunits.
(O’Day, 2002, p. 3)
6 Some critics of new school accountability believe that the policy is intended to privatize the public
education system. This research, however, is focused on the existing public education system and
improvement of the delivery of education within that system.
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Efficient and rational policy, like new school accountability, omits the social and
human dynamic that makes up the public education system. The onus is upon the SDE to
develop a system of accountability that accommodates this dynamic between the external
and internal systems. Specific research on new school accountability, and how this
rational policy is injected within the human/social dynamic is needed.
By examining the early processes and dynamics between the state and the school,
the voices of the practitioners experiencing the beginning of intervention are added to the
discussion of new school accountability policy and intervention into underperforming
schools. Given the scarce resources of time and money along with the limited capacity of
the state, collaboration with the underperforming school and respect, without
“smugness,” are important ingredients for improving the educational outcomes in all
schools, especially underperforming schools. The working relationship between the SDE
and the underperforming school is the informal organization or context in which the two
are functioning during the beginning of intervention of new school accountability policy.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY

This research is on the critical beginning of new school accountability
implementation. The aim of the study is to find out more about the policy
implementation process during the earliest phases of new school accountability from the
perspective of those in the SDE and the underperforming school. Falling in line with
phenomenological methodologies which are used to “...attempt to understand the
meaning of events and interactions to ordinary people in particular situations” (Bogdan &
Biklen, 1982, p. 31), the study is designed to understand how the working relationship
between the SDE staff and the underperforming school staff changes as new school
accountability policy is implemented. It strives to improve our understanding of the
meanings participants place on elements of the policy during the implementation process
and to identity elements that support or hamper new school accountability policy.
The assumptions at the foundation of this inquiry are that the working relationship
between the SDE and the underperforming school impact the new school accountability
policy implementation process, and that rather than a command and control style of
implementation implied within the policy, implementation requires negotiation and
bargaining between the SDE and underperforming school at the point of implementation
or the “street level.”
To understand this working relationship, it is necessary to explore the perceptions
the SDE staff and the underperforming school staff have of one another, the history of
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their relationship, and the levels of involvement and of trust in early intervention and
implementation. This section provides information on the research design and
methodology used to obtain these perceptions and how the working relationship changes
as new school accountability policy is implemented.
All names and places, with the exception of the state where this research took
place, have been changed to provide anonymity to interview participants.

Research Questions
A few things stand out with regard to this kind of research. First, it is important
to understand the perceptions of the individuals engaged in implementing new school
accountability policy, including both SDE officials and the “target group,” which include
the educators in the underperforming schools, and indirectly administrators in the districts
in which the underperforming schools reside. The context of policy implementation is
part of the essence of this study, and it is therefore necessary to examine these
perceptions within their natural setting. For this reason, I have chosen to conduct an
interpretive, phenomenological study. Both the experiences of those implementing new
school accountability policy and the structure of the policy implementation process are
the focal points of this qualitative study. Within this context I will focus on the following
questions: 1) how do the SDE and the underperforming school understand their
respective roles with regards to the implementation of new school accountability policy;
2) what is new about the relationship between the SDE and the underperforming school;
3) how do the SDE and underperforming school understand and perceive each other
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within the new context; 4) how has the relationship changed over time; and 5) what has
changed the relationship over time?
Throughout the exploration for answers to these questions, structure and
experience are central to this research, as within any phenomenological study. As Patton
(1990) states,
...[the] essences [of shared meaning] are the core meanings mutually
understood through phenomenon commonly experienced.
The
experiences of different people are bracketed, and analyzed, and compared
to identify the essences of the phenomenon...
(p. 70)
The perceptions of the staff within the SDE and the underperforming school provide
information on how new school accountability policy is understood and how this
understanding changes for each as the policy is implemented.

Unit of Analysis
The phenomenon under study is the interaction between the actors within the SDE
and the underperforming school during the earliest phases of state intervention and the
perceptions each has of one another. This encompasses the actual interactions,
communications and perceptions of one another at different points in this process.
The “earliest phases” of new school accountability intervention means the
interaction between the SDE and the school after a school has been identified,
investigated, and gone through a diagnostic phase (see Table 2.1). Specifically, this
occurs when a school: 1) does not meet established state performance criteria, 2) meets
the SDE’s “strategic criteria” for state investigation of the school, and 3) is found to be
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underperforming after the investigation and meets the criteria for state intervention,
moving the school into the diagnostic intervention phase.
The study examines the reflections of two underperforming schools in the same
school district within the state of Massachusetts toward new school accountability policy.
Interviews were conducted with principals and teachers at these schools: Alfred
Elementary and Babson Elementary. District administrators, who participate in school
improvement efforts in the Charlesburg Public School District, were also interviewed as
part of the local level interviews. At the state level, administrators from the
Massachusetts Department of Education, whose primary function is early intervention,
underperforming schools, and school improvement, were interviewed. In addition,
interviews were conducted with members of ABC Consulting, which is a consulting firm
that contracts with the Massachusetts Department of Education on many of the early
intervention activities.
In Massachusetts early intervention is broken into two stages: the School Panel
Review and the Fact Finding Review. The School Panel Review is much like the

strategic criteria described in Table 2.1 and is used “[t]o assist the Commissioner in
determining whether state intervention is needed to guide improvement efforts in schools
where students' MCAS [Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System] performance
is critically low and no trend toward improved student performance is evident from
MCAS data” (Massachusetts Department of Education, Unknown). The School Review
Panel, made up of administrators and educators from other Massachusetts school
districts, submits a report to the Massachusetts Commissioner of Education. The
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Commissioner then makes a determination on the status of the school based on
information from this report.
If the Commissioner decides that a school is indeed “underperforming” then it
must go through the diagnostic intervention called the Fact Finding Review. During this
longer and more in-depth visit, contractors, who represent the DOE (members of ABC
Consulting), with support from practitioners (from schools and districts that are outside
of the district being intervened in), identify strengths and weaknesses that are used to
inform the school improvement plan process.
Information from the Fact Finding Review is used during the diagnostic and
corrective intervention, which includes a school improvement planning process called the
Performance Improvement Mapping (PIM). PIM is a series of intensive technical

assistance sessions for underperforming school teams that include the principal and are
convened by the DOE. All underperforming schools are required to attend. District
representatives also attend the PIM training but are generally not a part of a particular
team, though they may serve as team facilitators. The outcome of the PIM training is to
equip school teams with improvement tools based on data driven decision making.
School teams are then expected to return to their schools and develop a school
improvement plan using the tenets of PIM. The point when a school is identified as
being potentially underperforming, diagnosed as underperforming, and provided
technical assistance or from the School Panel Review, to the Fact Finding Review to the
PIM encompasses the “earliest phases” of new school accountability policy
implementation in Massachusetts.
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The study of early intervention within two Massachusetts elementary schools
(Alfred Elementary and Babson Elementary) was conducted in a single public school
district (Charlesburg Public School District) from February through November 2004.
The observations of four School Panel Reviews occurred in three districts including the
Charlesburg District from February through March 2004. Two of the School Panel
Reviews were conducted in the Charlesburg district in which the two elementary schools
selected for study reside. One of the elementary School Panel Reviews observed ended
up being one of the elementary schools that was selected for interviews (Babson
Elementary). Each School Panel Review lasted for two days. One Fact Finding Review
was observed in May 2004 in the Charlesburg District. The Fact Finding Review lasted
for four consecutive days. Interviews of the participants occurred between September
and November 2004. Seventeen interviews were conducted ranging from 35 minutes to
180 minutes in length. The average interview lasted approximately 60 minutes. An
estimated 17 hours of interviews were conducted in person, and over the phone.
In pursuit of understanding the relationships among participants during the
earliest phases of new school accountability, the research project is limited to the
examination of the relationship between the state and two underperforming elementary
schools (Alfred Elementary and Babson Elementary). Alfred Elementary went under
review in the 2003 underperforming school review cycle, had been through the early
intervention and was being “monitored” by the DOE. The second school, Babson
Elementary, was selected from the 2004 underperforming school review cycle. Babson
Elementary went through the School Panel Review, the Fact Finding Review in 2004
(during the year of time of this research), and was awaiting the approval of their PIM
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(school improvement) plan by the Massachusetts Board of Education at the time of the
study.
The decision to focus on two schools was made for several reasons. First, by
limiting the number of schools studied, I hoped to gain a deeper insight to the relationship
and perceptions of participants through in-depth interviews and surveys, thus increasing
my ability to see the intricacies of this interaction. As Seidman (1991) notes, “the
method of in-depth, phenomenological interviewing applied to a sample of participants
who all experience similar structural and social conditions gives enormous power to the
stories of a relatively few participants” (p. 45). Second, there is a limited pool of
underperforming schools to choose from within Massachusetts. Only 26 schools have
been declared underperforming since the first reviews/interventions (2000) and of those
12 are elementary schools. Two elementary schools make up nearly 10% of the
underperforming schools within the state, and 17 % of the underperforming elementary
schools within Massachusetts.
In the 2003 and 2004 review cycles there were more elementary schools selected
for visits than any other type of school. This may be due in part to the greater numbers of
elementary schools within the state and may signal that the Massachusetts DOE is
focusing on this segment of the target population as an overall strategy (see Table 3.1).
Because there are more elementary schools participating in the process, the likelihood of
finding two elementary schools that were willing to participate in the study was greater.
Since the DOE has reviewed a number of elementary schools, with the additional
experience of working with elementary schools, there may be a better established
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process, and it may be more indicative of the general characteristics of developing a
working relationship when implementing new school accountability policy.
The timeframe is limited to two years of a process that has been officially
occurring for four years,1 because a significant policy change occurred in the 2002-2003
academic year (as of the 2003 underperforming school review year). In that academic
year, districts with high numbers of underperforming schools were provided with state
funding for a school support specialist (specialist) to be placed in the district and
considered an employee of the state, who supports schools in need of improvement and
underperforming schools both in terms of the federal No Child Left Behind Act, 2001
(NCLB) and the state Massachusetts Education Reform, 1993 (MERA) legislation. The
specialist strategy has more than likely altered the relationship between the state and the
school. Therefore examination of the relationship before and after the specialist, may be
inconsistent. The inconsistency has been accounted for by limiting the research to the
2003 and 2004 underperforming review cycles, which, at the time of this research,
encompassed all of the cycles that occurred after the specialist strategy was implemented.
Table 3.1: Massachusetts Schools Visited and Declared Underperforming,
by Year, by Type
Total

Elementary

Visited

UPS

Visited

UPS

TOTAL

61

26

23

12

2000
2001
2002
2003
2004

8

4
0
6
8
8

1

0
0
1
6
5

11
12
14
16

0
3
9
10

High

Middle2

;

Visited

UPS

Visited

UPS

33

12

5

2

7

4
0
3
2
3

0

0
0
2
0
0

10
7
3
6

1
2
2
0

UPS is the abbreviation for schools declared underperforming school.

1 The Underperforming School Review process was first piloted in the 1999-2000 academic year.
However, the official beginning of these reviews is considered to be in the 2000-2001 academic year.
2 There are four kindergartens through eighth grade schools that have been visited, and one has been
declared underperforming. The schools are counted in the “middle” school category.
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In the past two cycles 15 schools have been declared underperforming and of
those 11 are elementary schools. In fact, all but one of the elementary schools declared
underperforming have been designated underperforming in the past two cycles (See
Figure 3.1). The specialist strategy and the concentration upon elementary schools have
coincided, and make the elementary school level the best fit for studying the early phases
of new school accountability policy.

Figure 3.1: 2000-2004 Massachusetts Schools Declared Underperforming,
by Type, by Year

The school interviews were conducted in Alfred Elementary and Babson
Elementary. Each school was declared underperforming by the Massachusetts
Commissioner of Education. To get an idea of how perceptions change over time, each
individual school was chosen on the basis of being declared underperforming in a
different academic year to capture how the new school accountability policy “settles.”
Alfred Elementary School participated in the 2003 underperforming review cycle, and
Babson Elementary School participated in the more recent 2004 underperforming review
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cycle. By selecting schools from two different review cycles, I mean to examine the
threat of state intervention that principals (Acker-Hocevar & Touchton, 2001) feel early
in the process, and to observe how the working relationship with the SDE evolves as time
and different phases of intervention are understood over time. Moreover, this allows for
a time dimension to be added to Scheberle’s (1997) working relationship typology.
Limitations
The rationale for selecting schools that have been declared underperforming in
different academic years is to capture the differences in involvement and trust that
emerge as the relationship evolves between the school and the state. The purpose of the
method is to capture a point in time, and fit within time constraints of the research. A
limitation of this approach is that each school setting is unique. As Salomon (1991) finds
that,
Classrooms (schools, families, therapies, cultures) are complex,
often nested conglomerates of interdependent variables, events,
perceptions, attitudes, expectations, and behaviors and thus cannot
be approached in the same way that a study of single events and
single variables can.
(p. 1)

Another limitation to selecting schools from different review periods is that it
requires staff from schools declared underperforming in a previous year to recollect how
they felt at different points in time. Weick (2001) calls attention to the idea that people
tend to rationalize past actions or decisions into a sense making framework after the fact
and may ignore the complexities and unknown that was present when they were taking
the action or making the decision. This limitation, however, may be lessened because
schools are being selected two different points in time, so that information on the
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immediate reaction to SDE intervention is mostly taken from the underperforming school
declared underperforming in the 2004 underperforming school review cycle. The
underperforming school selected from the 2003 underperforming school review cycle
was in the second year of SDE intervention and therefore provides a view point that
allows participates to reflect upon their perceptions during early intervention and make
sense of the process in retrospect (Weick, 2001).
The interviews of teachers in Alfred Elementary and Babson Elementary reveal
different dispositions and attitudes toward the state, which may or may not be attributed
to the difference in time. For example, Alfred Elementary, having been declared
underperforming a year prior to Babson Elementary, certainly yielded answers to
questions with more of a reflective and sense-making disposition.
Additionally, it is sometimes challenging for teachers to distinguish between the
different points in time (i.e. the School Panel Review versus the Fact Finding Review).
Participants saw both as simply a “state visit.” Babson Elementary participants had
similar challenges, but because it was relatively recent, the principal and teachers had
more clarity about the different visits and their feelings during the different points in
time.

Participants
The participants for this study are those who participate in the beginning of
intervention at the state and the local level. They fall into two broad categories: state
level participants, and local level participants.
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State Level Participants
Four members of the Massachusetts Department of Education Accountability and
Targeted Assistance Cluster (DOE) were interviewed along with three members of the
consulting firm ABC Consulting who: provide staffing, write reports for the panel, and
conduct the bulk of the fact-finding reviews of underperforming schools.
At the DOE the School Accountability and Targeted Assistance (ATA) Cluster is
the part of the organization responsible for all aspects of the beginning of intervention.
Interviews were conducted with four DOE staff including: 1) Daphne, the Director of
School Performance Evaluation, who coordinates all aspects of the underperforming
school reviews; 2) Debra, the Administrator for School and District Planning Support,
who provides planning and support to the school support specialists within the district; 3)
Dianne, a DOE Coordinator, who acts as a DOE liaison and monitor by visiting schools
during the reviews and monitoring them after they have been declared underperforming;
and 4) Dan, the DOE liaison, who also plays the role of DOE monitor. It is worthy of
noting that many of the DOE staff I interviewed played a multitude of roles within ATA
and their titles were modified accordingly. However, the titles used here are appropriate
to their roles and participation in the beginning of intervention.
Interviews with the contractors from ABC Consulting, who work with the DOE
on early intervention were also conducted. Specifically, interviews were conducted with:
1) Christie, the Director of Resource Development, who is the main contact for the DOE
and coordinates the school accountability work with the DOE, and who also acts as a
Chairperson on School Panel Reviews and Fact Finding Reviews; 2) Chuck, a
subcontractor of the consulting group, who is a retired principal and who has served as a
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chairperson on many school panel and fact finding reviews over the past three years; and
3) Caitlin, a subcontractor, who serves as a staff person on School Panel and Fact Finding
Reviews and who is the primary report writer for these reviews. The ABC consulting
group, like many consulting groups, uses a wide array of subcontractors with specialized
skills and experiences who are contracted with on an “as needed” basis. When hired on
projects, however, they are representing ABC Consulting.
Interviews with participants at the DOE and ABC Consulting were conducted
with members who are most active in the beginning of intervention. The DOE uses ABC
Consulting to contract out services that enhance the skills and capacity of the DOE. ABC
Consulting offers the DOE expertise in dealing with evaluations and issues of school
accountability, the ability to expand the number of people visiting schools during the time
and labor intensive periods of early intervention, and contract with former principals,
superintendents and highly skilled educators who have a more in-depth understanding of
schools and how they function than the DOE staff. These people are the “face” of the
state and therefore, their actions during the beginning of intervention become the
foundation of the working relationship between the SDE and the underperforming school.
Local Level Participants
The local level participants consist of both those from the district and the
underperforming school. Participants interviewed at the local level include: school
support specialists, district administrators, school principals, and teachers.
Participants from within the district provide a slightly different perspective on the
SDE than those in the school. District employees presumably work with the DOE in
relation to all schools that are underperforming within their district. Therefore at a
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minimum the district/SDE relationship has been on going since 2000 when new school
accountability policy was first implemented. The relationship between the district and
the DOE has had a longer period to develop and the implementation of the specialist
strategy may have strengthened the connection between the DOE and the district. As
with many of the larger urban districts within Massachusetts, there are several
underperforming schools within the selected Charlesburg District. Consequently, over
the years the Charlesburg District staff and DOE staff have more familiarity with one
another because they have been interacting since the first underperforming school review
cycle.
School support specialists are paid for by the DOE and are technically employees
of the DOE who work in their designated district. To those in the district the specialist
appears to be a district employee because one of the requirements of the specialist is to
understand the district and therefore the specialists have worked in the district for many
years. An example of how ingrained the specialist position is within the district is: when
the superintendent of the Charlesburg District was contacted for an interview for this
research, his response that the district person and his representative in charge of
underperforming schools was one of the Charlesburg school support specialists.
Interviews were conducted with the two school support specialists (Stan and
Sandy). Both specialists were long time veterans of the district. They have each served
in many capacities from teacher, to counselor, to curriculum director, to principal, to
assistant superintendent. Originally, the plan was to interview the Superintendent as
well, but as mentioned, after contacting him, he recommended I speak with Stan, who
represents the district on the topic of school accountability.
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Traditionally, those in the district are guides for those in the school, especially
with regard to state compliance. Consequently, the perspective of participants at the
district level sets the tone, and informs some of the perceptions that participants in the
underperforming schools may have about the SDE. Because the Massachusetts DOE
funded specialist positions in the ten districts that have the majority of the
underperforming schools within the state, the specialist strategy proves to be an important
link in developing a working relationship between the state and local levels. The
specialist strategy enhances the ability of the state to build a “bridge” to align the external
and internal accountability systems.
Underperforming school administrators and teachers working with the DOE staff
were interviewed to provide the school level perspective. Each of the underperforming
elementary school principals in Charlesburg were contacted via email and post mail.
Two principals expressed interest in participating in the research project. Coincidentally
V

^

the two schools were from the 2003 (Alfred Elementary) and 2004 (Babson Elementary)
underperforming review cycles. From there the principals within each of the schools
gave permission to contact other teachers within the school.
In both Alfred Elementary and Babson Elementary the principals provided the
names of many staff who were involved in some capacity of the school improvement
planning. Though one might assume that these would be the staff working with the DOE,
this was not always the case. The degree to which the teachers interacted with the state
had some variation.
Still, the teachers who were working the most with the DOE (e.g., in the PIM
process) set the tone for intervention and the attitudes in the school towards DOE. The
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variation in the levels of involvement with the DOE among the teachers proved to be a
good way to check information and opinions to guard “against drawing easy conclusions”
(Seidman, 1991, p. 44) and to support the reliability of the information that is gathered.

Participant Selection
The study focuses on two elementary schools (Alfred Elementary and Babson
Elementary) from the same district (Charlesburg District) in the state of Massachusetts.
Massachusetts was selected because it has had a statutory mandate for new school
accountability policy since 1993 and because the DOE has been a front runner in
complying with the accountability requirements of the federal No Child Left Behind Act,
2001(NCLB) (Olson, 2003). The state began implementing a system of new school
accountability prior to the passage of the NCLB, and it has a school accountability
infrastructure that other states may still be developing. The state’s policy is similar to the
requirements in the NCLB, and, in areas where it is deficient, the Massachusetts DOE has
worked to comply with the federal requirements.
I selected a state with this type of pre-existing infrastructure in the hope that it
may have a more developed system that those from which states that are not as far along
in implementation might be able to learn. The statutory mandate shows the evidence of
commitment from politicians and policymakers within the state. The commitment is
reflected in the thoughtful and evolving new school accountability policy being
implemented by the DOE. Another reason for selecting a state with more implementation
experience is that there are more underperforming schools to select from.
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Table 3.2: Summary of Participants
Level

Name

| State Level
(n=7)
Daphne

Title

Organization

-

Director of School Performance
Evaluation

Department of
Education

Debra

Administrator for school and
district planning support

Department of
Education

Dianne

DOE Coordinator

Department of
Education

Dan

Underperforming School Liaison

Department of
Education

Christie

Director of Resource
Development/Panel Chair

ABC Consulting

Chuck

Panel Chair

ABC Consulting

Caitlin

Panelist/Report Writer

ABC Consulting

school support specialist
(specialist)

Charlesburg District

Sandy

school support specialist
(specialist)

Charlesburg District

Mr. Arnold

Principal

Alfred Elementary

Anita

Teacher

Alfred Elementary

Amelia

Teacher

Alfred Elementary

Adeline

Teacher

Alfred Elementary

Ms. Beth

Principal

Babson Elementary

Brenda

Teacher

Babson Elementary

Bridget

Teacher

Babson Elementary

Barbara

Teacher

Babson Elementary

Local Level
Stan

(n=10)

State Department of Education
The SDE selected is the Massachusetts Department of Education (DOE). The
DOE implemented the first round of site visits in the 1999-2000 academic year (2000
piloted underperforming school review cycle). In the first year the process was piloted
(2000) two schools were found to be underperforming, and since being implemented
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(2001- 2004) an additional 24 schools have been found to be underperforming for a total
of 26 underperforming schools. Table 3.3 shows the schools visited between 2000 and
2004.
Table 3.3: Massachusetts Schools Selected for Review and
Declared Underperforming, 2000-2004
_
Selected for a School Panel Review
Declared Underperforming

Total

Elementary

Middle3

High

61

23

33

5

26

12

12

2

At both the School Panel Reviews and the longer Fact Finding Reviews, I gained
permission to observe the process from the Associate Commissioner of the
Accountability and Targeted Assistance Cluster in the DOE. In total I observed four of
the two-day School Panel Reviews in three different school districts, and one of the fourday Fact Finding Reviews. At each of the reviews I observed, I was presented as a
neutral observer of the state team visits to the school during the 2004 reviews.
Permission to observe all of the reviews was sought from the DOE, the Panel Chairs from
ABC Consulting, the district superintendent, and the underperforming school principals.
Interviews conducted with representatives of the Massachusetts DOE were selfdesignated into one of the following categories: 1) DOE Staff or Contractor, who is
directly involved with the underperforming school (visits the school); 2) DOE employee
or Contractor, who primarily coordinates or manages the school accountability process;
or 3) DOE or contractor employees, who do both coordination, management and visit the
schools.

3 Schools that were designated kindergarten through eighth grade (K-8) have been counted with the
“middle” school category. Three of these (K-8) schools are from the Lawrence School District and one is
from the Springfield School District.
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Table 3.4: State Interview Participants, by Category of Involvement
in Early Intervention
Visits Schools (Directly
Involved)

Coordinator/
Management

Both
(V isit/Coordinate)

Total

DOE

1

2

1

4

Contractor
(ABC Consulting)

2

0

1

3

Total

3

2

2

7

District
The Charlesburg District was chosen for a number of reasons. First, it is a mid¬
size urban district with more than two underperforming schools. Second, it was the
district in which I conducted two School Panel Review observations and one Fact
Finding Review observation, so I was more familiar with the district. Third, the district
had recently undergone the state’s district accountability review, which made data on the
district and background information readily available. Fourth, while the district suffers
from many of the plights of an urban district, its public education system is not in
immediate danger of being taken over by the DOE for academic reasons. Of those 26
schools that have declared underperforming, 5 are in districts that are in danger of, or in
the recent past already have been, intervened in by the state4. Last, it was one of only
two districts have more than two underperforming elementary schools.
The combination of potential takeover and a large enough sample of
underperforming elementary schools proved to be somewhat rare, and narrowed down the
potential districts. Access to district personnel that have a familiarity with all levels of

4 Some of the school districts that have faced state intervention, were not intervened in because of new
school accountability policy, however, this prior relationship with the state may alter the findings. For this
reason schools will not be selected from these districts.
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those in the public schools was an invaluable characteristic of the mid-size urban district
and the district specialists agreed to participate in the study.
Underperforming Schools
Once permission for the research at the district level was obtained, all of the
underperforming elementary schools were contacted to see if there was interest in
participating in the study. Three of the elementary school principals expressed interest,
and two of those expressed a more serious interest by scheduling appointments for
interviews. The two elementary schools in some ways were self-selected based on their
interest to participate. They each came from the appropriate underperforming school
review cycle (Alfred Elementary from the 2003 cycle and Babson Elementary from the
2004 cycle).
At the end of each of the principal interviews, permission to interview teachers
was obtained. In both instances the principals provided a list of names of teachers that
may be able to provide insight to the intervention process. These teachers came from a
variety of involvement levels in the underperforming school status. Permission to
observe and interview participants was obtained on an individual teacher basis.
Participants from the school were placed into categories. Those in the school
were self-designated into one of the following categories: 1) those who are directly
involved with the underperforming school process; 2) those who are indirectly involved,
meaning there is no personal relationship with the SDE, but some of work is directly
related to the underperforming school status; or 3) those who are aware of the
underperforming school status, but are not directly impacted by this. The school
interviews break down is shown in Table 3.5.
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Table 3.5: School and District Interview Participants, by Category of Involvement
with the DOE
Directly
Involved

Indirectly
Involved

Not
Involved

District

2

0

0

Alfred Elementary

1

1

2

2
4

Babson Elementary

2

2

0

4

5

3

2

Total

Total

|

10

Data Collection
In a phenomenological study, the researcher is attempting to interpret human
interaction (Bogdan & Biklen, 1982, p. 31). In this type of study it is therefore important
to begin by listening and observing (Psathas, 1973). The data collection process was
designed to accommodate this need and to use multiple methods of collection. Data was
collected in three ways: 1) analysis and review of documentation pertaining to the new
school accountability process, 2) observation of the DOE visits to potentially
underperforming schools, and 3) loosely structured interviews conducted with DOE and
school staff. The variety of data collection methods has provided information about and
insight on the actions taken by the DOE and the underperforming school.
Document Analysis
Documents developed by the school for the state and by the state for the school
during the process of reviewing and intervening in the underperforming school were
reviewed. These documents fall into three categories: Process documentation,
underperforming school documentation, and underperforming school reports.
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Process Documentation
Process documents are those generic documents developed by the DOE for the
School Panel Reviews and the Fact Finding Reviews. These are specifically developed
for the training of the state representatives (panelists and consultants) that participate in
the early phases of new school accountability to ensure consistency during
implementation by a multitude of panelists. The documentation is not necessarily given
directly to the underperforming school, though much of this information is made
available to the general public on the DOE website. Summaries of the process
documentation are provided to the school principal, who is encouraged (not required) to
share the information with school faculty and staff.
Underperforming School Documentation
These are the internal5 documents from and about the underperforming school
used by the state to assess the ability of the school to improve without DOE intervention.
These documents include an anonymous teacher survey conducted by the DOE, the
school’s improvement plan, student body demographic information, the staffing
information, MCAS results for the school and district, a leadership report from the
principal developed specifically for the DOE review, and any other pertinent information
the principal and/or DOE feels should be included. Documents pertaining to the two
elementary schools selected for study will be reviewed for this research.
Underperforming School Reports
The underperforming school reports are different from the “documentation” in
that they are the result of reviews of an underperforming school. These are the public
5 Technically the “internal” documentation is made available to the general public, however, all reviewers
must return this documentation to the DOE and those that request access to the information are only
allowed to review the information on the premises of the DOE headquarters.
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documents that synthesize information gathered from the review of the underperforming
school documentation and the site visits to the school. Officially two reports are
developed by the state. The first is the report from the School Panel Review, which is
used by the Commissioner to make a determination about a school’s status. The second
is the Fact Finding Review report, which is used to inform the future technical assistance
and support for the underperforming school.
In each case, the school and/or district are allowed to respond to these reports in
writing to the Commissioner. This is a route for the school principal to pursue any
inaccuracies or omissions within the report and these are considered part of the “reports”
because they are public and become part of the report process.
Observations
The observation portion of the study is intended to provide insight into the early
phases and processes surrounding new school accountability in Massachusetts. Through
over 110 hours of observations, I have observed how the process works and how the
DOE staff, consulting staff working on behalf of the state, and practitioners who
participate in the state reviews connect with the underperforming school leaders and staff.
Specifically, I was interested in learning how the school staff reacts to questions made by
the state team and how the state teams delivered information about the method of the
DOE’s method of implementing new school accountability policy.
Also of interest was how the state team brought about a transition in the
underperforming school staffs’ understanding of the policy from one that is top down and
controlling, to a policy that relies on mutual involvement and cooperation to be
effectively implemented. The team, as the first state entity to come face-to-face with the
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school, is in a position to commence the relationship between the SDE and the
underperforming school off to a good (or bad) start. Therefore, the manner and attitudes
of the team toward the school are important to the implementation process and to the type
of working relationship that develops between the DOE and the school.
Observations of the state and (potentially) underperforming school were allowed
by permission of the Massachusetts Department of Education, district superintendent, and
underperforming school principals and teachers. In each instance observation
participants were given a description of the project and researcher contact information.
At each meeting with school staff, I was introduced and provided an oral explanation of
my role as a neutral observer (separate from the state team). Each participant was then
provided with written documentation about the project in the form of an Informed
Consent for Observations (appendix B).
Observations were specifically targeted at two official parts of the Massachusetts
School Accountability Process. The first was the School Panel Review, which is when a
team consisting of a DOE liaison, ABC Consulting staff and a group of school
practitioners from throughout the state interview district and underperforming school
staff and visit the underperforming school over a period of two days. In the four School
Panel Reviews that I observed, the DOE liaison, ABC Consulting staff, and school
practitioners on the team were made aware of my presence as an observer during the
process. In most instances the DOE liaison notified the school principals of my role as an
observer and researcher in advance of the visit. Because a number of the initial School
Panel Review visits are conducted simultaneously in different parts of the state, I was
only be able to observe a sample of the total number of DOE visits for a total of about 72
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hours of observation during the 2004 underperforming review cycle. One of the
observations of the School Panel Review was at Babson Elementary. No observations of
the cycle were conducted at Alfred Elementary because the study was conducted in the
year after the school was declared underperforming.
The second part of the school accountability process is the Fact Finding Review.
This review is for the schools that are determined to be underperforming based on
information gathered during the School Panel Review and a determination by the
Commissioner. The Fact Finding Review is designed to take an in-depth look at the
processes and practices within a school and to make suggestions about areas in need of
improvement. I participated as an observer during this four day process, which consisted
of a strategy meeting of the ABC Consulting Chair and Panelist and visiting the school
with the ABC Consulting Chair and Panelist as well as a team of practitioners, who
conducted interviews, focus groups and classroom observations. The results of these
activities are summarized into a brief report, which identifies some of the key strengths
and weaknesses in the school so that the principal and staff attending the PIM (school
improvement planning technical assistance provided by the state) training have a
diagnosis of areas to concentrate on during the school improvement planning sessions.
Loosely Structured Interviews
The loosely structured interview as a method is used to allow interview
participants to convey their feelings about the implementation processes of new school
accountability policy. In this study, I expected and found that the participants’
perceptions emerged during the loosely structured interview. The perspectives of those
in the DOE and the underperforming school provided insight into their attitudes toward
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the policy, their understanding of the policy as they went through its implementation and
their understanding of the organizational context. Specifically, I was interested in finding
out about the feelings of trust, involvement and cooperation between the DOE and
underperforming school staff.
Another component of interest was time. How a school employee or a DOE
employee feel about one another is likely to change over time. The two schools, having
been declared underperforming in different years, have different perceptions and attitudes
towards new school accountability policy. For example, Alfred Elementary has been
underperforming longer and has a more established relationship with the DOE, while
Babson Elementary has more recently been declared underperforming and may not have
as clear of a picture as to how they felt toward the DOE.
The interviews were conducted with DOE staff and underperforming school staff
who participated in the early phases of new school accountability policy implementation.
Participants were asked to review the questions (appendix A) and provide feedback on
ways to improve the questions, or additional questions that might be asked. Each
interview participant was asked to sign an informed consent (appendix B), which
provided information about the project and contact information for future follow-up.
Interviews were taped with the permission of the participant. Additionally, notes were
taken during the interviews. In all but one of the 17 interviews participants agreed to
allow the interview to be taped. At the one interview that was not taped, I took notes and
applied them to the interview questions.
The interviews lasted approximately one hour and follow-up questions were
sought in person, over the phone or through electronic correspondence, as they were
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needed. All interviews were transcribed. Transcriptions were provided to the interview
participant for his/her review. In the case of the one interview that was not taped, the
notes were typed and submitted to the participant for approval. This “member-checking”
method (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) was used to ensure the trustworthiness and credibility of
the information gathered during the interview (Seidman, 1991, p. 75). In some instances
comments and additional information were provided by the interview participants and
included in the transcript.
Data Collection Limitations
..[Institutional relationships and implementation process on any but the
smallest scale are simply too numerous and diverse to admit of our asserting law like
propositions about them” (Bardach, 1977, p. 57). To account for this challenge that many
researchers, who attempt to study policy implementation in its natural environment, face,
Salamon (1991) suggests that a “systemic” approach captures “...the richness of events
and actions in complex social environments.. .recognizing the inter-dependence,
inseparability and transactional elements among elements” (Chatteiji, 2004, p. 7). This
is a limitation found in many studies. Cronbach and Associates suggests thinking of it as
a “before-and-after study” (Cronbach, et. al., 1980, p. 271) in which you begin the study
with a small sample and use this small sample to develop the most pointed issues and
questions that arise and increasing the sample size to broaden this research after these
“pointed, significant questions” (p. 271) have been developed. The research as
conducted is therefore a “before” study to develop and strengthen questions about the
working relationship between the state and local during the beginning of intervention in
the underperforming school.

97

Consequently, the endeavor is still worthwhile because it serves as information
for those in this particular circumstance of implementing new school accountability
policy. It uncovers a dynamic of relationship between the state and the school that may
point to a new era in the history of public education within the United States. It is a
starting point for future research on the early stages of state intervention in the local
underperforming schools.
Within any phenomenological research the subjective meaning from the
perspective of the participants is essential to understanding. In fact, Bogdan and Biklen
(1982) identify the participant’s “point of view” as the foundation of the research
construct. By researching a specific event, the researcher may impose more thought than
the participant may have put upon a situation without the researcher’s prodding. This
forces the participant to think more deeply about the subject and develop a “point of
view.” It is semi-manufactured (motivated by the researcher’s questions), however, it is
important to seek the perceptions of stakeholders in the new school accountability policy,
and thus questions were selected, so as not to be leading, and they were open-ended to
improve the chances for the participants’ perceptions to emerge.

Data Analysis
In any phenomenological study, it is essential to allow the themes to emerge from
the data. Data from the document analysis, observations, and interviews have
intermingled to unfold a larger story about how new school accountability policy is
implemented and how the SDE and underperforming school relationship develops during
the process. Rather than impose a structure upon the data, Scheberle’s (1997) “Working
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Relationship Typology” (with an added time dimension) functions as “data analysis
scaffolding” that guides the direction of the research questions. As opposed to fitting the
data into the boxes within the working relationship typology, information from this
research was guided by Scheberle’s (1997) research experience, and the typology itself
was honed, or altered depending on the emerging data. It is the basis for examining the
status of the working relationship at different points in the new school accountability
policy implementation process. Information gathered through interviews, observations,
and document review have been analyzed to determine the levels of involvement and
trust existing at different phases of implementation.
Scheberle’s Working Relationship Typology Adapted
Figure 3.2 represents a typology of working relationships adapted from Scheberle
(1997) for the state and local relationship between the SDE and the underperforming
school. In this typology, two essential elements of working relationships are identified as
important to the interaction between the SDE and the school staff: mutual trust and
involvement.
High

H
(0
£

Low

Cooperative
but
Autonomous

Pulling Together
and
Synergistic

Coming Apart
with
Avoidance

Coming Apart
and
Contentious

INVOLVEMENT

High

Figure 3.2 A Typology of State and Local Working Relationships6

6 This is derived from Scheberle (1997) “Typology of Federal and State Working Relationships” (p. 18).
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Within this typology the variables of involvement and trust are examined during
the early phases of new school accountability policy implementation. In particular the
perceptions of those in the SDE and the underperforming school have been sought.
Involvement is defined as the interaction between the SDE and the school during the
early phases, and also includes the history of the relationship, the expected duration of the
relationship, and the expectations about the future of the relationship as perceived by both
the SDE and the school.
Trust is defined by Scheberle as the degree to which the other is dedicated to the
“intent of the policy.” By adding a time dimension, reciprocity between the two
organizations has been captured. To examine particular elements of trust, aspects of the
motivated attributions model of trust developed by Mumighan, Malhotra and Weber
(2003) are used. Specifically the characteristics of: feelings of dependence, sincerity of
trusting acts, evaluation of ambiguous information (positively or negatively), perceived
likelihood of reciprocity of the other party, risk reducing behaviors to encourage trust,
and consistent and clear communication.
By combining the levels of involvement with trust found at different points in
time, one is able to see the differences in the working relationship between the SDE and
the school over time. In congruence with the negotiation model of implementation, and
the evolving nature of policy implementation, the time element reveals how the working
relationship between the SDE and the underperforming school and the district evolves
and changes by moving into different quadrants as new school accountability policy is
implemented. The implementation strategies employed by the SDE affects the working
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relationship and changes as the enabling strategy becomes clearer to those in the
underperforming school and district. The following details the expectations of how the
working relationship is characterized in each of the four quadrants: 1) pulling together
and synergistic, 2) cooperative but autonomous, 3) coming apart with avoidance, and 4)
coming apart and contentious.
“Pulling together and synergistic” is high in trust and involvement between the
two entities. According to Scheberle this is the ideal working relationship. It is
characterized as a general willingness of both parties to contribute, support, and play an
active role in the implementation of policy. Characterized by high levels of trust, the
level of threat on an institutional, organizational or personal level is minimal. A high
level of involvement between the two entities means that there are resources and/or
commitment for both to work together to a common goal. This type of working
relationship is reminiscent of Weick’s (1979) definition of organization as the point when
two separate entities recognize that to achieve a desired goal they must work together. A
“pulling together and synergistic” working relationship is the point when Weick’s
definition is realized.
In this type of working relationship there is an understanding by both the SDE and
the underperforming school staff that they need one another to accomplish the goals of
new school accountability. I expected to find a common recognition among both parties
about the issues of being an underperforming school with an equal part of empathy and
motivation to improve the educational outcomes within the school. Communication
between the SDE and the school is clear and the expectations of all involved are explicit
and understood at the state and local levels. Also, though being declared
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‘"underperforming” may be seen as a negative experience, the process of implementing
new school accountability policy brings about a positive experience for those in the SDE
and the school. Because the level of involvement is high in this type of relationship,
beyond a strong commitment to the policy, I would expect the state to have allocated
enough resources to provide for high levels of staff involvement, and to provide technical
assistance and training as needed.
A “cooperative but autonomous” relationship is marked by high levels of trust,
but low levels of involvement. This type of working relationship is “cooperative, but
lonely” (Scheberle, 1997, p. 20). The loosely coupled nature of public education systems
within the United States makes it likely that involvement between the SDE and the school
is low. This type of working relationship is dependent upon the technology and expertise
within the underperforming school. Though the SDE is trusting of the school, its limited
capacity and expertise (Lusi, 1997) make it difficult to fully engage and support the
underperforming school. This relationship is marked by limitations of resources,
expertise and capacity. Because of the high levels of trust between the two parties,
communication is open and explicit; however the distance between the two restricts the
implementation to the capacity of the school. Trust is the glue in this type of working
relationship.
“Coming apart with avoidance” is a relationship with low levels of trust and
involvement. Scheberle (1997) describe this type of relationship as “token” or “skin
deep” (p 21). The type of working relationship may also exist in a loosely coupled
system, like the public education system. In this type of relationship I would expect to
find poor communication that is plagued by misunderstanding and misperceptions of

102

actions. Energy by both or either party is spent putting up a positive image, and the real
challenges and issues are often hidden from one another. The school staff might show
deference or what Gofftnan (1967) refers to as “avoidance rituals,” toward the SDE staff,
because they work at the state level, but this is only part of the show. By providing an
image that everything is all right, intervention may be avoided, and because there is low
involvement, this may actually work. The sincerity of actions made to implement the
policy are questioned and doubted. The SDE’s and the underperforming school’s
understanding of one another is limited. In this type of working relationship there is no
commitment to the nature of or solution to the policy problem. Though both parties are
obliged to implement the policy, they practice the art of going through the motions
without and real policy impact.
“Coming apart and contentious” working relationships have low levels of trust
and high levels of involvement. This type of relationship is a type of micromanagement
(Scheberle, 1997). The perception of one another is negative. Therefore, any actions and
communications are perceived negatively. In this type of working relationship distrust is
prevalent, and I would expect to find the school staff feeling threatened by new school
accountability policy, and the SDE staff second-guessing information put forth by the
school staff. Both parties may feel they need things to change the school’s
underperforming status, but neither recognizes their dependence upon one another, or
neither trusts the other enough to be willing to take the risk of trusting the other party.
The SDE and the school staff’s self-perceptions are positive, and the perceptions of the
other are negative. Intervention from the SDE is seen as a nuisance and interference with
the hard work that needs to be accomplished. This is indicative of the fact that both
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parties likely agree on the end-goals of new school accountability policy. However, they
disagree on the means to this end (Scheberle, 1997). Commitment to the implementation
of new school accountability policy is high within the SDE, and this leads to
micromanaging of the underperforming school. Commitment to the end-goal may also
be high within the underperforming school, but there is disagreement between the two
parties how to reach these goals. The resources of time, money and commitment exist,
but the recognition of areas of expertise and strengths of both parties would not exist and
therefore, undermines the policy implementation efforts. The SDE relationship would be
paternalistic in nature and resentment from the school staff grows because the expertise
they have to offer is not acknowledged by the SDE.
According to Scheberle (1997) “end-running” may be an “outgrowth of this kind
of relationship” (p. 22). End-running is when the SDE staff responsible for implementing
new school accountability is “stepped over,” and complaints are lodged by the school to
their superiors (i.e. Commissioner of SDE, State Board of Education, Legislators,
Governor, etc...). This begins a vicious cycle. Having been overstepped, the SDE staff
may increase their scrutiny of the underperforming school and identify areas of noncompliance. This in turn, increases the frustration of those at the school and the cycle
starts all over again. To alter this cycle Scheberle (1997) states, “[w]ithout dramatic
intervention, this kind of relationship has its own force of gravity, destined to generate
continued erosion of trust, resentment by all participants, and hypervigilance on the part
of the overseer” (p. 22). Without the willingness to risk trusting the other party, this
relationship is doomed, much like a nuclear arms race. Someone must take the first, big
step toward altering the relationship to break this cycle.
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For the purpose of this research the Working Relationship Typology is used to
observe movement in the working relationship between the SDE and the
underperforming school. The selection of two schools, each from different
underperforming review cycles, is important when applying the typology because they
contribute to an understanding of how the working relationship changes over time. In the
case of Alfred Elementary there is more distance from intervention, and thus the
perspectives of educators at Alfred Elementary shed light onto the attitudes over a longer
period of time. Babson Elementary educators, on the other hand, provide insight into the
fine grain of the early intervention process and allow for a closer examination of changes
in the working relationship between the school and the SDE. On the whole, the
involvement between the SDE and any single school is low, meaning the working
relationship is either cooperative but autonomous or coming apart with avoidance.
SDE’s and schools do not have a history of direct involvement. As potentially
underperforming schools are identified and visited by the SDE, involvement increases
and the relationship has the possibility of changing.
Limitations of the Working Relationship Typology
There is a limitation to the application of this typology to the implementation of
new school accountability. In Scheberle’s research, the typology was used to examine
the working relationship between federal and state agencies. Within the United States
there is a clear delineation between state and federal government and in this delineation
federalism is an ongoing tension between states and the federal government. There is
often an accepted dynamic that the state is equal to or above the federal government in
this hierarchy and the federal government is simply an organizational tool to accomplish
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things that provide a collective good or “economies of scale,” that a single state may not
as readily accomplish.
These ideas herald back to the birth of this nation and continue to provide balance
and tension between the two levels of government (Ellis, 2001). It is for these reasons
that laws and policies between states and the federal government can and do conflict with
one another. This adds a dimension to a state and federal relationship that is not as
prominent in the state and local relationship. In the case of new school accountability the
state and local governments are interacting through their public education conduits, the
SDE and the school. The states are constitutionally responsible for the delivery of an
adequate public education and the schools are seen as agents of the states. Within the
public education context the bond between the two is legally more direct and obvious
between the state and local entities. Because of the grassroots evolution of the public
education system within states (Tyack & Cuban, 1999), and the overarching theme of
local control of public schools, however, the tension of control among state and local
entities is similar to the tension of control in federal and state relationships.
Trust and Involvement Over Time
Within the loosely structured interviews, and document analysis I looked for
evidence of trust and involvement to examine where the working relationship between
the SDE and the underperforming school lies within the typology. I expected that the
relationship would change over time. Therefore, I selected four points during the early
intervention phases that will be examined (see Figure 3.3). These are: 1) after a school
has failed to meet the performance criteria and has met the state’s strategic criteria for
potential underperformance; 2) during the School Panel Review and the release of the

subsequent School Panel Review Report and decision by the Commissioner that the
school is indeed underperforming; 3) during the second DOE diagnostic intervention
which is called the Fact Finding Review and after the subsequent Fact Finding Review
Report is released; and 4) after the first state strategic intervention in the form of
technical assistance provided to the school (after the first Performance Improvement
Mapping - PIM training).

1. Past Relationship

2. School Panel
Review

3. Fact Finding
Review

4. PIM

The School:
•

Receives a copy of the School Panel
Review Report.

•

Is determined to be underperforming by
the Commissioner of Education.

•

Is readied for the diagnostic phase: the
Fact Finding Review.

New School
Accountability Policy
Implementation

Fact-Finding
Review

1
PAST
Relationship between
the SDE and the
underperforming
school prior to new
school accountability.

PIM Training
(State
Mandated)

School Panel
Review Visit

f The School:

FUTURE
Expectations about
the future of the
SDE and the
underperforming
school relationship
and expectations
about the school's
status are factors
in their
relationship.

>

*

Is identified as potentially
underperforming.

•

Meets SDE strategic criteria.

•

Is selected for a School Panel
Review Visit to determine
whether the school will or will not
need state intervention to

^Ibe School:
•

Receives the Fact Finding
Review Report

•

Is required to attend the state's
school improvement planning
training (PIM) and begin to plan
for the corrective interventions.

imnm\/o

Figure 3.3: Timeline Reflecting Points of Interest during the Study of New School
Accountability Policy Implementation

Within the collection methods these four points in time are delineated and used to
structure interviews, documents, and observations. Ideally, as a researcher, I would have
been part of the process and simultaneously interviewing participants as they were
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experiencing these points in time. However, due to the demands placed upon an
underperforming school during the early phases, it was not feasible for those in the
schools to participate in the study as they were experiencing early intervention.
Additionally, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, for me as the sole researcher
to conduct the functions of observing and interviewing simultaneously. Therefore,
interviews occurred after the state teams and school staffs have been through the early
phases of new school accountability and participants were asked to reflect upon their
experiences. Relying on state and local reflection upon the past experiences was another
limitation of the study because of what Weick (2001) calls “sense making” in which
participants impose the present point in time upon reflections to put together a cohesive
and consistent path that brings them to where they currently are in the process.
Regardless, it provides insight into the process, and allows for participants to reflect upon
their experiences and participate in the interview during a less demanding and stressful
time period.
T rustworthiness
Throughout the data gathering process, there are methods embedded to increase
the trustworthiness of the data gathered. On a grand level, the reason for looking at two
schools is to be able to support some of the more generic procedural findings and identify
any similarities in response. Still, the generalizability of phenomena across the two
school sites is difficult. Selecting two schools and the teachers and principals from those
schools may improve the ability to generalize. However, it is better suited as a first step
to hone questions for a future larger study. Additionally, the document analysis specific
to the school also provides a place to crosscheck information.
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It is important not to place the “state” and the “school” on opposite sides of the
same coin for many reasons pointed out in the literature review. They are, in a sense,
implementation partners. However, though the perspectives of those representing the
state and the school are likely different, there are also similarities in experience. After all
they are going through the same process together. These points of similarity and
departure are the fine details of this research, and are used to validate the trustworthiness
of the data gathered.
The last effort to improve trustworthiness is at the participant level. Each
interview participant was asked to member-check his or her transcribed interview. This
allowed for the possibility to clarify points, change inaccuracies, and further reflect upon
their experiences. As a researcher, I used follow-up interviews and correspondence as
needed to clarify points and findings that emerge from the data.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS

In the following chapters I use the data from documents, observations and
participant interviews to improve understanding of the beginning of intervention.
Chapter 5 discusses the state level, chapter 6 the local level, and chapter 7 the working
relationship between the DOE and the underperforming school. Finally, chapter 8
analyzes the district and its role as the “fixer” of new school accountability during early
intervention.
The state level and local level chapters (6 and 7) have a similar format. First,
there is a discussion of the role each particular entity (Massachusetts Department of
Education, ABC Consulting, Charlesburg District, Alfred Elementary and Babson
Elementary) plays during the beginning of state intervention and how individuals within
these organizations understand their role in the larger picture (e.g., state level, local
level). Then the discussion focuses on the state and local context of early intervention.
At each level there are factors that emerged from the data which influence how those at
the state and local levels perceive early intervention and how new school accountability
policy is implemented.
After gaining familiarity with the state and local levels, I delve into the working
relationship between the SDE (DOE) and the underperforming schools (Alfred and
Babson Elementary Schools) over the designated time periods (past experience, School
Panel Review, Fact Finding Review, PIM) structured within Scheberle’s working
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relationship typology. The variables of trust and involvement are key to building a
concept of the working relationship. By summarizing the working relationship between
the state and local level from participants’ perspectives, I attempt to track the evolution of
the working relationship in terms of Scheberle’s typology. Out of the working
relationship analysis a discussion about the context, the impact, and the perspectives of
the different stakeholders ensues. I conclude by discussing some of the findings that
arose from the data and attempt to estimate the point where, from the various
perspectives, the incremental or dramatic shift from a deterrent to an enabling process of
implementation is perceived and understood at the local level, the assumption being that
cooperation between the state and the underperforming school is only possible at that
point.

Ill

CHAPTER V
THE STATE LEVEL

In this chapter, the state level organizations (DOE and ABC Consulting) findings
and perspectives as they relate to and influence new school accountability policy
implementation during early intervention are investigated. First, the state level
participants, the SDE’s (DOE) and the contractor’s (ABC Consulting) roles during early
intervention are discussed. Then, the context in which the DOE implements new school
accountability policy is considered.
Table 5.1 details the state level interview participants and their respective
positions. All names have been changed and titles have been simplified (in some
instances) to the title under which the person most connects with new school
accountability policy implementation.
Table 5.1: Summary of State Level Interview Participants
Level_Name_Title_Organization
State Level:
(n=7)

Massachusetts Department of
(n=4)
Education (DOE)
Daphne
Director of School Performance Evaluation

Department of Education

Debra

Administrator for school and district
planning support

Department of Education

Dianne

DOE Coordinator

Department of Education

Dan

Underperforming School Liaison

Department of Education

ABC Consulting
(n=3)
Director of Resource Development/Panel
Christie
Chair

ABC Consulting

Chuck

Panel Chair

ABC Consulting

Caitlin

Panelist/Report Writer

ABC Consulting
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The state level is represented by the SDE and the contractor. In Massachusetts,
the SDE is the Department of Education (DOE) and the contractor is ABC Consulting.
The DOE is involved in all aspects of school accountability policy and thus brings a
broader understanding of the implementation process. ABC Consulting works mainly on
the review visits to the schools. Each brings a rich and detailed understanding of the
visits, and how the schools receive the state teams.

The SDE: The Massachusetts Department of Education
The part of the Massachusetts Department of Education that manages the
beginning of intervention is the School Performance and Evaluation Department within
the Accountability and Targeted Assistance Cluster. It is a relatively new entity that has
come about because of the added responsibility of holding schools accountable and has
been in existence since the late 1990’s. The staff members that work within the cluster
for the most part have not worked in other parts of the Department of Education (DOE).
Many of the employees interviewed have worked at the DOE for less than ten years and
began working at the DOE for the specific purpose of working on school accountability
and targeted assistance in particular.
Daphne oversees the underperforming school intervention and monitoring within
the DOE. She is a veteran of the public education system in a neighboring state and has
over 25 years of experience in the classroom, as a district administrator, and as a
principal. She has been working on school accountability ever since and describes her
work as “.. .learning how to build the plane as we fly it.” She oversees the DOE liaisons
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and the relationship with ABC Consulting. Daphne is the leader of underperforming
school intervention and is responsible for overseeing the DOE staff and contractors, who
work on school accountability, as well as managing the relationship with districts, where
the underperforming schools reside.
Dianne is considered an Education Specialist in School Performance Evaluation.
She participates in many aspects of accountability and targeted assistance that reach
beyond the scope of underperforming school interventions. However, she does
participate in the role of a DOE liaison. A DOE liaison is the representative from the
DOE who participates on School Panel Reviews and during the Fact Finding Review
attends the exit interviews. She is not considered a “monitor,” which is the role the DOE
liaison takes on for the two years after an underperforming school has developed a state
Board of Education approved improvement plan. She has been with the DOE for
approximately seven years and clearly has experience in a wide range of initiatives that
fall in the realm of school accountability. Her perspective is broader than that of a DOE
liaison because she deals with the entire process of early intervention and is a contributor
to the design of the system.
A typical DOE liaison would only be responsible for connecting with the
underperforming school, managing the logistics of the early intervention process, and
maintaining contact with the school principal and team during the school improvement
planning process (PIM). After the principal of the underperforming school has presented
the school improvement plan before the state’s board of education, and the board of
education approves the plan, the DOE liaison’s role then switches to a monitoring role.
An underperforming school is monitored by the DOE liaison for two years. At the end of
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the two years a determination about the school’s ability to improve based on the
achievement over the two years of monitoring is made. At the end of the two years the
school can take one of three paths: 1) move out of the underperforming status, 2) be
declared chronically underperforming and face strong intervention, or 3) maintain the
“monitored” status for a designated amount of time. During the two years of monitoring
the DOE liaison visits the school to make sure the principal is accomplishing the goals set
forth in the board approved school improvement plan. The visits are an opportunity to
identify areas of need within the school and to negotiate the implementation of the
improvement plan. The DOE liaison is largely responsible for bringing the voice of the
underperforming school to the DOE. They often see themselves as supportive advocates
for the underperforming school, who also must be a critical friend to the school as they
monitor the implementation of the underperforming school’s improvement plan.
Dan is a DOE liaison who has worked with the Department for a little under two
years. He was a DOE liaison on two of the School Panel Reviews and the one Fact
Finding Review I observed in the Charlesburg School District. The Charlesburg District
was his region. However, he left the DOE in the summer of 2004 to become a vice
principal at a middle school. Dan’s background is in public education, though he did take
on some other jobs that were loosely related to education and accountability for a few
years. His short tenure as a DOE liaison limited his depth of knowledge, but in many
ways Dan is a typical example of a DOE liaison who only stays in the position for a short
time.
Debra is less involved with the beginning of intervention, but plays a critical role
in the district strategy as the coordinator of the school support specialists (specialist),
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which means that she is in charge of all of the specialists in the state. When discussing
early intervention, the district’s role through the school support specialists came up over
and over again as one of the critical components of early intervention. Debra, unlike the
others interviewed, has been at the DOE for many years and only in the past four years
began to work in the accountability unit of the DOE.
The Massachusetts Department of Education’s Role
There is an old adage out there that the greatest joke in the world
is, ‘Hi, I’m here from the DOE, and I’m here to help you.’
(Daphne, DOE)
The quote above is often heard when talking about the DOE. It typifies the distance
between the DOE and the local district and school, and denotes the old role of the DOE,
which required less of the educational/practitioner knowledge and expertise and more
administration, data collection, and compliance expertise. It captures the challenges DOE
faces when implementing new school accountability policy. The DOE must build
relationships where there were none, and simultaneously change the perception locals
have of the state as a non-influential and less than helpful part of the education system.
Despite the general feeling among those in the lower echelons of a state’s loosely
coupled public education system, the Massachusetts Department of Education has
attempted to implement new school accountability policy that conveys a message of
support to the underperforming school by saying,
.. .[W]e know this is hard. We understand the challenges you face,
but you can do it a little better, we think. And, we’re going to
show you how. We think, we don’t have all these answers, but we
do think there is room there for us to work together on behalf of
kids. And, the message is this isn’t about you, it’s about these
kids. (Daphne, DOE)
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By removing the onus of blame those within the school feel, Daphne has created an
implementation process that does not place personal blame upon educators in the school.
Rather, it is intended to redirect and refocus efforts within the school so that the educators
within the school move toward improvement rather than having early intervention
paralyze them. From the start the state representatives send the message that they do not
have the answers by showing respect for the expertise of the educators in the school, and
by conveying sincerity and honesty when communicating with them. All efforts
concentrate on changing the idea of new school accountability policy from a deterrent to
an enabling system.
According to Dan, at every turn the educators in the school are told that school
improvement is reliant upon their efforts. He emphasizes the point by stating,
That’s crystal clear. There’s just no two ways about it that your
school has to pull itself up. You’re the one that’s going to do this
work. You’re the one that’s going to carry this forward. And, it’s
not done in such a way that it’s threatening or anything like that.
(Dan, DOE)
Throughout the DOE, those in contact with the school emphasize that the educators
within the school are going to improve the school. The enabling message sent to
principals and teachers symbolizes the respect the DOE has for the work they do within
the schools, and it shows that the DOE staff recognize that the classroom expertise exists
within the school. Dan mentions that the message is sent without threat to those in the
school. Rather, the approach is designed to reinvigorate and refocus the internal
accountability mechanisms within the school so that they meet the end goal of improving
educational outcomes.
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Consistently, interview participants from the DOE reiterated that building a
relationship with the district and the school is a central focus of early intervention.
Dianne discusses the type of relationship the DOE wants with the underperforming
school, and how the DOE negotiates cooperation with those in the underperforming
school.
We try to establish a really professional, pragmatic approach. That
there’s a job that we have to do, and this is how we have to get it
done. And, we try to be as sensitive to the school as we can - the
people in the school as we can - because we understand it can be a
difficult situation for them, and it can be disruptive for them. So,
we try to be as sensitive as we can and as professional as we can.
(Dianne, DOE)
Once again, sincerity and respect for those within the school is ingrained in the DOE’s
language and process. Accommodation of the school principal and staff are made at
every turn in the early intervention process. The respect and professionalism with which
they approach the school staff is proof in actions that the DOE is interested in partnering
with the school to achieve a commonly desired end goal. The culture within the DOE
unit responsible for underperforming schools is that of support and enabling. The
Director, Daphne puts it best,
.. .1 think as [early intervention’s] premise it has always been really
focused on support. Despite the fact that school performance
evaluation is really an accountability measure, where for the first
time the state is making judgments about the quality of what is
happening in the schools...but I think that our perspective has
always been to do so as a way to help schools. (Daphne, DOE)
The bottom line within the DOE is support for the underperforming schools and
designing a system of early intervention that gives the principal and teachers in the school
the tools to analyze how they will improve educational outcomes. Throughout the
process, the DOE staff recognize their need to partner with the school, and that after the
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underperforming school principal and teachers are given the tools, true improvement
relies on the internal expertise and ability to gain the expertise of the teachers in the
classroom. Knowing that every piece of the public education system is needed to focus
upon school improvement means the DOE does not automatically take a command and
control style implied by the legislation. Rather, the DOE’s process works within and
alters the public education system by injecting support, placing importance on outcomes,
and respecting the professional educators within the schools and classrooms.

The Contractor: ABC Consulting
ABC Consulting is the contractor that supports the state’s underperforming school
accountability efforts. At the higher levels of ABC Consulting, the staff have worked in
partnership to develop an early intervention system for Massachusetts that is supportive
of school improvement efforts by diagnosing school challenges with a team of experts
(panelists) and developing a system of data analysis that directs school improvement
efforts (PIM). Beyond working on the development of the early intervention process, the
role of ABC Consulting is narrowly focused on a portion of the beginning of
intervention: the School Panel Reviews and the Fact Finding Reviews. The purpose of
using an outside consultant is to bring the skills and experience of an organization that
works primarily on school accountability evaluations and school improvement initiatives
within schools and districts across the nation. ABC Consulting has clients ranging from
other state departments of education to city districts. Using ABC Consulting’s services
on an as needed basis expands the capacity and skills of the DOE.
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ABC Consulting’s specialization and expertise have helped to design the
“beginning of intervention” implementation for the Massachusetts DOE. The contractor
and the DOE alike describe the relationship as a partnership. The contractor develops
plans and the DOE has the final approval on them. Additionally, the contractor has the
flexibility to bring in experts to chair the panels and to write the reports. These experts
generally have a public school leadership background as retired principals and
superintendents. This type of background and experience is generally not found among
state level DOE staff (McDermott, Berger, Bowles, Brooks, Churchill, & Effrat, 2001).
Three members of ABC Consulting were interviewed for this study. Each of the
interview participants represents a different aspect of the consulting group, but covers all
of the roles that ABC Consulting plays with regard to the school accountability process in
Massachusetts. Christie manages the role of the contractor with the DOE and partners
with the DOE by participating and contributing to the development and evolution of the
beginning of intervention. She has a background as a teacher in middle schools and is a
veteran teacher of the public education system in a neighboring state. Not only does she
help to develop the process, but she also provides logistical support and serves as a chair
on both School Panel and Fact Finding Reviews. Her insights, therefore, are much more
connected to the DOE perspective than to that of the schools because she has regular
contact with the leaders within the DOE and the director (Daphne) in particular.
Chuck is a retired principal, who subcontracts with ABC Consulting. He works
on more than just the Massachusetts school accountability project for ABC Consulting.
When he is working on Massachusetts school accountability, he serves as a Chair for
both School Panel Reviews and Fact Finding Reviews. He has been working on school
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accountability issues for over three years and participates in the annual training that ABC
Consulting provides to its employees and subcontractors. His perspective on school
accountability is that of an outsider to the school accountability policy, but he has
experience in the public education system under the education reform initiatives of which
school accountability is part. He has a particular focus upon the school. His contact with
the DOE is limited. He reports directly to Christie, and the information about the state
process he possesses comes from her as well as from his experiences visiting
underperforming schools.
Caitlin is a former special education teacher, who is currently working outside of
the classroom. She is also a subcontractor with ABC Consulting. She has participated as
a panel member on School Panel and Fact Finding Reviews for two years and in the most
recent year began subcontracting with ABC Consulting to work closely with the Chairs
and to write the reports that are submitted to DOE. The reports she writes for ABC
Consulting are handed off to DOE. The DOE liaison and Daphne edit them as they see
fit. The reports are used to make determinations about a school’s status of
underperformance and particular areas that need to be addressed for improvement. Like
Chuck, Caitlin reports to Christie and gets most of her information about school
accountability from ABC Consulting trainings and from her experiences as a panelist on
underperforming school reviews.
ABC Consulting’s Role
ABC Consulting’s role is to chair and conduct the School Panel and Fact Finding
Reviews, write the first draft of the reports from these visits, and at the higher levels of
the organization partner with the DOE to develop the early intervention process. The
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DOE has partnered with ABC Consulting to take advantage of the organizations
experience in managing school accountability and school improvement initiatives in other
parts of the country and to access the expertise of school practitioners (e.g., principals,
superintendents) on an as needed basis. Because of their experience working with
districts and states around the nation, ABC Consulting has played an important role in the
design of early intervention. Christie describes the relationship.
Originally, back in the early days we were developers of the
protocol. So that we were, you know, we were invited to provide
support over the summer to develop a process for not just visiting
schools, but for guiding the improvement planning process which
is what schools undergo once they’re declared underperforming.
So, we have been developers of the process, as well as, you know,
conductors of the visits. (Christie, ABC Consulting)
... So,... it’s been a very collaborative relationship with respect to
the DOE. (Christie, ABC Consulting)
By collaborative relationship, Christie is referring to the how ABC Consulting has
worked with the DOE to develop the process, and how they work in partnership to
improve and change the implementation process of early intervention.
ABC Consulting’s most important role is to build the capacity of the DOE by
visiting the schools, gathering the practitioners, screening panelist candidates, writing the
reports, and handling the finances of paying the subcontractors. ABC Consulting pulls in
expertise from a variety of school settings and ultimately leads and enhances the breadth
and depth of the panels during the School Panel and Fact Finding Reviews.
In observations and discussions about the role of ABC Consulting, it is clear that
the role of the contractor is important for more than just expanding the state’s capacity.
They bring in experienced educators, who are veterans of the public education system.
The members of ABC Consulting are some of the first people that those in the school see.
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Essentially they are the “face” of the state because they are working on the frontline
during the beginning of intervention. Their role lends credibility to the DOE from the
perspective of those in the school and potentially the district. ABC Consulting requires
the Chair of a panel to be someone who has been in the trenches of the public education
system (e.g., retired superintendent, principal), and at the very least it is someone who
has worked in the classroom. In most cases educators in the schools believed the ABC
Consultants were employees of the DOE. At the district level, administrators were more
familiar with the process and understood that ABC Consultants were contractors of the
state. The consultants never denied being external contractors, but the message was not
forthcoming, so educators in the underperforming schools tended to assume they were
DOE employees because they did not know otherwise.
Because they are the “face” of the state during early school intervention, it is
valuable to understand how those that work for ABC Consulting view the state’s role
during early intervention. Rather than being an independent and separate evaluator, ABC
Consulting is presented as the state and acts as a partner of the state.
We... make sure it’s clear that we are an agent of the state and that
we are doing the state’s business here. That the state’s business
allows us to offer you from another perspective... what issues you
might want to address and how you might want to deploy your
energies and time. (Christie, ABC Consulting)
The role of the ABC Consultants, as they see it, is to represent the state and
provide a fair assessment of what is occurring in the underperforming school so that the
DOE is able to make a determination about the school. Still, as representatives of the
state they work within their unique situations, and they are melding their own
organizational goals with their client’s goals.
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With respect to the schools, we have a personal goal that even
though the client may be an agency or organization or foundation,
we have a strong belief that if our work is to be, our work has to be
useful to the school. In some way or fashion it has to be... useful
and hopefully meaningful to the school... [Y]ou know we have the
extra responsibility that we hold ourselves to - an extra standard
that we hold ourselves to. So, with respect to the schools our
target, [or] the reason we do so much training on interpersonal
relationships is that, you know, we want them to know that we’re
there. We’re there for the state. We’re conducting the state’s
business, you know, business on behalf of the state, but... we want
to do it in a way that [people in the school] can... nod their heads
when we leave and say, “Yeah, you’re right. You know you got it.
You have described us correctly.” (Christie, ABC Consulting)
In congruence with the DOE’s expressed desire for a cooperative working relationship
with those in the school, ABC Consulting as an organization places a priority on
developing a supportive relationship with the principal and teachers within the
underperforming school. The “extra responsibility” Christie talks about is concentrated
on forming a positive working relationship with the underperforming school on behalf of
the state.
In fact, ABC Consulting’s role of representing the DOE in the reviews of
underperforming schools is taken quite seriously. For each consultant, on a personal
level, there is a clearly expressed empathy for the school and the difficult situation it
faces. In many instances when they are Chairs of the reviews, they find themselves
making those in the school comfortable with the process and letting them know that no
matter what happens the process can only improve the current situation. Much of their
effort is concentrated upon the school and the reaction of those within the school, which
requires them to pay close attention during visits and interviews and to model the
counseling/empathetic behavior to the practitioners on the panels. As Chuck states, “The
thing that ABC Consulting does well is that it emphasizes that this is a human process,
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you know? That the relationships that you create or fail to create.. .are really pivotal to
everything that goes on.”
The DOE and ABC Consulting have teamed up to implement new school
accountability policy during the beginning of intervention. Their priorities of developing
a working relationship between the state, the underperforming school, and the district,
and balancing support and accountability during implementation, reveal a symbiotic
partnership between the two. The evolution of new school accountability policy is
indication of a continuous improvement effort that includes information gathered from
state and local feedback. The state’s willingness to empower the local district and
underperforming school during early intervention shows a sincere desire to work within
the existing public education system.

The State Context
The staff from the Massachusetts Department of Education Accountability and
Targeted Assistance Cluster (DOE) developed an early school intervention process that
puts the idea of building relationships between the state and local levels at the center of
new school accountability in Massachusetts. For the DOE the goal of building a working
relationship is to change the perception of new school accountability from a deterrent to
an enabling system as perceived by those at the local level. Ultimately the DOE wants to
empower the underperforming school principal and teachers to take responsibility for
school improvement. The goals of building a working relationship with those in the
school and changing the perception of school accountability policy is to improve
educational outcomes and to avoid further state interventions.
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Relationship building takes time, energy, and resources that are in short supply at
the state level. Therefore, the DOE has implemented several strategies to expand and
balance the state s capacity, all of which put relationships between the state, the district
and the school as a top priority. Using contractors to expand their expertise during
reviews, and partnering with district superintendents have broadened the expertise levels
and human resources working with the underperforming schools. Relationship building
with the underperforming school further engages and empowers the principal and
teachers within the underperforming school. Additionally, DOE has also involved the
districts that oversee the underperforming schools. District superintendent involvement
and the DOE’s district based school support specialist (specialists) strategy improves and
expands DOE’s capacity to work with underperforming schools. Simultaneously, it helps
the district, which is the entity responsible for school improvement, by providing
additional, focused resources for school improvement.
Though the DOE is best suited to implement “one best system,” the relationship
centered early intervention process allows for accommodations and negotiations within
the unique local contexts. Partnerships with the urban school principals and urban
districts leaders keep the DOE administrators apprised of local needs, provide feedback
to reform systematic problems with implementation over time, and maintain a common
understanding among state and local partners about the end goal of policy
implementation. The strategy led to the development of a common framework for
implementation that gives locals control and discretion over how the policy is
implemented and negotiated at the district and school levels. In a sense, rather than
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taking the expected “one best system” approach, the DOE has taken a “one best
framework” approach.
The purpose of a “framework” type of approach is that it respects and leaves room
for local expertise and authority aimed at accomplishing the intent of new school
accountability policy, to improve educational outcomes in all schools. It allows for
negotiation of new school accountability policy implementation, and perhaps more
importantly, it is evidence of the DOE’s recognition of their dependence upon the local
staff of underperforming schools and district to mobilize themselves around improvement
efforts that are designed and therefore owned by the local educators. In the face of
limited capacity and expertise to implement a deterrent system, the DOE (and ABC
Consulting) must rely upon the partnership with the underperforming schools and the
existing educational expertise at the local level.
For those at the state level, the idea that real change needs to occur at the local
school level pervades all explanations of new school accountability policy
implementation. Implicitly, it reveals an understanding among DOE administrators that
they are dependent upon the local underperforming school and district for improvement
in the educational outcomes. State level interviewees did see the importance of
cooperation during the beginning of intervention. However, state level participants did
not express a dependence upon the local level. Rather, they couched the need for
cooperation as an essential ingredient to supporting the underperforming school and
ensuring those at the local level are appropriately taking on their responsibility to provide
an adequate education to students within their schools and district.
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State and District Relationship
Throughout early intervention the underperforming school and the DOE are
forging a new working relationship, but not without the facilitation of the district. In
Massachusetts the district is a central component of early intervention. In earlier waves
of new school accountability policy implementation in other states, the relationship
between the state and schools was forged separately from the district. Consequently, it
leaps over the traditional SDE-district-school hierarchy of the public educations system.
In Massachusetts, however, the district is the key partner during early intervention. The
DOE Coordinator for the school support specialists explains the decision to make the
district such an integral part of early intervention.
[Other state educational leaders] said they sent people in and the
school would get better while they were there, but ... they had no
confidence that the school could stay better without their presence.
So, that was one of the reasons why we decided that if we built
capacity at the district level, there was a closer-in relationship
between the district and the school. And...the school would have
somebody at the district level who would be there for much longer
than we would if we sent somebody from [the DOE]. And besides,
somebody at the district level would also help the school, would be
somebody who understood the culture of the district and would be
able to try and work within that and make changes within the
district that would not only effect the particular low performing
school, but would have impact on other schools in the district.
(Debra, DOE)
The DOE implements a district focused strategy for school improvement based on the
challenges faced by those SDE’s that went before Massachusetts, and in an effort to
sustain improvements within the school and share the improvement strategies across the
district. Additionally, they see the district based strategy as a way of getting at the
problem of having to balance the number of schools that are underperforming and the
number of schools the state can intervene in during a single year. By placing a person in
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the district (school support specialist), whose sole responsibility is school improvement,
the district can integrate the improvement methods learned through the state’s early
intervention, in the schools that are not selected for state review, but still designated as in
need based on student test results.
Professional courtesy and respect from the DOE toward the district abounds in all
the conversations with the state level participants. Rather than jumping over the district
to work with the underperforming school, the DOE has integrated the district or enlisted
the district to be a partner in the school improvement endeavor. In fact, the bulk of the
negotiations of early intervention occur between the DOE and the district. DOE staff
members’ regular contact with district superintendents and specialists creates a forum for
negotiation of the implementation process on a regular and informal basis. The evolution
of the policy implementation process is a good indication that the DOE staff listens to the
local level and has embarked on developing a positive working relationship with the
school. Consequently, because the district is in the middle of negotiations between the
DOE and the underperforming school, the district has become an integral part of the
working relationship between the DOE and the local underperforming school.
Building and Balancing State Capacity
Capacity limitations are cited frequently by state level participants, especially
when discussing the beginning of intervention, and have at least partially shaped the way
new school accountability is implemented and negotiated between the state and local
levels.
With regard to the early intervention visits, the DOE has innovatively expanded
its capacity by using a contractor (ABC Consulting) to provide expertise during the early
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intervention school visits. As the face of the state in the eyes of the school, ABC
Consulting serves a special role in developing the working relationship between the
school and the state. ABC Consulting has national expertise in school accountability and
school improvement initiatives. The staff are experienced and regularly trained with
priority placed on the human aspect of school accountability. They see building a
“critical friend” type of relationship as essential to the school accountability process. A
combination of honest feedback and understanding helps to push and empower school
leadership to move forward. With a wide variety of K-12 educational backgrounds, the
consultants from ABC Consulting are selected for their intuitive sense of how to work
with school leaders respectfully and sincerely. ABC Consulting is an integral participant
in the design of the early intervention process and offers the DOE an expanded capacity
to visit and provide in-depth diagnoses of underperforming schools.
As another capacity expansion measure, the DOE uses the working relationship
with the local district and underperforming school as the vehicle to encourage and
empower local change. Apart from creating more harmony during implementation, a
cooperative working relationship helps the DOE expand its capacity and resource
limitations by partnering with the underperforming schools, hence relying on and
empowering the professional educators within the schools. To expand capacity and
support the schools the DOE has enlisted the district’s help and thus tapped into district
level expertise and capacity. Through regular contact with the urban superintendents,
who have the bulk of the underperforming schools within their districts, and by a strategy
of embedding district-based school support specialists to provide targeted assistance to
underperforming schools, the state has increased its interaction with the schools.
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Engaging the district as a partner in supporting underperforming schools additionally gets
the district invested in a school’s improvement. This investment is critical, as the district,
according to all state level interview participants, is the entity that is ultimately
responsible for an underperforming school’s improvement.
Even with the capacity building measures the DOE takes during early
intervention, it still must engage in capacity balancing efforts. The most superficial
glance at the number of schools in need compared with the number of schools the state
intervenes in places the question of capacity front and center. Simply by comparing the
number of federal No Child Left Behind Act, 2001 (NCLB) designated schools “in need
of impro vement, in “corrective action,” and in “restructuring” within Massachusetts to
the number of state intervention or underperforming schools within the state presents the
question. Between 2000 and 2004, the state officially visited 61 schools and declared 26
underperforming. In Massachusetts, according to NCLB designations as of the 20032004 “Cycle III” 324 schools were “in need of improvement,” 27 school were in
“corrective action,” and 25 more schools were in “restructuring” (Perlman, 2004). There
are 376 schools, according to federal guidelines, that are at the very least in need of
support and very worst in restructuring. Still, during the same 2004 underperforming
school review cycle, the DOE was only able to visit 16 schools (the most it has ever
visited in a single year) and found eight to be underperforming. Thus, in 2004 the state
had the capacity to visit approximately 4.26% of the schools designated as needing
improvement or worse, and only intervened in 2.13% of them. In all of the years the
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DOE has been implementing new school accountability policy only 61 or 6.38% of the
schools designated as in need have been the target of state intervention.1
Strategic criteria are not only a way of looking beyond poor test scores in a school
and at other influential dimensions of schooling. They are also how the DOE manages its
capacity to intervene in schools. Mintrop (2003) found that states use a variety of
methods to match the SDE’s capacity with the numbers of schools in need. Maryland
typifies the type of strategic criteria methodology used in Massachusetts. In these cases,
the SDE selects the worst of the worse schools as targets of intervention by prioritizing
schools that have the declines in improvement and poor overall ratings. Additionally, in
Massachusetts, the DOE relies upon the district superintendent’s professional judgment
or belief that a state visit would be good for an underperforming school. By matching
school performance and professional judgments of the district superintendent to the
DOE’s capacity to support schools the number of schools intervened in by the state is
determined.
There is some pride in the fact that the DOE does not only use test scores to
determine whether a school should be visited or declared underperforming. According to
the Director of School Performance and Evaluation at the DOE (Daphne), the state looks
at more than just test scores to intervene in a school, which puts a heavy demand upon the
DOE’s constrained resources. Consequently, no more than 16 schools have been visited
in a cycle. The DOE is forced to look initially at all of the schools in need. In due course
the DOE depends upon strategic criteria to determine a school’s needs in an effort to

1 Because the Massachusetts school accountability policy precedes the NCLB legislation, it is difficult to
provide an exact estimate of the number of schools that fall into the NCLB designated categories. The
designations are a moving target from year to year and changes within a given school can alter these
determinations. It should be noted that since NCLB, the DOE has aligned their school performance criteria
to suit the requirements of the federal legislation.

132

balance the state’s resources and capacity with the needs of the most severely
underperforming schools across the state.
The general feeling among DOE administrators and ABC Consultants is that the
DOE does the best it can in balancing capacity with limited resources. One way the DOE
balances capacity with need is to carefully select the “right people,” who represent the
appropriate attitude and approach to the implementation of new school accountability
policy. The “right people” are essential to accomplishing the difficult job of
implementing new school accountability.
Daphne has been very skillful in getting DOE personnel, people on
her staff, although, you know turnover rate is incredibly high just
because of other conditions that are beyond Daphne’s control. But
she’s been very clear in making that the focus of their work.
(Christie, ABC Consulting)
By looking for the “right people” the DOE assures quality and consistency when
implementing new school accountability policy. The right people for DOE must be able
to balance the punitive and supportive roles the DOE plays when negotiating new school
accountability implementation within a particular underperforming school. Christie
believes the DOE has been successful at getting the right people to ensure that the DOE’s
message of support and desire for a positive working relationship with the school is
clearly articulated. As Christie notes, for that to happen support has to be the overriding
message.
That [the DOE staff are] there to support the schools, and if what
they’re doing isn’t supportive, if the schools aren’t responding,
then ok, they can be a little stricter and more demanding, but... the
first step is to do the supportive. So, I think they’ve been very
good given the limitations. They’ve been less effective than they’d
like to be just because they don’t have the personnel and time.
(Christie, ABC Consulting)
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Balancing the role of support and enforcement is a challenge for the DOE
according to ABC Consultants. In many ways they see the state’s enforcement role grow
as one moves higher up the DOE’s hierarchy of administrators. At the bottom of the
hierarchy are the DOE people who have the closest relationship with the underperforming
school, the DOE liaisons. The DOE liaison is the school’s contact at the DOE and
eventually the person who monitors the school’s improvement after early intervention.
Because of their direct relationship with the school, the DOE liaison tends to be an
advocate for the school. As Christie describes,
[The DOE liaisons] do tend to align themselves with the school.
So...when we’ve had some DOE liaisons engaged in conversations
afterwards, they tend to present an overly rosy picture. They
defend the school’s actions in many ways, despite, you know,
other evidence that suggests that...such is not formerly the case.
(Christie, ABC Consulting)
Christie states that the DOE liaisons are “going native” because they are so close with the
school they start to defend the school, and she suggests they become overly supportive.
As advocates for the underperforming schools, DOE liaisons serve the school and
the DOE by connecting the two. The DOE liaisons become advocates at the state level
by providing the school perspective for decisions the DOE makes about the school. By
connecting the DOE and the underperforming school directly, the unique circumstances
and challenges of a particular underperforming school are taken into account. The DOE
liaisons’ supportive advocacy of the underperforming schools ensures that the
implementation process is checked and makes sense within the context of an
underperforming school.
On the other hand, the supportive nature can sometimes cause DOE liaisons to
paint a rosy picture of the activities within an underperforming school, and thus may give
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the diagnostic intervention less power to cause change in the school. DOE liaisons are
charged with connecting to the schools and supporting improvements. While they
recognize that they must also hold schools accountable for improvement, their dual role
contributes to the DOE’s ability to change the implementation of new school
accountability from one which is deterrent to one which is enabling for the
underperforming school.
In some senses “going native” (Christie, ABC Consulting) can help the DOE
liaison to collaborate with underperforming school principals and teachers as well as
district administrators. As one moves further up the chain of command in the DOE,
however, it seems that the administrators tend to be stronger advocates for accountability
rather than support. Comments from Daphne indicate that the DOE is organized to play
both roles intentionally, so it is not surprising to find that the DOE staff at the bottom of
the organization (DOE liaisons) tend to be more supportive toward the school than they
are at holding the school accountable. As you move up the hierarchy within the DOE, the
degree to which the staff holds a school accountable increases as the support decreases.
Throughout the organization, support and accountability exist. They even have a
symbiotic relationship, with one looming larger than the other depending upon the
situation and the level in the hierarchy which the DOE administrator works.
Evolution or Negotiation of Policy Implementation
Under the constraints of limited capacity the state, the district, and the
underperforming schools must work to fit the policy into their organizations so that it
makes sense for their organizations. The evolution of the early intervention (policy
implementation) is evidence of Lipsky’s (1977) and Elmore’s (1979) suggestion that
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policy implementation is negotiated as it is implemented to better fit the organization.
Changes in the process and understanding at the state and local level have contributed to
significant changes in the perceptions the DOE, the district, and the underperforming
school have about one another and thus have altered the way the organizations function
together within the public education system.
From the beginning the DOE has established a “culture” of support that pervades
new school accountability policy implementation. During early intervention, each of the
partners (contractors and the districts) are encouraged by administrators at the highest
levels of the DOE to adhere to a common tone of support and sincerity when
implementing new school accountability policy. Christie discusses the DOE’s earnest
desire to work with underperforming schools to improve the existing public education
system.
You know, [the DOE staff] are always working a gazillion hours to
do everything possible to support the schools. And, you know,
that’s a culture. My personal belief is that Daphne is responsible
for that culture. ... [S]he surrounds her people with the notion that,
you know, that their job is to be the strongest support for the
schools. ...That’s what they see themselves as, but they also see
the constraints of not having enough people to do exactly, to do it
right and to do it well by their standards. So, there’s a level of
frustration that I sense because they know that there are more
things that could be done. There are more things that should be
done, but they just don’t have the number of hours or the number
of people to do it. (Christie, ABC Consulting)
Even within the capacity limitations, the supportive culture and the right people to
carry out the support to the schools has led to changes in the state and school relationship.
A sign of the change in state and local relationship is in the difference between the
reaction toward the state when school accountability policy was first implemented (2000)
and the more recent years. The DOE and ABC Consulting staff members recount the
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reaction of schools toward early state intervention teams as “defensive” during the early
years. Daphne discusses the change.
... the more practitioners we involved in our School [Panel]
Review process who got to participate, understand what it was we
were looking for, come to a training where I was able to explain to
them what we were really trying to do here. So, as the word got
out, people although it still makes them very uptight, have become
much more accepting. (Daphne, DOE)
The state teams still encounter nervousness and milder levels of defensiveness during
school visits, but note a remarkable difference and lessening of the defensiveness. The
relationship and expectations between the state and the underperforming school have
changed since the first years of implementation. More than likely it is because the
frequency of early intervention has increased, information about the process has spread
among the lower ranks of the public education system, and because the district, especially
the specialists, provides additional support and information to those within the
underperforming schools.
Over the many cycles of underperforming school reviews, the behavior and policy
implementation methods of the DOE have bestowed a new, and more cooperative starting
point for early intervention. Beyond the local level changes, those in the DOE believe
these changes have come about because of the clear and sincere message the DOE sends
to the school about needing them as partners during implementation combined with the
strategy of expanding their capacity to support schools with the help of the district
superintendents and specialists. As Daphne states when referring to the district school
support specialists, “They’re a bridge.” The school support specialists provide an
important and consistent connection between the DOE, the district, and the
underperforming school.
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Specific changes in the early intervention process framework since new school
accountability policy has been implemented are another outcome of negotiations. One
important change has been the timing of state visits to underperforming schools.
Originally the underperforming schools went through school panel reviews in the
springtime, attended a Performance Improvement Measurement (PIM) training session
over the summer, and were visited for a Fact Finding Review in the fall. In these cases,
the state teams often found that dramatic changes were made in between the Panel
Review and the Fact Finding Review because of a summer of planning and staff changes.
Additionally, the original timing of early intervention meant that the school teams at PIM
were heading into a planning session without the diagnostic information from the Fact
Finding Review. The timeline has been changed in the last two years because the DOE
listened to the districts and schools and felt it would be better to have the Fact Finding
Review report information for the underperforming school team during the PIM training.
Therefore, last year the Fact Finding Reviews were held in the later spring (May/June).
In the 2005 underperforming review cycle, the DOE is altering the timeline even further.
The School Panel Reviews will be conducted in the fall of the school year, and the Fact
Finding Reviews will be held in the early spring to allow more time for the school to plan
for improvement.
Another alteration to the school accountability framework is the decision to have
DOE liaisons have territories (much like sales people), which enhances their ability to
develop relationships with a district and a school. Because the liaison is often visiting
more than one school within a district, there is a greater familiarity with the district
players. On occasions the ABC Consulting panelists mentioned, and I observed, the
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DOE liaison justify or translate information provided by a superintendent or district
representative for a School Panel or Fact Finding Panel Review based on “knowing” him
or her. It suggests that early intervention policy strengthens the relationship between the
DOE and the underperforming school, and perhaps even more so contributes to a stronger
working relationship between the DOE and the district. The DOE liaisons become an
advocate of the district, and by the time of the Fact Finding Review, a relationship with
the principal makes them an advocate for the school.
In the most recent year there has been an attempt by the DOE to have ABC
Consulting use the same (ABC Consulting) Chair for an individual school’s School Panel
and Fact Finding Reviews, provided there was no conflict between the principal/school
staff and the chair during the School Panel Review. State level participants report that
using the same Chair (ABC Consultant) on both the School Panel and Fact Finding
Reviews allows for a more in-depth Fact Finding visit (diagnosis), because there is
already some familiarity with the school, beyond simply having read the School Panel
Review report. Additionally the ABC Consultants, who go on both School Panel and
Fact Finding Reviews, indicated that when the principal and staff within a school see a
familiar face it puts the staff at ease and is helpful in allaying any fear and/or anxiety
within the school.
Another reason for using the same Chair (ABC Consulting) on the School Panel
and Fact Finding Reviews may be because the length of time of the Fact Finding Review
has been shortened from the original 10 days, to 4 days and now to three which has been
attributed to limited financial resources. Having the same Chair at both reviews shortens
the time it takes those in the school to warm up to the state panel. In fact Christie and
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Chuck from ABC Consulting stated that with the change there is not as much of a
learning curve with the process and that the reports are likely comparable to the reports
developed during the longer visits of the past.

Conclusion
From the perspective of the state DOE and ABC Consulting, cooperation and a
working relationship are at the heart of the early intervention. Initially, the positive and
cooperative approach was surprising based on the deterrent nature of the new school
accountability policy language. However, it quickly became apparent that after the
deterrent threats of new school accountability were realized, that to continue down a path
where threat was the motivation would quickly undermine any real efforts to improve
educational outcomes within the underperforming schools. Deterrent systems of
implementation imply that expertise exists primarily at the top of the organization.
Rather, a state public education system is loosely coupled with professional
educators (and expertise) at the bottom levels of the organization. The real challenge
seems to be bridging the state’s external accountability system and the school’s internal
accountability system, which is controlled by the professional educators within the
underperforming school. Consequently, the DOE’s switch from the deterrent nature of
the policy language to an enabling system of implementation that incorporates the
professional judgment, persuasion, and negotiation of the policy to fit the context of the
organization is a better implementation choice.
An enabling system of implementation is the type of implementation traditionally
found in the public education system, but more than tradition, the capacity limitations at
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the state level force the DOE to alter its approach to the beginning of intervention.
Deterrent systems of intervention require centralized resources for effective
implementation (Bardach, 1977). Enabling systems require a strong sense of professional
duty as incentive and motivation to implement policy (Bardach, 1977). Because the DOE
has been able to intervene in less that 10% of the schools that are underperforming in
Massachusetts, efforts to expand capacity are the driving force behind the state’s
implementation of new school accountability policy.
Capacity limitations at the state level create a dependence upon the educators
within the underperforming school to take on their own improvement efforts within the
one best framework of implementation the DOE had developed. Enabling the
professional educators within the underperforming school is a primary goal for the DOE.
By developing educator capacity to address the issues causing underperformance
(through the PIM process), the DOE is imbuing educators by providing them with
capacity and tools to develop their own improvement strategies.
Early intervention strategies improve the DOE’s credibility in the eyes of the
educators within the underperforming schools, and they encourage a mutually respectful
type of relationship with the school. ABC Consulting plays a critical role in enhancing
the credibility of the DOE by providing experienced (and often retired) administrators
and staff mixed with practitioner panelists who are trained to put relationship building
and respect at the center of their process. Also, the DOE liaisons are encouraged to be
supportive toward the principal and educators, rather than critical of the educators within
the school. These efforts help to build a positive working relationship between the DOE
and the underperforming school from the start.
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Throughout the state level, support and accountability have a symbiotic
relationship during the beginning of intervention. Though much of early intervention is
based on supporting the school and equipping educators with the tools they need to
develop improvement strategies, there is still an element of accountability which the
DOE staff use as they see fit. DOE staff at the lower levels of the organization tend to be
more supportive and are encouraged to be supportive by their superiors. At the higher
levels of the organization, however, the DOE administrators realize they must be strong
with educators in the underperforming schools and hold them accountable. The dual role
and relationship can be difficult to juggle, but throughout the process is clearly
sympathetic to the hard working educator in the underperforming school.
The DOE has partnered with the districts to expand the state and local capacity to
intervene in underperforming schools. By providing the districts with school support
specialists, the DOE has expanded the district’s ability and vicariously the DOE’s ability
to intervene in schools (through the work of the specialists). By providing specialists
with regular training and developing an informal and formal communication network at
the district level, the DOE receives feedback and is able to negotiation the
implementation of policy so that it fits the local context. Partnering between the two has
been made easier because the district accountability office is outside of the DOE. So the
DOE support efforts toward the district are seen as genuine without strings of
accountability (at least by DOE) attached to them.
The DOE is dependent upon a positive working relationship, or at least not a
negative working relationship, with the underperforming school during the beginning of
intervention to impact improvement and avoid the strong interventions that the DOE has
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even less capacity to implement. DOE and ABC Consulting seem to implicitly recognize
the dependency. Credibility offered by the experts from ABC Consulting, and support
offered by the DOE liaisons, are the olive branches offered to the local district
administrators and the underperforming school educators in an effort to initiate a positive
relationship. The beginning of intervention brings with it many shifts in perception of
new school accountability policy. Clearly, from the state perspective intervention brings
a switch from a deterrent system of implementation to one which enables educators to
make real changes after receiving state led capacity building professional development.
The most important change for those in the school is to understand that the DOE is
implementing “one best framework” rather than one best system. As an organization it is
more than willing to negotiate the implementation of new school accountability policy, in
fact, the DOE staff expect the educators in the underperforming school to take on the
responsibility for school improvement.
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CHAPTER VI
THE LOCAL LEVEL

The original definition of the “local level” in this study was the underperforming
schools, meaning the perceptions of the principals and teachers from within the two
schools selected for study. A surprise, however, was the influential role the district plays.
Specifically, the engagement of the district by the DOE administrators, and to a lesser
degree the principals and faculty members in the underperforming schools, pushes the
district to spend additional resources of time and attention on the underperforming
school. In the end, the district is at the center of new school accountability
implementation, plays a critical role during early intervention. Thus, the district had to
be included as part of the definition of the local level.
In many ways the district is encouraged by the DOE to provide the bridge or play
a “fixer” role (Bardach, 1977) in the implementation of the Massachusetts Education
Reform Act, 1993 and NCLB during the beginning of intervention between the state and
local levels. The local level is where new school accountability policy implementation is
negotiated, and the district administrators become the diplomatic ambassadors working
on behalf of the state and the schools. The district staff (specifically the school support
specialists) are the negotiators and translators for the implementation of state policy into
a district an underperforming school’s unique local context.
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Table 6.1 is a list of the local level interview participants and their organizational
affiliations. All names of individuals and the organizations have been changed to protect
their privacy.
Table 6.1: Charlesburg Public School District Local Level Participants

District Administrators

(n=2)

Stan

School Support Specialist
(specialist)

Sandy

School Support Specialist
(specialist)

Alfred Elementary
School

(n=4)

Mr. Arnold

Principal

Anita

Teacher

Amelia

Teacher

Adeline

Teacher

Babson Elementary
School

(n=4)

Ms. Beth

Principal

Brenda

Teacher

Bridget

Teacher

Barbara

Teacher

The Charlesburg Public School District1
The Charlesburg Public School District, of which the Alfred and Babson
Elementary Schools are a part, is a typical mid to large size urban district with roots in
the manufacturing and mill technology of New England. The city has a diverse

1 For more detailed information about the Charlesburg School District see appendix C.
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population that is 56% White, 21% Black or African American, 2% Asian and 16.4%
other race (Massachusetts Department of Housing and Community Development, 2004).
Nearly 30% of the Hispanic population is of Puerto Rican descent. The median
household income is $30,417 in the 2000 Census Community Profile as compared to the
state’s $50,502 as reported on the 2000 Census Massachusetts Profile (U.S. Census
Bureau, 2000).
Within the past year the Charlesburg district has faced many fiscal problems
attributed to the stagnation of state aid. The Charlesburg Public School District has been
impacted by the state of affairs, but its funding has remained somewhat level.
There are a total of 47 schools in the Charlesburg Public School District, 32 of
which are elementary schools. Per pupil expenditures have been increasing since 1993
because of changes made to the state aid formula when the state’s comprehensive
education legislation, the Massachusetts Education Reform Act, 1993 (MERA) was
passed. The state funding formula that came out of MERA has increased state aid to
urban districts like Charlesburg. Most importantly, MERA has leveled the fluctuations in
funding levels from year to year by establishing a required level of school spending.
Within the district more than three quarters of the students are considered low income
and over 30% of the students, who attend the Charlesburg Schools, do not speak English
as their first language or are considered “limited English proficient.”
Because of budget issues, there has been a slight decline in the number of teachers
working in Charlesburg schools. At the same time, there has been a slight increase in
student enrollment. Salaries of teachers are slightly below the state average (Table 6.2).
Teacher salaries are a big issue in the district because there have been no raises for more
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than three years due to the city not funding union contracts. As a result, district and
school level staff report low morale and frustration.
Table 6.2: Charlesburg Public School District Teacher Salaries and Counts as
Compared with the State, 1999 and 2003
District

Salary Totals
Average Salary
FTE Count

State

1999

2003

1999

2003

$92,892,766

$102,506,941

$3,081,654,861

$3,603,600,648

$43,622

$50,801

$45,149

$51,803

2,129.50

2,017.80

68,255.80
69,562.90
(Massachusetts Department of Education)

In many of the interviews with district and school staff, there was mention that
there have been no pay raises for over three years. The average teacher salary continues
to be lower than the state average and has contributed to some of the losses in teaching
staff. A few of the interviewees mentioned that the practice of teachers taking jobs in
surrounding school districts that are seen as less challenging places to work than
Charlesburg, for more pay than Charlesburg was able to offer, has been increasing in
frequency. Adding to the challenge of experienced teachers leaving the district, the
student population has grown slightly since 1999, while the number of teachers has
decreased.
Role of the District: The Negotiator
Two of the school support specialists were interviewed because of their dual roles
as members of the district and as specialists. DOE requires all school support specialists
to be veterans of both the Massachusetts public education system and the district in which
they are working. Stan has been working in the Charlesburg District for 32 years.
Fourteen of those years were spent as a teacher. After being a teacher, he became a
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counselor, an assistant principal, and eventually he worked in a variety of capacities at
the district level. He is well liked by all who I spoke with in the district and schools and
is designated by the superintendent as the person in charge of underperforming schools.
Sandy has been in public education for over 32 years and in the Charlesburg district for
27 years. She has been a teacher, grant administrator, and central office administrator.
She is a detail oriented and focused administrator. Both Stan and Sandy as school
support specialists felt the importance of their work and in many examples were able to
enlist the help and support of others in the district office (e.g., curriculum coordinators
and content specialists) to work with the underperforming schools.
The school support specialists are the connection to the underperforming schools,
the district, and the DOE. They are in the middle of it all. As advocates for the
underperforming schools within the district, the specialists provide a strong and direct
connection between the underperforming school and the district, as well as the district
and the state. Both describe efforts they have made to make people in the district
comfortable with the idea of working with the schools and the state. Prior to new school
accountability policy, the schools, district, and DOE had essentially been working
independently of one another, and the specialists create a bridge of communication to the
DOE and support and communication to the schools. Having the connection is important
to the DOE because it lessens miscommunication between the DOE and the
underperforming school, it increases feedback from the targets of new school
accountability policy, and it creates a place for all parties to develop a theory of action
around the policy. For the schools, it is critical because they are not in the habit of
contacting the state when troubles arise. Rather, they turn to the district. Now that there

148

is someone at the district level to work with them, they are more likely to get an
appropriate and timely response and support.
The specialists must juggle the counseling and supportive role with the
accountability role at the district level. The “human piece” (Sandy, Charlesburg District)
is an important element to the process. Principals feel threatened by the process. In fact,
Sandy said, “I really worry sometimes if they’ll have a heart attack over this thing.” And
Stan refers to the “art” of balancing support and accountability when relating to those in
the schools. Embedded in their understanding of their role is the idea of building a
relationship with the school. Having the “right people,” who understand when they need
to support or to hold a school principal accountable is identified as a critical part of their
jobs. Juggling of these roles is an obvious place where the specialists are able to
negotiate the implementation of new school accountability policy within the school.
The school support specialists believe there are two major components of public
education that contribute to the switch from a deterrent to an enabling understanding of
new school accountability policy. First, the beginning of intervention by the DOE
captures the attention of the school principal and teachers in a way the district could not.
The DOE is considered an outsider removed from the politics of the district and the
school. Consequently, those in the school feel more obliged to listen to the state about
the issues within the school. Second, the professional integrity of educators means that
“people really want to be seen as good educators” (Stan, Charlesburg District). The
inherent desire for educators as professionals concerned with and “very much invested in
how they are seen academically” (Stan, Charlesburg District) makes an outsider’s critique
of the school more valid than if a district level person did it. The specialists concede that
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the principal and teachers in the underperforming school are upset and angry initially, but
eventually, their professionalism as educators pushes them into mobilizing and taking on
the challenges within an underperforming school.
The specialists find that principals and teachers have one of two responses toward
new school accountability and early intervention. Either they move forward and start
making changes, or they are paralyzed. The specialists feel it is their job to encourage the
principals and teachers to view the state’s outside assessment as an opportunity to make
changes, which professionally they already knew needed to happen. The district
specialists generally believe that the power to improve exists within the underperforming
school (after some staffing changes). It is simply a matter of providing focus and tapping
into the educators’ professional work ethic.
More than any other participants, the school support specialists repeatedly spoke
of the change occurring in how the different levels of the public education system relate
with one another because of new school accountability policy. They see change in their
relationship with the DOE and in their relationship with the school because of school
accountability policy. They know they are acting differently. Before they felt that the
DOE was “underutilized,” and now they realize the DOE staff are “not ogres” (Sandy,
Charlesburg District) but simply people who are trying to help them. They also have an
idea that the schools may have felt the same way about the district level administrators.
The DOE and the school participants view the district as the entity responsible for
improving the delivery of education; however, the district school support specialists were
not as explicit about taking on the responsibility. Sandy explains, “.. .it’s not always
entirely clear what the DOE does, what the district does, and what the school does [under
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new school accountability policy.” According to them the DOE “works” with the district
and the school support specialists to “define what each... is supposed to be doing”
(Sandy, Charlesburg District). Neither specialist explicitly stated that the district is
responsible for school improvement. What they do know is that they are individually
responsible for the improvement of the state determined underperforming schools and
maybe that is enough of an understanding.
District specialists tend to see accountability in terms of everyone (including the
DOE) being held accountable. Their perception is a testimony to the degree to which
DOE has developed a cooperative working relationship with the district. Stan talked
about the DOE administrators realizing that they would be held accountable for how well
they interacted with the districts in need or with schools in need. The state’s district
accountability system compounds the urgency of improving schools because it holds
districts accountable for how well the schools are doing. Consequently, the school
support specialists believe that building a stronger relationship with the schools and
improving educational outcomes will keep the district out of trouble with the state. The
threat of district accountability is at least part of the incentive for the district to engage
with and develop a new kind of working relationship with the schools.
As a school support specialist, Sandy describes the feeling of being in the middle
of trying to improve schools, work in the district, and work with the DOE as, “[feeling]
like you’re trying to keep all the balls in the air, and.. .am I getting the work done that I
need to do?” Bearing the responsibility for improving schools and keeping the district
out of trouble with the state is a lot of pressure for the school support specialists.
Fortunately, as veterans of the district they have a wide network of contacts and support
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within the district and a new connection to members of the DOE who work with them for
the common goal of improving public education in the Charlesburg District.
The district’s school support specialists are purposely placed in the middle of new
school accountability policy implementation. They have the ability to negotiate change
at the state level as well as at the local level. Trained by the DOE and largely hired for
their professional judgment, the school support specialists are the negotiators during early
intervention. They are constantly making sense of the policy as it relates to the
Charlesburg District and making it accessible to the underperforming school principals
and teachers. In instances when they cannot make sense of the policy, the specialists turn
to the DOE to discuss their challenges and negotiate a workable solution. It is a give and
take.
Rather than allowing district administrators to make decisions about how well or
not so well the policy fits in their district, the DOE has built an ally and “fixer” into the
implementation process. The school support specialists must consistently follow the
implementation of new school accountability policy strategies within each
underperforming schools and make adjustments to implementation (Stan calls this an
“art”) so that it makes sense for the school and for the intent of the policy. Negotiation of
implementation is a natural part of the specialists’ role and is evident in their district’s
working relationships with the DOE and the underperforming schools. The district’s role
in new school accountability policy implementation and early intervention is explored
further in chapter 8. Now the targets of the policy, the underperforming schools are
examined.
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The Underperforming Schools
The two elementary schools in the study are elementary schools from the
Charlesburg School District. Alfred Elementary School was declared underperforming in
the 2002-2003 academic year (2003 underperforming school review cycle) and Babson
Elementary School was declared underperforming in the following 2003-2004 academic
year (2004 underperforming school review cycle). In both instances the principal, who
was in charge of the school when it was declared underperforming, was subsequently
removed from the school.
The DOE does not track the exact number of principals removed in the midst of
early intervention, but there is general agreement that designation of a school as
underperforming is usually followed by a change in leadership, especially in the
Charlesburg District. The removal of the principal is typically the action a superintendent
takes once a school is declared underperforming. In the Charlesburg District, in all but
one of the schools declared underperforming by the state, a new principal was placed at
the helm of the school by the summer following the school year in which a school was
declared underperforming. Generally, principals are replaced before the school goes into
the state mandated school improvement planning process (PIM training), which is
conducted over the summer.
With the exception of the number of English Language Learners (ELL), the two
elementary schools have fairly similar student bodies. The Babson School has a larger
student population (n=321) than the Alfred School (n=280). Also, the student
populations are similar in terms of percentages of student who are from low-income
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backgrounds and who require special education. Babson Elementary, however, serves a
much higher number of “First Language Not English” and “Limited English Proficient”
students. The racial composition of the student body between the two schools is similar
(Table 6.3). The student to teacher ratio is lower in Babson Elementary, and may be
attributed to the larger population of ELL students (Table 6.4). The Charlesburg District
has a policy regarding student teacher ratios and by most reports they have met the
demands of the policy.

Table 6.3: Percentage of Selected Student Populations (2003-2004)

% of
Alfred
Elementary

%of
Babson
Elementary

%of
Charlesburg
School
District

First Language not
English

2.3

31.3

17

Limited English Proficient
Low-income
Special Education

0.4
84.3
13.0

%of
Massachusetts
13.7

26.4
11.6
5
84.9
77.1
27.2
20.0
15.6
12.9
(Massachusetts Department of Education, 2004)

Table 6.4: Distribution Pupils by Race October 1, 2004
% Native
American

%
Asian

% African
American

% Hispanic

% White

Charlesburg District
Alfred Elementary

0.2%
0.0%

2.5%
2.1%

27.9%
21.8%

49.9%
58.2%

19.5%
17.9%

Babson Elementary

0.3%

3.4%
15.0%
19.3%
62.0%
(Massachusetts Department of Education, 2004)
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Table 6.5: Teacher Data (2003-2004)
Alfred
Elementary

Babson
Elementary

Charlesburg
District

Massachusetts

20

34

2,302

72,062

Teaching Assignment
% of Core Academic
Teachers Identified as
Highly Qualified

100

91.2

88.9

93.9

100

90.3

86.8

93.9

Student/Teacher Ratio

13.1 to 1

Total # of Teachers

% of Teachers Licensed in

11.4 to 1
13.6 to 1
10.9 to 1
(Massachusetts Department of Education, 2004)

Alfred Elementary School2
Like many of the school buildings in the district, Alfred Elementary was built
during the early 1900’s. It is embedded in a neighborhood, surrounded by homes on all
sides. There are 280 students attending the school in grades K-5. There are a total of 20
teachers working in the building. Alfred Elementary School is an older building that is
well-maintained in the inside, but looks in need of repair from the outside. It is a small
school on a single floor with an open courtyard in the center. There is practically no
technology in the school, and teachers describe the supplies of educational materials as
limited at best.
The principal of the Alfred Elementary is Mr. Arnold. He came to Alfred
Elementary in the summer after the school was declared underperforming by the DOE
(during the 2003 underperforming school review cycle). Mr. Arnold has been in the
district for over ten years as a teacher and a counselor. He was an assistant principal for
2 Early intervention had a different timeline during the year Alfred Elementary was declared
underperforming. Alfred Elementary was declared underperforming during the 2003 review cycle. The
PIM was held in the summer following the School Panel Review (as it still is), and the Fact Finding
Review was conducted the following fall (rather than in the spring prior to the PIM training as it is now).
Therefore, Mr. Arnold participated in the PIM and the Fact Finding Review. In fact, he was hired a few
days prior to attending the state PIM training.

155

one year and then became a principal, for the first time, at Alfred Elementary School. He
is in his early thirties and extremely energetic, focused, and clearly involved with all of
the teachers. During visits to the school, it became clear that there is a strong, respectful,
working relationship with many of the teachers in the building. Interviews with teachers
in the school support this assertion. Even though the school has recently made its annual
yearly progress (AYP) goals, it is required to be monitored for two years after being
declared underperforming by the state. Because the school has achieved AYP, those in
the school have a sense of success, though Mr. Arnold and some of the teachers feel that
there is still much to do and plenty of improvement to be made. The attitude that
prevailed in the school is one of focus, determination, and collegiality.
The three teachers interviewed from the school were indirectly and directly
connected to the underperforming school early intervention by the state. Anita is a
teacher in her mid forties and has taught in the school for three years. She has worked as
a drug counselor in the city of Charlesburg and been involved in education for ten years.
She is an active member of the faculty and advocate within the school, though because of
family issues did not participate in the school improvement planning process that took
place after school hours and over the summer. Amelia is a teacher in her early thirties
and has worked as a teacher in the school and Charlesburg district for five years. Though
more reserved, she did participate on the school improvement planning team when the
district ran the process the year prior to her school being declared underperforming.
After the state came in, she handed over the duties to other teachers in the building, but
communicated with them regularly. Adeline is in her early fifties and has taught in the
school and district for seven years, after switching to teaching in mid career. She
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conveys a positive attitude and is an active participant in the school having participated
on the PIM team during the year of their intervention (last year). Collectively the
teachers provide insight to many aspects of new school accountability policy during early
intervention.
When speaking to the new principal and the teachers, they each point to the same
problems in the school prior to state intervention: the old principal was ineffective and
caused many problems amongst the teaching faculty. The teachers feel the district
administrators were aware of the issues and did nothing to help the situation. Mr. Arnold
believes, “[The teachers] deliberately were fighting against the past administrator, and I
think they stopped teaching.” The teachers describe the former principal as someone who
played favorites, who was mercurial in nature, and who really just wanted to shut her
door and not be bothered with the running of the school. One teacher described the
dissension between the faculty and the principal and how the teachers together
contemplated getting the superintendent’s attention.
...I remember there being times where... the teachers said, ‘Well
what if we just all sit out in front of the building today and just
refuse to come in?’ You know? What kind of message would that
send to the superintendent... that we have a very ineffective leader
in our building? And, of course we’re all professionals here, and
we wouldn’t do that. But... what does it need to take? There were
numerous complaints and so forth. So, I don’t know how [the
district administrators] were unaware. (Amelia, teacher, Alfred
Elementary)
Another spoke of the challenge of engaging the district
We were very glad to see [the DOE] come in because nothing was
getting done district wide. No matter, how many grievances were
filed, how many reports were filed, nothing was getting done at the
district level. We kept on being promised but nothing was getting
done. (Adeline, teacher, Alfred Elementary)
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Like Adeline, each of the teachers mentioned that many complaints had been filed at the
district office, but they were met with no district response until the state decided to visit
the school. The new principal, Mr. Arnold, was a part of the district response.
After being declared underperforming in the spring of 2003, the school lost nine
teachers or 45% of the teachers in the building, and the principal was removed and placed
into a central office position. It is not clear what this says about district staff. The
impression given from the specialists is that sometimes a principal is placed into a school
that he or she may be ill-equipped to manage. The problem is characterized as a bad fit
between the needs of the school and the skills of the principal, rather than as a bad
principal. The district staff seem to be aware that there are mismatches between schools
and principals, but because there are so few qualified principals, they do not have a
choice in the matter. Candidates for principal are often weak or inexperienced because
there is a shortage of qualified elementary school principals (National Association of
Elementary School Principals, 2005), and district staff identified this is a challenge.
Additionally, they agreed that there is an unwillingness at the district superintendent level
to fire principals who do not fit into difficult leadership positions.
With a new administrator and nearly half the staff new to the school, things at
Alfred Elementary dramatically changed between the time of the School Panel and Fact
Finding Reviews. Teachers in the school felt the change immediately. On the whole the
teaching faculty understood that prior to intervention the school was an underperforming
school. Adeline explains,
... before we were identified as underperforming, in my opinion,
and talking to other staff members that were here at the time, we
all felt that we were an underperforming school. We were a school
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that lacked direction... and... congeniality, there just wasn’t any.
We worked. We left. (Adeline, teacher, Alfred Elementary)
The professional judgment of the teachers in the school is that it was underperforming
long before the state visit. In fact, many of the teachers discussed a downward spiral for
over five years in which the district provided no help. Because of the situation at the
school the teachers felt that any kind of help, even the severity of a state visit had to make
things better.
The district staff reported that they were aware the test scores at Alfred
Elementary were not good. However, the district’s own capacity limitations made it
difficult for them to address the issues at the school. Sandy describes a possible scenario:
[It] could be that the current principal or the past principal cut off
all communications with the people at central office that could help
him or her for whatever reason; it could be that [the principals are]
managers - in other words, they keep the building quiet, there’s no
parents coming down here [to the district office] and complaining
but they don’t let anybody in. Nobody really has a sense of what’s
going on [in the school]... (Sandy, Charlesburg District)
There is an expectation that the school principal will reach out to the district, and that the
district, with its own limitations of capacity, can easily ignore a school that is not
engaged with the district because there are so many other things that must be done. The
onus of responsibility for school improvement at the local level, therefore, is upon the
principal. The district tended not to interfere as long as there were no parents
complaining.
After the school was identified as underperforming, Mr. Arnold felt there were
tremendous supports from the district. It is clear the district involvement in and
connection with the school has made a huge difference in the school. Since being
declared underperforming, Alfred Elementary has been a success story as it has had
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modest gains in student test scores in the first year of being monitored, and the teachers
and principal alike are pleased with the improvement, though each admits there is a long
road ahead. A positive attitude permeated the building and the interviews.
Babson Elementary School
Babson Elementary is an older school built in the early 1900’s. Though it is old,
the inside has interesting architecture with two grand staircases that come down and spill
out into the front foyer. There are classrooms on three floors, the basement, first and
second floors. The woodwork in the building is well maintained, and the classrooms I
visited looked like elementary school classrooms in any school. The kindergarten
through fifth grade school serves 320 students and has 34 teachers. In the school, the
new principal and three teachers were interviewed about their perceptions of new school
accountability policy and the working relationship between the state and their school.
The principal of the Babson Elementary is Ms. Beth. Ms Beth is in her mid fifties
and was transferred to the Babson Elementary from another school at which she was the
principal for ten years. She was bom and raised in the city and in her own words,
“bought a plot in the cemetery” so she’ll “likely die here.” She has worked for the
district for over thirty years and is very much engaged in the politics of the district. She
said she was not surprised when she heard Babson Elementary was going to be declared
underperforming, because the “administrators meet regularly, and they know what’s
going on in the district.” She describes feeling “ashamed” of being in charge of an
underperforming school and feels she had no choice but to move to this school if she
wanted to still be a principal in Charlesburg. In our conversation it was clear that she still
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had a foot in her old school. In fact, she noted that she “will be very disappointed if my
name is not on the [old school’s] report card.”
The three teachers interviewed are members of the school’s PIM team and are
therefore more intimately familiar with early intervention and new school accountability
policy. Brenda is in her early thirties, has been working at Babson Elementary for six
years and has been working in the Charlesburg school district for 7 years. She has taught
in the classroom for over a decade and has an allegiance to the school, despite the fact
that most of her former colleagues have left the school. Brenda is highly involved in the
school and the school improvement planning process and has been since the year prior to
its being declared underperforming when the district implemented a school improvement
planning process. Bridget is in her late forties and has also been involved in the school
improvement planning process with Brenda. She has taught at Babson Elementary and in
the district for a total of 6 years. Prior to coming to Charlesburg, she taught for over ten
years in private schools in the United States and internationally. Bridget is engaged in
the planning process and has seen a positive change in morale amongst the staff since Ms.
Beth has arrived as the principal of the school. Barbara is in her mid fifties and is a
professional development teacher at Babson Elementary. She came to the school with
Ms. Beth. She is a member of the PEM team and has long been Ms. Beth’s colleague.
She has been working in the Charlesburg Public Schools for 33 years in a number of
capacities. Barbara has served as a classroom teacher and a Title I teacher in reading and
math. She works closely with Ms. Beth and brings a friendly sense of humor to the
planning process.
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When the school was declared underperforming approximately 80% of the staff
transferred out of Babson Elementary. Over the summer Ms. Beth had to hire nearly an
entire school of new teachers, adding to the challenges of being put in charge of
overseeing an underperforming school. While high staff turnover does occur once a
school is declared underperforming, school and district people interviewed indicated that
by all accounts the turnover at Babson Elementary was extraordinarily high.
Being a veteran and replacement principal at Babson Elementary brings about
many challenges for a new principal in the underperforming elementary school. First,
there is a degree of personal reconciliation about why you, as a principal, are put in the
school. As a professional, the principal wants to do the best she can, however personally
she feels some shame in being associated with an underperforming school. For Ms. Beth
it is especially true. She felt as though she had no choice but to move from the high
performing school she was principal of to Babson, because the superintendent required
her to change. There is a sense that Ms. Beth knows she is a good principal, but facing
the hard work to improve an underperforming school, on a personal level, is
overwhelming.
Ms Beth’s feelings about not being supported by the state or by the district may
be attributed to the disruption in the working relationship over early intervention that
occurs when a principal is replaced. In fact, Ms. Beth was uncertain about who the DOE
liaison assigned to Babson Elementary even was. She was generally aware of a DOE
person that would check in on the PIM team, but was not sure what role that person
would or would not play in the future. At first she indicated that the district staff were
just as absent from the school. Because she was moved to the school under less than
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ideal circumstances, she felt the district staff and superintendent owed her support. Her
expectations of the level of support are high, and the district staff simply were not living
up to them. Eventually, she did mention that the two school support specialists were
involved in their improvement planning process and that they had been helpful to the
school.
Early intervention is designed to be supportive to the school prior to and during
the two review visits. Ms. Beth came to the school after these visits and thus did not feel
supported or connected to anyone at the DOE. Being new to the school and to the
process, she was forced to learn about the school and what it means to be
underperforming in a very short period of time. The demanding learning curve and
anxiety about taking charge of a new school contribute to the feelings of not being
supported, and indeed much of the DOE’s relationship building strategies are missed by a
new principal. It can be very isolating for the new principal.
Ms Beth was interviewed a few weeks prior to presenting Babson Elementary’s
school improvement plan to the state Board of Education (BOE). Upon approval by the
BOE, a new level of support is laid out for the school with the specialist and the DOE
liaison meeting regularly with the underperforming school principal. The shift from
being declared underperforming to being monitored by the state brings about a new round
of support and a new opportunity for a positive working relationship between the school
and the DOE and district. Indeed, in correspondence with Ms. Beth after the school’s
plan was approved by the BOE, she wrote,
My DOE [liaison] is great and very accommodating of her time to
me and the school. I have received a great deal of help from the
district level support specialists to date, and all school personnel
have called me in the last few months to offer any assistance. I
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have not asked for a great deal of help, only because of who and
what I’m all about. But, it is nice to know they really do care
about my students and staff. (Ms. Beth, principal, Babson
Elementary)
The comment is much more similar to the perspective of Mr. Arnold, who felt extremely
supported by the district. His school is further along on the early intervention process,
and therefore he was receiving more support. At the time of Ms. Beth’s interview she
had not yet presented her improvement plan before the Board of Education.
At Babson Elementary the School Panel Review and Fact Finding Review reports
along with principal and staff interviews point to a history of inadequate principal
leadership and district neglect. The last principal being ill-equipped for the school, and
the inconsistent quality of the teaching staff led to Babson Elementary being declared
underperforming. As each of the teachers said,
The administration wasn’t helping. The district wasn’t helping.
The kids were doing poor. The parents weren’t here. The teachers
were working hard. Some teachers weren’t. It was just a mess. It
was a mess. It really was...I’ve been here six years and [the
school] just kind of spiraled downward. (Brenda, teacher, Babson
Elementary)
I haven’t seen much of anything. I thought.. .the past few years
things had gotten worse than better within the school. And what
was going on in the school? And, I don’t’ mean to put anybody
down, but what I saw and what was going on in the classrooms. I
thought things had deteriorated. (Bridget, teacher, Babson
Elementary)
There were kids running around doing nothing. There were
classrooms we went into where there was no learning going
on...[T]here was nothing going on that looked like learning.
(Barbara, teacher, Babson Elementary)
Throughout the discussions with the principal and the teachers about Babson’s
underperforming status, there was a wavering between professional opinion and personal
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shame. Interestingly, each participant could identify the reasons that Babson Elementary
was declared underperforming, and none of the teachers felt that the declaration of
underperformance was a surprise. The school’s test scores were low, and the teachers
knew they would be reviewed by the state. Teachers said they knew about the problems
that were cited in the reports long before the state came into the school. Teachers
described a ripple effect within the school. Teaching was inconsistent in classrooms
because the principals over the years were not holding teachers accountable, and
principals were not being held accountable by the superintendent and district staff.
According to one teacher, “...[the district] was like, ‘Let’s forget you exist’” (Bridget,
teacher, Babson Elementary).
There had been problems in the school over a period of over six years, but
teachers felt helpless to change things within the school. Bridget said,
It’s not anybody’s fault, but my general feeling is that everybody
looks at us, the teachers, but they don’t look at all of the things.
And, they don’t want to hear these things. You do, you know, I
think people do the best they can with what they’ve got...”
(Bridget, teacher, Babson Elementary)
Teachers did the best they could, but remained isolated. Still, there is a palpable
sentiment of shame or maybe embarrassment in being associated with a state designated
underperforming school. Over the period of an interview the principal and the teachers
would oscillate between giving their professional opinion about the problems in the
school, which were in accord with the findings in the state reports, and the frustration and
embarrassment about what was written in the school’s Panel Review and Fact Finding
Review reports. Feelings amongst the staff about the DOE intervention can be described
best as complicated.
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When one teacher was asked about her feeling about new school accountability
policy, she stated, “Are you talking about the teachers being accountable for everything”
(Bridget, teacher, Babson Elementary)? Clearly, there is a degree of ownership
embedded within the professional tenets of the teachers, which pre-dates new school
accountability policy, but the understanding of the policy even as a school staff is
experiencing early intervention continues to be tainted by a less than desirable and less
than empowering perception of the policy.
The school staffs expectations of support from the district were very high and,
according to those in the school, they were unmet. In the year prior to being declared
underperforming, Babson Elementary along with all of the other district schools was
required by the district to participate in a school improvement planning process.
However, the district staff were unable to provide the level of support that many of the
schools needed. As Brenda explained,
We didn’t have any help. We made phone calls. District people
didn’t show up. .. .[T]hey had no idea. Supposedly they looked at
the [school improvement plan], and they sent it back and said we
had to make some changes. We did, but we didn’t have help.
Nobody really knew what they were doing including ourselves. It
was a work in process, but the district people really didn’t know,
...so we kind of got the run around. (Brenda, teacher, Babson
Elementary)
Before Ms. Beth came, [the district administrators] were not seen,
not heard. They didn’t show up. If we called for help, they didn’t
come. I mean, I’ve got to tell you. There are two stories. One
story was, ‘Yes, I called them to come, and they never showed up.’
Another [district’s side of the] story was, ‘Well, they were rude to
me when I got to the door, so I turned away, turned and walked
away.’ (Brenda, teacher, Babson Elementary)
Bridget also reported frustration with the lack of district support.
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You know, I just think the district; they come in and throw things
at us. And, you know, we’re supposed to do these things, but
nobody backs us up. Nobody comes in to retrain or model or do
anything. (Bridget, teacher, Babson Elementary)
The working relationship between the state and the underperforming school had less
“baggage” because there are fewer expectations for the relationship. The district,
however, must confront and overcome a prevalent feeling of neglect and anger about the
neglect amongst the staff within the underperforming school.

The Local Context
There are differences between the two schools in the way each of the principals
and teachers perceive the beginning of intervention. Not surprisingly, the unique
characteristics within any given school may account for differences in how a school
responds to early intervention. O’Day (2004) found that “.. .this unevenness may be
directly tied to the internal conditions in the schools that make them more or less able to
use information generated by the accountability system” (p. 25). The cohesiveness
among the staff, the internal trust among teachers, and the trust they have in the principal
each contribute to the differences (Bryk & Schneider, 2002).
Overall the teachers and principal at Alfred Elementary tended to be more
positive than the teachers and principal at Babson Elementary. The most obvious reason
for the difference is that Alfred Elementary had been declared underperforming in the
2003 underperforming school review cycle and had since had a round of testing in which
the school had shown enough improvement to move off the federal NCLB list, but still
monitored by the DOE. Having felt a small success and improvement, teachers and the
principal may see the beginning of intervention in a much different light than those
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teachers and the principal at Alfred Elementary who were still in the “thick of it” having
yet to complete their school improvement planning. The Alfred Elementary principal and
teachers still had to work long hours to conduct the data driven analysis required by PIM,
as well as doing their jobs at the school. Because PIM is the point where the school team
is expected to take responsibility for school improvement, it can be a difficult transition
for team members.
Another possible cause in the difference is the teaching staff in each of the
schools. At Babson Elementary nearly all of the staff left after the school was declared
underperforming, while at Alfred Elementary a little less than half of the staff left (still
quite a few, but not as dramatic). It may be evidence of difference in the levels of trust
and sense of collaboration and cohesion among the teachers in the school, with both
having a high teacher turnover, but Babson Elementary certainly having a much higher
loss. At Babson Elementary, the norms of the school environment were lost as the
veteran teachers became a minority group, while at Alfred Elementary, veteran teachers
were still the majority group.
Further, the School Panel Review and Fact Finding Review reports were different
and perceived differently by the staff between the two schools. At Alfred Elementary the
report was more focused on the inadequacy of the principal and instructional leadership
and less focused on problems in the classroom, though there were a few. Teachers at
Alfred truly felt that there was not a problem with them, but that it was the administrator,
and they strongly felt that state reports backed them up. Alfred teachers described a
cohesive group of educators who knew they were good teachers.

168

In contrast, Babson Elementary state reports were equally damning toward the
principal and the teachers in the classroom. Babson teachers described an environment in
the school where everyone just did their own thing. They expressed awareness that there
were teachers in the school who were not doing their job, but they felt helpless to make
any changes. The new principal and the teachers clearly stated that the principal was not
holding teachers accountable and the environment in the school was chaotic on a daily
basis. Teachers stated that they knew they were good teachers, but still felt like the
reports singled them out as bad teachers and took things out of context. The anger and
devastation after reading the reports and especially the Fact Finding Review report was
palpable at Babson Elementary.
New principals placed at each school changed the context in the school. Having
been placed in the school after it was declared underperforming and just prior to the PIM
training, principals were forced to enter into a state mandated school improvement
planning process at the helm of an underperforming school of which they knew very
little. In both cases the new principals started at the school less than a week prior to
having to go to PIM. Not knowing the teaching staff can make the PIM extremely
difficult for the new principal for the purposes of planning. In both instances they had to
hire many new teachers and were unable to do that until the end of the summer. So, they
were forced to lead a team to plan for the future of a school without knowing the existing
teaching staff and not knowing the qualifications of the staff he or she would be hiring.
Both principals stated that there were not many people interested in being the
principal of their schools, nor were many people interested in teaching at their schools.
Once a school is declared underperforming and the principal is removed, there are very
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few candidates from within the district who want to transfer to a school in which the state
is intervening. As a matter of fact, Mr. Arnold felt fortunate that he was able to get a
principal job so quickly because none of the current principals in the district were
interested in the job. He was able to apply and get the job without any prior experience
as a principal. In the case of Babson Elementary, Ms. Beth was the principal of a high
achieving school and was asked by the superintendent to take over as principal of Babson
Elementary. Ms. Beth did not want to leave her old school and especially did not want to
have to do the work of building a school from the “ground up.” However, she felt that
her choices were limited and that professionally she had to do her duty.
As much as an underperforming school is not the most desirable place for a
principal, it is even less desirable for teachers. Both principals discussed the difficulty in
finding teachers to fill the vacant positions. Mr. Arnold received help finding teachers
for the vacancies from the school support specialist. Ms. Beth, after having no one apply
for the vacancies and having over 80% of the teaching positions to fill, appealed for help
from the superintendent. She said that she was finally able to hire outside the district and
found teachers in the final weeks of summer.
Keeping up with the demands of being declared underperforming, providing
instructional leadership in the classrooms, training a new teaching staff, and securing the
resources needed in the school proved to be extremely demanding for each principal.
Being new to the school only made things more challenging, though each principal did
feel that entering the school buildings on the heels of an inadequate leader set the bar
low. Just talking with the teachers and getting district resources were improvements in
the school.
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Principals and teachers universally agreed that the schools were indeed
underperforming before the state intervention. They also agreed that being declared
underperforming by the state created many changes in their schools that would not have
occurred without state intervention. At least in the short term, the principals and teachers
believed these changes would lead to school improvement.

Conclusion
O’Day (2004) asserts that schools respond unevenly to school accountability
intervention strategies because they are starting from very different places. The evidence
from the local level participant surveys and observations supports O’Day’s (2004)
assertion in the cases of Alfred and Babson Elementary Schools. However, O’Day’s
point also implies that a state externally imposed accountability system will not impact
the underperforming school because it does not mobilize the professionally driven
internal accountability system within the school. The findings from Alfred Elementary
and Babson Elementary do not sufficiently support this argument.
Rather, the teachers from the underperforming schools claimed that the changes
that occurred in the schools after they were intervened in by the state would not have
happened if the schools had not been declared underperforming. The attention of the
DOE upon the schools caused rapid changes in the leadership and staffs of each school.
Prior to the beginning of intervention teachers identified problems within the school but
felt helpless to change them. In fact, some teachers went over the head of their principal
and complained to the district. They found the district to be unresponsive until the state
declared their school underperforming.
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In Alfred Elementary and in Babson Elementary, teachers in the schools clearly
articulated the feeling that the district had been neglecting their schools for five years or
longer. The beginning of state intervention changed the pattern of chronic neglect
between the district and the underperforming schools, when nothing else, even their
complaints, seemed to alter the relationship. As one specialist indicated, if no parents
were complaining, then the district did not take the time to look into a school. Even
teacher complaints did not alter the pattern.
The district’s role in neglecting the underperforming schools prior to state
intervention is an interesting one. The district staff experience their own limitations of
capacity. If, as Ms. Beth continually pointed out, everyone in the district knows where
the bad schools are and the ineffective administrators are, why did the district not
intervene in the schools? The reason lies in a traditional manifestation of bureaucracy in
the context of constrained resources. The district administrators worked with the school
principals and educators who were contacting the district staff and may have had smaller
problems to fix. The district administrators probably intended to help fix the small
problems and eventually get to the big problems. Another possible explanation is
Maynard Moody and Musheno’s (2004) assertion that clients must be deemed worthy of
services and respect the expertise of those delivering the services. The environment in
both schools described communication as cut-off from the district and isolated. The
district as deliverers of expertise were not always appropriately received by those in the
school, and therefore moved on to more “worthy” clients or schools.
In both schools, teachers reported that prior to intervention there was no contact
or help coming from the district and relations were characterized as hostile or negative
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between the schools and the district. As Maynard Moody and Musheno (2004) state,
“When [clients] do not comply.. .workers disengage and move on to other cases and other
situations” (p. 138). Limitations in capacity in such instances are used to the advantage
of the district, because there are always other schools to help in an urban district. In such
a structure, ignoring big problems is possible because there are always other issues to
address. When there is more work than any single district administrator is capable of
accomplishing, it is easier to work with school principals and educators who are receptive
to working with the district. The beginning of intervention during new school
accountability policy implementation upsets the traditional approach, by prioritizing the
worst of the worse as targets of intervention. Early state intervention therefore, shines
light and attention of the district upon the previously neglected underperforming schools.
It serves to focus and prioritize resources at the district level by clearly articulating the
areas of need.
The partnership between the DOE and the district serves several purposes. First,
it creates a working relationship between the two that encourages mutual respect and
reciprocity. These feelings are then conveyed by the district to the school and help build
a positive relationship between the DOE and the underperforming school at the beginning
of intervention. Second, by giving resources in the form of specialists to the district,
DOE has enlisted a partner and developed capacity at the district level to help the state
identified underperforming schools as well as the schools that are underperforming
according to federal NCLB designation, but in which the state has not intervened. Last,
the DOE is able to communicate the expectations of the districts roles and responsibilities
in multiple ways. By modeling a process that looks at the worst schools, the DOE
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encourages the district to do the same. Through regular training and meetings, the DOE
and the district have formed a true partnership in which they are able to negotiate the
implementation of new school accountability policy.
Evidence of the impact of the partnership between the district and the DOE can be
found in the changes in staffing patterns after a school is declared underperforming
during the beginning of intervention. In the Charlesburg District all but one of the
principals was removed shortly before or after their school was declared
underperforming. Additionally, high percentages of staff leave the school building. The
district imposes much more severe interventions than the state, which look more like
strong interventions such as reconstitution. The self imposed reconstitution of the
district’s underperforming schools means the district is taking on the responsibility of
strong accountability interventions, and that the DOE may have delegated this
responsibility to the district.

CHAPTER VII
THE WORKING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE STATE DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION AND THE UNDERPERFORMING SCHOOL

The state and local level perspectives are combined to determine the type of
working relationship that exists between the DOE and the underperforming schools.
There are several points during the early intervention process that capture the evolution
of the working relationship between the two. Those segments include the past
relationship, the performance and strategic criteria captured in the School Panel Review,
the diagnostic intervention or Fact Finding Review, and the corrective intervention or
Performance Improvement Mapping (PIM).
When examining the state and local perspectives on their working relationship
during early intervention, there is a noteworthy difference in their viewpoints. The state
level perspective takes a longer-term view upon the working relationship and early
intervention than the local level. This is likely because the DOE staff and contractors
have been implementing new school accountability policy for a number of years, but the
educators in the underperforming schools most likely experience the beginning of
intervention once. Throughout the state level participants’ perspectives of the working
relationship is a strong sense that the process is being continually refined or negotiated,
and rather than having one shot at the process like an underperforming school, they have
many opportunities to change the process of intervention.
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On the other hand, the local level experiences of principals and teachers during an
underperforming school review cycle are much more specific because unlike those at the
state level, they only experience early intervention once (unless they change schools).
Consequently, their experiences and insights are not as reflective or as general as one
finds among the state level administrators and contractors who participate in early
intervention on an annual basis. The perspective of those in the schools is therefore much
more of a once in a lifetime experience and less concentrated upon continuous
improvement of the early intervention process. This makes the experience of principals
and teachers in underperforming schools a testing ground to examine whether the DOE
goals of support and messages of enabling the school to improve are effective and
understood by the principals and teachers in the underperforming schools, who are
expected to accomplish these goals.
At the state level the DOE and ABC Consulting aim to develop a positive
working relationship with the underperforming school in order to support improvement.
Daphne explains the nurturing approach the DOE takes when implementing new school
accountability policy.
[W]e have...this medical analogy where we say, ‘if we look at
your student performance results over time, you are a patient being
brought to the emergency room because you are bleeding profusely
[underperforming]. When you are in the emergency room, the
emergency room physician is first going to stop the bleeding.’
That’s what the Panel Review is. ‘We’re coming in.’ We’re going
to say, ‘We’ve got to stop this bleeding.
This school is
underperforming.’ They need help. So, we’re going to apply that
tourniquet, if you will, that label of underperforming. ‘And, then
once we’ve stopped the bleeding, we’re going to take you to the
specialist who is going to really look you over and figure what in
the world caused this.’ That’s the Fact Finding Review. ‘Where
we are going to spend time in your classrooms, we’re going to look
at teaching and learning close up and we’re going to tell you what
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we think is working and what isn’t working, and we’re going to
tell you what we think is working and what isn’t working, and
we’re going to help you figure out why that is. And, [Performance
Improvement Mapping training, a.k.a.] PIM is going to help you
do that.’ That’s our medicine we have. (Daphne, DOE)
Daphne describes a process that takes the school through several steps of identification of
underperformance, diagnosis of the problems within the school and providing the tools or
“medicine” to the school through the PIM training process. Differences in the reaction of
those in the school are dependent upon how well they understand how to use the
“medicine” and how well they respond to the “medicine.”
Developing a working relationship between the school and the DOE is evident
and is reinforced throughout the state level discussion about the early intervention
process. An example of this can be found with the contractor, ABC Consulting. As an
organizational method, ABC Consultants are trained to place top priority on relationship
building because the DOE’s strategy requires this, and because of their experience
working with schools in Massachusetts and in other parts of the country. The ABC
Consultants discussed the importance of their relationship with the school often in the
interviews.
...[W]e’ve learned from... having been in so, so, many schools
and having to provide feedback that’s not always positive, and it is
sometimes critical that the way for that feedback to be heard and
...to be useful is to have developed... a trusting relationship
between the schools and us. ...I know certainly it is for us. It is
something we’ve learned over time. I think it’s true in the work
the DOE does. I think... they would say, ‘Yes, we understand that
you’ve got to persuade these principals, these superintendents
whomever you’re speaking with that we’re really there to help
their work.’ (Christie, ABC Consulting)
.. .1 think that when you... talk about the obstacles to acceptance of
this process that could be raised by a district or by a school, in a
sense that it could become a hostile process and has been very
adversarial. A lot of the people that have the training pay attention

177

to how do you go into a school and neutralize the process as much
as you can and personalize it in a positive way. They try to help
people understand that this is not a finger pointing exercise.
(Chuck, ABC Consulting)
Christie talks about having to sell or persuade the local district superintendents and
principals that it is a supportive intervention and not, as Chuck calls it, a “finger pointing
exercise” or a deterrent system. As partners of the DOE the ABC Consultants advocate
for a positive working relationship between the state and local levels, and thus as the face
of early intervention help the DOE to develop that kind of relationship. In many ways
the ABC Consultants carry the burden of commencing a positive working relationship
between the state and the underperforming school.
The initial desire for a positive working relationship is not necessarily prevalent
or a priority for those at the local level. Building on that commonality between the two
schools, there are also some distinct difference between the experiences of participants in
Alfred Elementary and Babson Elementary. First, one of the principals is new to being a
principal and the other is an experienced principal, which means many things and
fundamentally contributed to a difference in the expectations each principal had for the
district and the state. Ms. Beth, the experienced principal, believes there should be a
tremendous amount of resources and support from the district and possibly the DOE. Mr.
Arnold, on the other hand, did not have such high expectations, though it is clear that he
understands maintaining frequent communication between the school and the district is
essential to getting the school the resources it needs. Second, the predominant attitude
among the teachers was notably different between the two schools. Generally, Babson
Elementary teachers’ responses were either neutral or slightly negative toward the entire
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process while the Alfred Elementary teachers were much more positive and accepting of
early intervention.
Alfred and Babson Elementary Schools are different schools with different issues,
and the unique context of the schools more than likely contributes to these differences.
Another potential reason for the differences may be that they are in different points of the
early intervention process. Alfred Elementary staff members were past the state’s Board
of Education (BOE) approval of their school improvement plan and have had positive
feedback in terms of higher student test results. Babson Elementary was still in the thick
of the early intervention process. They were putting the finishing touches on their school
improvement plan, which by all accounts is an arduous process, and preparing to present
the plan to the BOE. Additionally, much of the support that comes from the state and
district really commences after the BOE has approved the school’s improvement plan.
For that reason, staff members from Babson Elementary may have been feeling alone in
their efforts. So, while some of the difference may be due to differences between the
schools, at least some of the differences may be attributed to where they are in the early
intervention process. Still throughout the local level participant responses there are
common threads and attitudes toward the DOE during the beginning of intervention.
The working relationship analysis includes the long term point of view of the state
participants and the short (or one) time view of the local participants with regard to the
beginning of intervention. Each of the points in time, past. School Panel Review, Fact
Finding Review, and PIM are examined to look at the state and local level perceptions of
one another during early intervention.
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Past Relationship
The past working relationship between the DOE and any given underperforming
school is virtually non-existent. Prior to identifying a school as underperforming, the
DOE worked with the district, which in turn worked with the school. The work is
characterized as compliance driven, which was typically found in state departments of
education prior to new school accountability policy. When asked if they had a past
relationship with the school, DOE staff said “no.” Those in the schools, with a few
exceptions discussed previously, agreed that the relationship between the school and the
DOE, and for that matter any individual within the school and any individual within the
DOE did not exist.

State Level
An interesting facet of the state level perspectives was the DOE staff’s and ABC
Consultants’ understanding or attempted understanding of how principals and teachers in
an underperforming school feel about and react to the beginning of intervention. One
example of this state level understanding is described by Chuck, an ABC Consultant and
Chair of the state teams, who is a retired principal. His experience lent him a special
insight into the local level and the past relationship between the state and the local levels
of the education system,
I think that in the beginning when reform began there was such a
crazy distrust of what was going on because people were so
unaccustomed to being held accountable. Other than standard tests
that were administered at a district level the belief that [privatizing
education] ...was supposed to happen or that that was the
underlying goal of the conservative movement, I mean it was there.
(Chuck, ABC Consulting)
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I think [the working relationship between the DOE and the school]
is very small. The relationship, ... you know...there was really
very little interface. (Chuck, ABC Consulting)
Chuck’s explanation reveals “distrust” towards the state because of the legislated
education reform that brought about new school accountability policy. Among educators,
he explains, there is a belief that the policy makers want to eliminate public education
and opt for a privatized education system, which drives the distrust among those working
in public education. The deterrent nature of new school accountability policy to the
perceived undercurrent of privatizing public education only furthers the distrust. Without
any kind of working relationship with schools, the “distrust” was not immediately
addressed, and has gone unmanaged since the onset of new school accountability policy.
Now, early intervention is the moment where the distrust is lessened, and it can only be
changed by actions of the state and how the local level stakeholders perceive those
actions.
Truly, since the passage of the comprehensive reform legislation (Massachusetts
Education Reform Act, 1993) created its own waves of upheaval among schools in
Massachusetts, new school accountability policy and, particularly, early intervention is
the first time the state and the underperforming school have had to confront one another.
DOE visits to underperforming schools bring the school staff face to face with the state
and more than likely the past distrust Chuck discusses, at least initially, contributes to the
“defensiveness” and fighting back by the schools that DOE and contractors encountered
during the earlier years of implementation.
The ability for state level actors like Chuck to place themselves in the shoes of the
educators at the local level has helped to get the working relationship between the DOE
and the underperforming school off to a good start. Overall, the DOE and ABC
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Consulting staff were aware of the feelings of distrust toward the legislative reforms and
noted that there was much more acceptance among those in the schools since the
legislation was first passed and a few years of early intervention have been put into
practice. State level participants believed that local level educators were beginning to
understand the reforms and accountability are not going away. In particular, as new
school accountability policy implementation has been experienced by those at the local
level, there is a pragmatic understanding of the beginning of intervention among
educators, which has lessened the defensiveness they meet at the underperforming
school’s door.

Underperforming Schools
Generally speaking, the school principals and staff have no relationship or
experience with staff members from the DOE prior to early intervention. Discussions
about the “central office” always referred to the district. Feelings toward the district
tended to be negative and toward the DOE tended to be full of low expectations.
As an example of the low expectations those in the school have for the DOE, two
of the teachers, one from each of the schools described a brief encounter with the DOE
prior to their interaction during early intervention. One described finding an error on the
scoring of student tests from her school. She spoke with a contact person at the DOE,
whose name she could not remember, and the DOE person found her to be correct. The
DOE staff person changed the results immediately, and the teacher was rather impressed
and surprised at how fast the change was made. Another teacher contacted the DOE to
report there had been cheating on the MCAS student tests. She expected the state to
come in and conduct an investigation, but she never heard a word from the DOE. She
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was not certain what would happen when she reported the case and had low expectations
for DOE. When her low expectations were met, she did not feel surprised. In both cases,
however, the expectations the teachers had for the DOE were low. One teacher expected
there would be no response, and when that happened, it was not that big of a surprise.
The other teacher got a response, and was surprised because her expectations of the DOE
were exceeded. In other words, any response that is more than no response from the state
is seen as a positive experience by those in the school. No response from the state is
actually expected, and consequently not seen as negative.
There is an unspoken professional code in the schools that was implicit in my
interviews of principals and teachers. For the most part, principals and teachers in the
schools interact with one another or with the district staff. The traditional hierarchy of
the public education system is followed with the DOE at the top, the district in the
middle, and the school at the bottom. Even in the instances when teachers felt a
complaint should be lodged about the conditions within the school, or the lack of
principal leadership in their school prior to being declared underperforming, the
complaints were lodged to the district by teachers, who took a considered risk in doing
so.
For a teacher to go above the head of his or her principal is seen as a symbolic and
perilous move. Even in the difficult environments they worked in, in their stories,
teachers hesitated to contact the district staff directly and rarely did more than talk about
such acts amongst themselves. Likewise, a principal would be considered insubordinate
if he or she were to go over the superintendent’s head and contact the DOE directly to
complain about a lack of resources or neglect by the district. Early intervention opens the
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door for the DOE to go directly to the school and ask the principal and staff about what is
going on in their school.

School Panel Review
The School Panel Review is a visit designed to use performance and strategic
criteria gained from information gathered through interviews with staff and observations
at the underperforming school. Considered to be narrowly focused, clear, and concise by
those at the state level, the visit is aimed at getting a sense of the school beyond MCAS
scores, which trigger a potential visit in the first place. The most cited strength of the
School Panel Review by state participants is that it is concise and clear. Focused on the
school improvement plan, the state panelists are required to answer two key questions: 1)
does the school have a sound improvement plan, and 2) does the school have the ability
to implement the plan? The simplicity of these two questions makes it possible for
panelists to hone in on two items within the complexities of any school and turn to
documentation and evidence from observations and interviews within the school to
answer them. Dianne explains, “Well, I think it is a very clear and focused system. And,
in the sense that it cuts right to the chase, it does not try to figure out everything that is
going on in every school” (Dianne, DOE). The simple approach of asking two key
questions allows room for the state to examine the school within the unique context of a
particular school.

State Level
Making room for the local context is an important element in early intervention,
but still there are challenges to the School Panel Review. While the conciseness and
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clarity are strengths, they are also part of its weaknesses. It is so narrowly focused and
omits many other dimensions of a school. For example, often there are good activities
and improvement initiatives that exist within a school that are not captured by or
connected to the improvement plan. The School Panel Review overlooks the whole
school for the school improvement plan.
Another challenge of the School Panel Review is its brevity. The panelists
convene over a two day period, but only spend one day in the school. The first day is for
reviewing the improvement plan and interviewing the district superintendent and
underperforming school principal. The second day is spent observing classrooms,
interviewing staff and conducting focus groups. At the end of the second day the panel
must arrive at answers to the two questions. Overall it is a huge “intellectual
commitment” (Christie, ABC Consulting) on the part of panelist practitioners, the DOE
liaison and the ABC Consultants.
From the state perspective, there is certainly a varied response from school
principals and teachers during the School Panel Review. State level participants
identified a number of factors that they felt affected the way in which the state team is
received by a school. Factors that affect the response include: 1) the degree to which the
principal understands the process; 2) the degree to which the staff understand the process;
3) the degree to which the district is involved in preparing the school for the process; 4)
the degree to which the DOE liaison is involved in helping the principal prepare for the
process; 5) the selection of the “right people” to participate on the panel; and 6) the
ability of the panelists to take an “inquirer” approach rather than an “evaluator” approach.
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From the state perspective each of these can make the difference between a cooperative
and a conflict ridden experience.
Within the School Panel Review process there are several important points in time
and the reaction of those in the school changes in stages. The important points include:
the identification and notification of the school for a School Panel Review, the beginning
of the visit, the end of the visit, and the release of the report with the results of the
visit/diagnosis of a school as underperforming.
When a school is identified as potentially underperforming, Daphne first calls the
superintendent and asks him or her to contact the school principal to notify him or her
that he or she will be receiving a letter identifying the school as potentially
underperforming from the DOE. During the phone call with the superintendent. Daphne
discusses the school or schools on the list for review and whether they will benefit from
such a visit. It is the first opportunity for the superintendent to discuss the actual context
of the school beyond the numbers (student test results). The professional courtesy of a
phone call to the superintendent respects the traditional hierarchy of the public education
system. It communicates to the superintendent that early intervention in an
underperforming school is really a partnership between the district and the DOE.
Additionally, it serves as an opportunity for the superintendent to interact directly with
the school principal and potentially open up the lines of communication between the two.
After the letter is sent out, the DOE liaison contacts the school principal to set up
a pre-visit meeting. At the meeting the principal is given a binder of information
detailing the School Panel Review process. The principal is given assignments to be
completed. The principal must submit a “leadership report” discussing his or her role
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implementing the school improvement plan and a schedule of classroom observations,
interviews and focus groups during the panel visit. Additionally, the DOE liaison
administers an anonymous teacher survey that is sent directly to the DOE, which
compiles the results that are included in the materials for the panelists to review prior to
the visit.
From the point of the pre-visit meeting on, the DOE liaison handles the logistical
matters related to the School Panel Review visit. More importantly the DOE liaison is
responsible for demystifying the process and managing the anxiety of the principal. The
DOE liaison is the first state contact the school has. Dan explains that the initial pre-visit
meeting is, “Just to introduce myself...[and] trying to get them [principals] to be
relaxed...” (Dan, DOE) about the visit. Recognizing the level of anxiety those in the
school feel, he really tries to emphasize that the DOE consists of individual people trying
to help schools. He discusses how that helps to shape the first visit between the DOE and
the underperforming school principal.
[It’s] definitely humanizing it... [Y]ou know the DOE is just
people too, and I know it doesn’t sound like we’re there to help.
You’re out there looking to see if something’s underperforming or
not, but like I said, it can be good. I can be a really, really good
process to go through. (Dan, DOE)
As a DOE liaison, Dan emphasizes the need for cooperation with the school and really
tries to make a personal connection with the school principal. Recognizing the anxiety
among the staff in a school that is being visited, Daphne tries to assure principals that it is
a supporti ve process and “the beginning of a partnership” between the DOE and the
school. Dan tried to reiterate the same idea by letting them know that even if it feels bad,
it is a “really good process to go through.”
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The message that the School Panel Review is a supportive partnership with the
state and a “really good process” evidently has been heard and understood at some level
among those at the local level. State participants report that after several
underperforming review cycles, the response of the school principals and teachers
towards the School Panel Review have changed to be less combative and more accepting.
DOE staff attribute the change to the process itself and to a wider understanding of the
process among principals and teachers in the schools.
The devastation of being identified by the state for a visit has lessened among
underperforming school educators, but still the DOE administrators find that there is a
complexity to the response of school principals and teachers. Dianne finds that though
there seems to be an understanding that it is not the end of the world, there is still a range
in the responses from those in the school. She explains,
It can be demoralizing. I think especially in schools where people
feel they’ve been working really hard...I think others are not
surprised.
You know?
I think that sometimes there’s
embarrassment. I think there’s a range of response, but I think
there’s a sort of first response and that changes over time. (Dianne,
DOE)
The complexity may be attributed to the difference between the educators’ organizational
identity and professional identity. Organizationally, educators in the school are more
than likely “not surprised” because they have seen the student test scores and know the
challenges the face in the school. Professionally, however, the label of potentially
underperforming and the state coming to visit the school for these reasons my feel
shameful. Chuck refers to this as the “emotional level” when he discusses the reaction of
the school educators to the panel visit.
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I think there’s a lot of caution. I think that unless the principal has
done a marvelous job with the staff. ...[A]t a personal and an
emotional level so that they’re able to believe that this is really a
group that’s here to look at what we’re doing to help us make some
change. Unless that exists, there’s a certain amount of suspicion
and fear and ‘what does this mean to us?’ (Chuck, ABC
Consulting)
In general the state level participants noted that even when the response was negative
from the school at first, the manner of the visit and the pre-visit connections between the
school and the state have lessened the levels of embarrassment. The message of support
and the professional and humane nature of the panelists help to inject the principal and
educators with a message of hope and support for improving the school.
The pre-visit meetings between the principal and the DOE liaison are to prepare
the School Panel Review visit; however, the state participants find that the level of
preparation by the school and district remains varied and is dependent upon the
superintendent and principal. Daphne discusses the range in response of school
principals.
Principals who take this seriously meet with their staff, give
everyone a copy of our protocol. We give interview questions so
they can be very well prepared. Some principals do nothing. And,
when we actually visit the school, and we have conversations with
the teachers, we have teachers saying, ‘What is this all about
anyway?’ (Daphne, DOE)
ABC Consultants finds the same variation in preparedness. Chuck explains his dismay at
the lack of preparation in some schools,
... [T]his is something that... regularly amazes me: the difference
in how a district and a school will prepare for [a School Panel
Review] visit. I mean there are places where principals do totally
nothing. Absolutely nothing until the last week or so, and then
they’ll throw together a schedule and that will generally inform
people [in the school] that there’s group coming to explore some of
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the things that are going on in the school.
Consulting)

(Chuck, ABC

Over and over again state level participant refer to early intervention as a “transparent
process” meaning the information about what the DOE is looking for at any given point
in time, including the School Panel Review visit is made available. Beyond providing
schools with documentation about the process, the information is made available to the
public on the DOE’s website. Finding an underperforming school at which the principal
and the teachers are not prepared for the panelists’ questions indicates to the state that
there are serious problems within the school.
Regardless of the degree of preparation, generally the state panel is met with a
school principal and staff who are “apprehensive - that is the first feeling and most
predominant feeling,” according to Christie. Other comments about the first impression
the school has of the state team reveal a similar tone.
...they’re apprehensive about the whole process. You know,
‘You’re going to take over our school. You’re going to close our
school... You’re going to shut us down. You’ve mislabeled us.
You’re all wrong.’ ...So, ...they’re very apprehensive, defensive,
.. .they’re worried. (Christie, ABC Consulting)
The punishing and deterrent perceptions the educators in the schools have about the state
and new school accountability policy are exposed in Christie’s comment. The deterrent
system that is perceived by the local stakeholders comes out during the first face to face
interaction between the school educators and the state panelists. The “distrust” refers to
the lack of faith the educators have in the state’s ability to identify a school as
underperforming, and the defensiveness toward the state must be countered in order to
progress or begin to change the working relationship so that the school staff are able to
take on the improvement initiatives on their own. Though the response is varied, the
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team is seen as “the state” and is an intervention into the school. There is an implicit
perception by the school that “the state is out to get us” (Christie, ABC Consulting). And
Christie goes on to say, “I don’t think I’ve ever been in a situation [when] the state was
referenced in that positive light from the outset.”
The beginning of a School Panel Review reflects a less than positive perception of
the DOE by those in the school, and those in the DOE clearly understand the challenge
they face in overcoming it. Daphne acknowledges the feelings of the principals and
teacher in a school that is visited.
They.. .really feel awful. They don’t like it. The.. .first response is
very defensive. It is sort of a grief cycle. You know? At first you
don’t believe it, and you can think of every reason why it’s not
happening. And then, you sort of get angry. You know? That is
kind of the next thing. You are really upset about this. It’s not
right. How could this have happened? And then you finally have
to accept it. (Daphne, DOE)
The state’s recognition of the difficulty educators have with the process, and letting
individuals within the school go through the “grief cycle” without reacting negatively,
allows the school principal and teachers to process the idea of state intervention and
eventually move into acceptance and cooperation with the state.
Though state participants feel the individuals in the school are much more
accepting than in the past, nervousness and tension among the educators in the school
exists during the visit. Being at the front line of the School Panel Review, Dan explains
the first encounters,
They [school staff] are nervous. There is no two ways about it.
Sometimes you’d walk out of classes, and someone would kind of
give...a look behind you. Or, they’ll stop you in the hallway, and
they’ll start showing you volumes of paper and things. Projects
they’ve worked on. Just to show you, ‘We’re doing this. We’re
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doing this. We’re doing this.’ It’s all good. It’s nice that they are,
but it’s not exactly what we’re there to see. (Dan, DOE)
First impressions are lasting, and the professional manner and regular assurance the DOE
liaisons, ABC Consultants, and the panelist practitioners take during their first encounter
quickly changes the reaction of those in the school. Panelists’ actions serve as indicators
for the school principal and staff that the process is professional. This begins to change
the reaction of those in the school toward the state visit. Dan describes the phenomenon,
After a very short while, after you conduct interviews, they’ll,
many times, though I have no specific data for it...someone would
say, ‘Well, that’s it?’
I’d say, ‘Yeah, that’s it.’
They’d say, ‘Wow, I really expected this to be really hard.’
[I’d say], ‘You just have to tell us how your plan evolved. That’s
all. And, what’s your role in that, and if you can tell us that, then
we’re pretty happy and you should be too.’ So they would be much
more relaxed.. .by the time we left. (Dan, DOE)
Dianne supports Dan’s comment when she explains that at first the state (panel) is seen as
the “interloper,” but once the first few interactions occur between the panel and members
of the school staff, the word gets around fast.
Indeed, state stakeholders find that there are certainly at least some “people in the
school [who] actually seem happy that someone is recognizing that they’re in trouble”
(Dianne, DOE). At first the process may be frightening in and of itself, but in the
comments from DOE and ABC Consulting staff, there is an undercurrent that arises after
the initial defensiveness and nervous reactions the staff in the school are welcoming of
the help and support. State participants believe educators in the school are really afraid
of being “blamed” for the underperformance and when they realize it is not a “finger
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pointing exercise” the attitude changes and the perception of the state visitors becomes
more positive.
The change in attitude is largely influenced by the panelists themselves, who
always include a DOE liaison, ABC Consultants, and several practitioners. Their actions
and styles of inquiry dominate the opinions the local level stakeholders are forming about
the state. Consequently, selecting the “right people” for the role is imperative to being
able to build a cooperative working relationship with the school. Caitlin hits upon the
idea that the practitioners bring an, “I’m in your position,” perspective, which lends
credibility to the visit for those within the school.
Having the “right people” on the panel is important and the management of the
panel by the Chair sets the tone of the visit. Chuck talks about the challenge of
overseeing practitioner panelists.
I think the biggest challenge is to yank the predispositions out of
practitioners. You know right away if somebody is going to go in
there with a predisposition, and the difference between that type of
person and somebody who is going to go in with an open-mind and
say, ‘You know, we see this in writing, but we have to see how it’s
operationalized, and what it feels like.’ So if you’ve got a good
group of people, it makes a big difference.
(Chuck, ABC
Consulting)

Even more than managing the panel and having a good group of people, Christie talks
about the importance of selecting practitioner panelists who work in similar situations
and types of school as the educators in the school that is being visited. Christie explains,
Well, practitioners are the big strength. If you can have a team in
which the practitioners’ experience mirrors the school context
that’s a very powerful team because those people really can know
quickly, you know, sort of what the lay of the land is. (Christie,
ABC Consulting)
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If things have gone well in terms of the being able to allay the fear of the principal
and gaining a degree of trust among the staff after they realize the state is just a team of
people who are professional and courteous, a positive relationship begins to develop
between the panel and the school. Caitlin discussed how “people [in the school] are
nervous,” but “a lot of people are frustrated with what’s going on [in the school], so
they’re ready to talk.” Over the short period of time most have found that the school
principal and staff are nervous, but they are willing to get to the point in the “grief cycle”
where they are able to discuss the challenges the school is facing.
By all state stakeholders’ accounts the majority of the School Panel Reviews do
go well. This is different from the earlier years of new school accountability
implementation.
In the early years, of the very first few years, it was an extremely
antagonistic reception of the idea of potentially underperforming.
Schools denied...that there was any underperformance, that...it
wasn’t their responsibility... So, there was very little constructive
conversation emanating from the school regarding - it was all
defensive. ...[T]hat was in the early years. It has migrated
somewhat over the years to be more.. .constructive. (Christie, ABC
Consulting)
The change shows a wider understanding of early intervention among the public
education stakeholders. With the change comes a change in understanding of the policy
from a deterrent to an enabling process. While this may have occurred at the school level
at a later point, there is an indication that it occurs earlier in the process, or at least the
perception of the policy as deterrent begins to erode earlier than during the first year of
implementation. A contributing factor to the erosion of the school’s deterrent perceptions
may be the DOE’s attitude as professed by Daphne, “It’s not about blame. It’s about
moving forward.”
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After the School Panel Review visit, a report detailing the findings of the panel is
submitted to the commissioner of the DOE. He then makes a determination about the
school. The superintendent is notified by Daphne and told that one or more of the
schools reviewed in his or her district will be declared underperforming, and that he or
she should notify the school principal because the letter from the DOE with a copy of the
report is being sent out in the next few days. Again, professional courtesy is paid to the
district. It is used as an opportunity to strengthen the DOE and district relationship, and
is an opportunity to encourage a stronger district and school relationship.
After the notification Daphne goes to the district and meets with both the
superintendent and principal. She discusses the meeting,
And basically, here is what I say, ‘I’m here. You can put a face to
the Department of Education. This is your opportunity to talk to
me about why we got it wrong, if that is what you think.’ And, so
some principals take advantage of that and really spout off about
the DOE. And, then ultimately I say, ‘It is what it is. So, here are
the choices. We want to work with you now. We know you don’t
like this label. We wish there were a better way too.’ (Daphne,
DOE)
The DOE Director allows for the underperforming school principal to vent and uses the
meeting as a push to start changing things within the school. She reinforces the
partnership with the DOE and then details the next steps in the early intervention process.
Underperforming Schools
The principals interviewed were not present during the initial School Panel
Review, but teachers, who were present, indicated that they knew the school was
underperforming, as did the former principal, long before the school was selected for a
state visit. Bridget recalls, “I wasn’t [surprised]. We had a feeling. I mean we were told
this was probably going to happen just by the MCAS scores.” The teachers in the two

195

schools vacillated between feeling nervous or intimidated and feeling like they could use
the help and let the state see what we deal with every day.
Being selected for a School Panel Review is a big deal in the school. Teachers
felt unsure about the process, though each indicated they had received information,
questions, and schedules from their principal ahead of time. Still, the teachers did not
feel like they clearly understood what was going on. As Anita explains, “There was no
big picture.” They simply understood “the state is coming because we’re
underperforming.” One teacher describes the feeling in the building once the school was
selected for a DOE visit,
... [Tjhere were mixed feelings. There was, ‘OK. Come on in
state. I’m going to tell you everything that’s going on. I'm going
to... complain. I’m gonna tell you everything that’s happening.’
And other people were like, ‘You know, I’m nervous. Am I going
to be accountable? Am I going to lose my job? What’s going to
happen here?’ So, there was a lot of mixed feelings going on.
(Brenda, teacher, Babson Elementary)
The mixed reaction ranged from tension because of the stress of being identified, to
recognition that the school and the teachers needed help. This point was discussed by
many of the teachers in the schools.
...[I]t was tense. The principal you could tell was on edge. She
was definitely on edge. She was nervous... She was new to
administration, very new in the system, and she had a lot on her
plate. There was a lot going on... It was tense. It was very tense.
(Brenda, teacher, Babson Elementary)
We knew we needed some serious changes, and uh, so, I think
most people were looking forward to it. It can be sort of
intimidating, but I think the general feel was, ‘Come on in and help
us.’ (Amelia, teacher, Alfred Elementary)
Despite the tension and intimidation of a state visit, the hope that finally someone,
even if it was someone from the state, would listen to them and see for themselves what
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was going on in the school was clearly articulated. One teacher described her mixed
feelings about the state coming in over the heads of the district, but knowing that it was
the school’s only hope of improvement. Anita explains,
But, at that point, I welcomed it. Because I said, this has got to
mean something good because just getting to interview with DOE.
They interviewed all of us at different times. Just to tell them.. .we
have no textbooks. We don’t have [supplies]. We ran out of
paper. We ran out of pencils. You know?
They were like, ‘What do you mean you have no text books?’
I was like, ‘You know textbooks? We don’t have them.’
They were like, ‘What? You don’t?’
[I said,] ‘Papers, pencils, that’s on our own. It’s up to us.’
(Anita, teacher, Alfred Elementary)
The DOE arrives to a tense yet conciliatory staff within the school. The schoolteachers
really want to tell somebody, who will listen, that they have no “textbooks” or that they
“ran out of paper” and to get a reaction of concern from the DOE makes the risk of
sharing the information worth it. The tone of the DOE visit feels like they are being
understood and gives a sense of reciprocity to those in the school. It gives those in the
school hope.
To the DOE’s advantage during early intervention, the staff in the schools found
the panelists to be professional and courteous, and it gave the state credibility with the
educators in the school. In turn, the teachers were more willing to share information
because they saw the professionalism of the panelists. Brenda explained, “[The panelists]
were very pleasant and you know they were very nice. They.. .told us their background
and what they did. They.. .weren’t pointing fingers at anybody or anything like that.”
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Having the “right people” on the state team was important to many of the teachers and
contributes to a sense of DOE reciprocity within the school.
Teachers in the schools supported the state level participants’ notion that
matching the experience of the practitioner panelists with that of the underperforming
school as important to the reliability of early intervention. It is important to the teachers
to have panelists reviewing their school who have similar backgrounds and experiences
as they have within their school.
I think [the panelists] were very nice. You know? They were
principals. I don’t know how long they were teaching, or if they
had ever been teachers. You know? Or, if they even taught in a
school like this, you know? Or, did they come from some little
suburban town where they don’t have the same kind of problems
that we do. I have no idea. (Bridget, teacher, Babson Elementary)
I probably wish [the panel] had some Hispanic people because
over 80% of [the] student population is Hispanic. I think that
would have been, you know that’s a huge thing that’s missing from
the school and other schools like it that nobody gets - the language
barrier. (Anita, teacher, Alfred Elementary)

Teachers are quick to identify deficiencies of the panelists. From the DOE, to ABC
Consulting, to the practitioners, it is important to have people from similar types of
districts and schools because otherwise the teachers felt they “don’t have the same kind
of problems.”
While neither of the school’s panels were a perfect reflection of the schools, all in
all the teachers felt they were professional and courteous and just having them listen to
what the teachers had to say gave them some credibility. Adeline explained that, “Just
talking to them, [you could see among] the students and the teachers around here, there
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was a difference. They had hope. There was hope” (Adeline, teacher, Alfred
Elementary).
When the report was released, each of the teachers stated that they knew the
school would be declared underperforming, so it was not a surprise when it happened.
Generally, teachers believed the report was an honest articulation of what was really
going on in the school, which contributed to the credibility of the state team. They felt
listened to, finally.
Still, teachers expressed confusion about what the label of underperforming
meant. They wondered if it was a sanction on the teaching in the school, and how it
impacted them. With the principal who was on the way out the door as the primary
communication link about the process to the district and the DOE, teachers had little
information about what it all meant and had little opportunity to find out. Teachers
expressed their confusion.
Well, [the school being declared underperforming] was
disappointing. It was. Because my thing is, is that kids here are
low. The kids are low. You know, most of the city is, but they
have no idea how hard a lot of us have worked. They’re low, yes,
but they’ve come a long way some of these kids. And, that is what
really upsets me... (Brenda, teacher, Babson Elementary)
We didn’t really know what to expect. We kind of had a lot of
questions. What does this mean for the building? Can they come
in and take it over? There wasn’t fear. Nobody was afraid.
Nobody felt, ‘Oh, we’ve been caught,’ because we all knew how
hard we’d all been working. With nothing you work a lot harder.
So, we weren’t afraid for [the state] to come in. We thought once
they came in, now they’ll see it. Now we have them here. (Anita,
teacher, Alfred Elementary)
Uncomfortable with the process, and wondering if the report was an indictment upon the
teachers themselves, questions about the process abound. In each of the teachers’
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explanations mingles disappointment and confusion because they did not know what was
going to happen next, along with a gratefulness that something is happening to change
things in the school. In the uneasiness of understanding the process, and the more than
likely removal of the top administrator (the principal), there was a dense feeling of
confusion and concern.
Perhaps at least partially because of the confusion and concern or not knowing the
“big picture,” turnover in schools declared underperforming is high. It is a classic
symptom of what happens after a school is declared underperforming. One of the teachers
described that response,
A lot of the staff was like, ‘You know, I’m out of here.’ ‘I’m out
of here,’ was a big reaction... a lot of people did do that. That’s
when the transfers were coming out, and they put in for transfers.
‘I don’t want to be here. I don’t want the state breathing down my
neck. I could lose my job.’ That was the major feeling. (Brenda,
teacher, Babson Elementary)
Fear of the unknown is at least part of the reason for the turnover. Additionally, the
timing of the district transfer period matches up with the timing of the school being
declared underperforming.
By the end of the school year, an underperforming school more than likely has a
new principal who must replace a large percentage of the teachers who have transferred.
The staffing changes alone contribute to transforming the underperforming schools and
make it easier for the new principal to implement new improvement strategies. What is
lost from teachers leaving because the school is declared underperforming is unknown.
Sincerity, reciprocity between the DOE and the school, and clear communication
are major strands interwoven throughout the initial process. At that point involvement
between the DOE staff and the underperforming school staff has increased and the

200

expectations for future involvement are clarified. Though trust in each party’s intention
to implement the policy is varied, the professional nature of the visit and sincerity of the
message of support is embedded throughout the visit. Much of the defensiveness and
combativeness in reaction to a state visit is lessened or eliminated during this phase, and
thus the actions taken during the School Panel Review begin to alter the school staffs
perceptions of a deterrent system that can cause a defensive or paralyzing reaction to an
enabling system that relies upon the internal expertise of those within the school.

Fact Finding Review
The Fact Finding Review is the state’s diagnostic criteria stage of early
intervention. Prior to the Fact Finding Review, there has already been an introduction to
the state (School Panel Review), so the Fact Finding Review Panel is seen as another
state visit like one which the educators within the school have already experienced. From
the perspective of those at the state level, the way the Fact Finding Review is received by
the school is affected by factors similar to the School Panel Reviews including the level
of preparedness, the level of involvement of the district, the level of understanding of the
process, the right people on the panel and their professional manner. The Fact Finding
Review is different from the Panel Review in that it is intended to provide a
comprehensive diagnosis of a specific school. It moves beyond simply looking at the
school improvement plan to conducting classroom observations and in-depth interviews
with the principal and staff.
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The State Level
Though these visits are supposed to be customized for the school, the state has
developed a uniform protocol and schedule for the Fact Finding Review. Still, the chair
of the team emphasizes that, “it is really flexible” (Daphne, DOE). The information from
the Fact Finding Report is to support the school. It is, therefore, centered on the unique
context of a particular school and is negotiated to fit the needs of a school. Daphne
describes the evolution of the Fact Finding Review,
The Fact Finding Review...is something we’ve struggled with.
We would like it to have a different feel for the school... The Fact
Finding Review is really a team that’s coming in to give you
feedback now. So, we urge principals and their staffs to prepare a
set of questions that they are looking for answers to. For example,
if the school has gone about the business of...developing a
schedule that uses common planning time, principals may say,
‘You know, I’m not sure how my teachers are really using that. If
they are using it for planning for students or if it is just a session,
you know where they sit around and complain about kids. And, I
can’t get to all of them. So, I would like some feedback on that.’
In that case the team would structure their schedule to include
observations of common planning time meetings. (Daphne, DOE)
During the Fact Finding Review, the introductions and first impressions are over. The
DOE immediately tries to engage the school principal and teachers in helping the team
diagnose the problems in the school by having them “prepare a set of questions they are
looking for answers to” (Daphne, DOE). The team is engaging them to work as partners
with the state team and is supporting staff members of the school by helping them to find
those answers. The Fact Finding Review marks a transition in the working relationship
between the state and the school, one in which they must both actively participate.
The state’s emphasis on making the Fact Finding Review feel different to those in
the school is one of its strengths. The difference is in the participation of the educators as
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well as the amount of time spent at the school, which allows the state team to conduct a
closer in-depth analysis of the underperforming school. If the implementation of the
review works as planned, the analysis and diagnosis are guided by the principal, who
quickly validates findings as systemic problems or discredits findings as out of context.
Daphne describes the review as “very collaborative.” As part of the collaborative
approach, the school leadership is provided with feedback on a daily basis.
There have been two important changes in the Fact Finding portion of
intervention that, in the eyes of the state, have improved the reception of the state team.
First, the time frame was altered so that both the School Panel and Fact Finding visits are
conducted in the same academic year, which helps the school not to feel abandoned by
the state after being declared underperforming. Involvement of the DOE liaison over a
shorter time period creates continuity for those within the school, and it allowed the
school team to enter into the PIM process with an in-depth analysis of some of the issues
that exist within the school.
Second, to the extent possible, the DOE now assigns the same ABC Consulting
team leaders that conducted a school’s School Panel Review to its Fact Finding Review.
Cited as a very influential change to the process, it allows for the relationship that had
begun to develop during the previous visit to continue. It also contributes to a deeper
diagnosis of the school’s needs during the Fact Finding Review. As Chuck states,
Well, I think that if you’ve been able to establish some kind of
connection with a school on a [School] Panel Review, and they felt
that...the relationships were positive and that the nature of the
visit, the content, [was] positive, that it’s helpful for the school to
see the same people. (Chuck, ABC Consulting)

Clearly, it is a change in implementation that takes into consideration relationship
building between the state and the school.
At the Fact Finding Review, the ABC Consulting team leads the panel of
practitioners without the presence of the DOE liaison. Dianne explains the reason to not
have a DOE presence,
I think it’s to...ensure a level of objectivity. You know, that
there’s not investment by the DOE about what is found at the
school. And, it’s also to allow for another practitioner to be on the
panel... During the Fact Finding they’re really spending a lot of
time in classrooms and really trying to get at the teaching and
learning and the curriculum and instruction of what might be the
gaps in that. So...for that role it really does need to have people
who are classroom people and teachers and principals and people
who supervise teachers or principals...function best in that role.
(Dianne, DOE)
There is no DOE member on the staff to ensure “objectivity,” though it is not clear that
the local level stakeholders understand there is no one from the state on the panel. To
underperforming school staff it is a state visit.
While objectivity may be one goal, it is likely that the decision is influenced by
limitations in the DOE’s capacity to send a person to a four day review. Dianne also
remarked on a capacity issue in matching DOE skills with the demands of the review.
The intent of the visit is focused on curriculum and instruction, areas where the DOE
staff generally have a limited level of expertise. It is better to have practitioners who are
currently in schools in this role. The point is important because it shows the DOE staff
have a self-awareness about its organizational limitations. Dianne expressed a level of
understanding of the DOE’s strengths and weaknesses with regard to the early
intervention process. Rather than cover them up, the choice was to expand capacity to
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address the limitations. At once, it shows respect for the educators at the local level and a
self-awareness of the DOE’s limitations that might surprise the local educators.
Absence of the DOE places the ABC Consultants in charge of the state panel.
ABC Consultants find that being the person in charge and having direct contact with the
school, unlike that School Panel Review when it is the responsibility of the DOE liaison,
makes them better able to manage the process and the working relationship between
themselves and the school. During the visits the school is made to understand that the
ABC Consulting team is representing the DOE, as are the panel practitioners. From the
perspective of the ABC Consultants, it is unlikely that those in the school know that they
are not the DOE. Put simply, at the school level the distinction was not important.
To open up a rapport with the school, the first session focuses on discussing the
report from the previous state visit (School Panel Review report). In an effort to enlist
the school leadership’s cooperation and as an act of sincerity, the review team asks what
the school team thought about the report, what they got wrong and what they got right.
Because the information from the initial meeting shapes and influences what the review
panel looks for during the review, Caitlin believes,
... it’s a great way to start from those discussions of, ‘Did you read
the report?’ ‘Were we right?’ ‘Was it accurate?’ ‘What did you
agree with, what didn’t you?’ And, right away you’ve got a further
understanding of what you already knew based on what their
impressions are. I mean they’re the people that need to give you
the information. (Caitlin, ABC Consulting)
The meeting requires the school leadership to put forth information, and the way in which
the state team listens is an act of reciprocity that sends a message of respect for the school
principal’s professional opinion and the team’s willingness to listen and incorporate what
the principal has to say. Caitlin articulates the need for cooperation with those in the
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underperforming school because they “need to give you the information.” Chuck adds
that he uses the approach to gain the cooperation of the school.
I think that.. .if you’re able to convince people that you might have
missed stuff, you know? If we got something wrong or that we got
it right, but to be open to the possibility that we didn’t get it right.
You know? OK, so we were there for one day [during the School
Panel Review], now you’ve got to take a second look at it or tell us
what, tell us what we misinterpreted. (Chuck, ABC Consulting)
The willingness of the Chair of the panel (Chuck) to admit honestly that the first panel
(School Panel Review) may have missed something and to listen to what was right and
wrong within the report, strengthens working relationships by conveying a sincere
interest in the opinion of the educators in the schools.
As in the School Panel Review, information about what happens in the initial
meetings of the Fact Finding Review travels fast among the educators within the school.
Christie found that the “tone” of the opening session creates a relationship with more than
just the school people that are in the initial meeting.
... the opening sessions sets a tone that’s constructive and positive.
Then I think that you’d be amazed how fast word travels around
the school. You would be astounded. By the end of the first
session, we usually have a quick break, you know, maybe a
bathroom stop, and then we’re out in the classrooms, visiting
classrooms, and interviewing teachers and word has already spread
as to who we are. You know, like these are real people. These
people know what they’re talking about, you know? And, we’ll
hear that as we interview teachers through the day. (Christie, ABC
Consulting)
The “constructive and positive” tone of the first meeting sets the tone for the rest of the
Fact Finding Review. The understanding of the human aspect of the process that ABC
Consultants bring to early interventions really helps to build a working relationship
between the DOE and the underperforming school. Every action the panel takes during a
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visit is being scrutinized by the educators in the underperforming school, and the panel,
led by ABC Consultants is made aware of the need to be consistent, professional, and
respectful because they want to send a positive message.
The Fact Finding Review brings new challenges to the school. A declaration of
underperformance triggers the review, and the first opportunity for the teachers in the
school to see the state is when the Fact Finding Review Panel walks through the school
doors. Despite the variation in response, generally there is a change in the teachers’
reactions, because they are no longer fighting the “threat” of the “underperforming” label.
With the deterrent system’s initial threat past, the educators in the school need to figure
out what is next for them.
DOE staff and ABC Consultants believe it is that question and the supportive and
respectful nature of the Fact Finding Review panel that pushes the educators within the
school closer to acceptance of the state intervention and all that it brings. Caitlin
discusses that difference.
Well, it’s not the experience in the [School Panel] review, but they
are more likely to admit they do need help. We’ve told them that
they need help by the time the Fact Finding had got there. (Caitlin,
ABC Consulting)
Getting the school staff to the point of admitting they need help brings them that much
closer to accepting the enabling implementation style of early intervention.
Throughout the Fact Finding Review the messages of being courteous,
professional, respectful, and attentive to the principal and staff in the school are
reinforced the by the state team. The ability of the school principal to direct the process
and the flexibility of the ABC Consulting team contributes to moving the school from a
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deterrent understanding of the process to that of an enabling process. As Daphne
explains.
So, sometimes despite the fact that a school is found to be
underperforming, if we can help them understand that there are
things they need to do differently. They don’t necessarily need to
throw out the baby with the bathwater, but there are better ways to
approach what they are doing, then they come to PIM with a sort
of a more positive attitude. ‘OK, so this is how the DOE is going
to help us figure this out.’ (Daphne, DOE)
Daphne’s description of helping the school to understand that things can be done
differently also discloses a consistent theme among all of the state level participants. At
no time did any of the DOE staff members indicate they had answers as to how to
improve a school. Each mention of school improvement focused on helping the school
“figure” out how to improve and the belief that there are good things going on in each
school.
Once again, to convey the need for a working relationship with the
underperforming school, at the end of the Fact Finding Review, the ABC Consulting
team meets with the school principal and/or leadership team to debrief and discuss the
final findings of the panel. At that time, the DOE liaison, who is assigned to be the state
level person involved with underperforming school team during PIM and after the
school’s improvement plan is approved by the Board of Education to monitor the
underperforming school for two years, comes back into the picture.
Dan, a DOE liaison describes his entry back into the early intervention process, “I
mean by that time I would have a decent relationship with the principal.” In fact, the
DOE liaison has become the state level advocate for the underperforming school. ABC
Consultants find that the DOE liaison’s role as an advocate for the school during the last
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Fact Finding Review meeting with the principal, reinforces the supportive nature of
DOE’s partnership with the school. According to the consultants, DOE liaisons truly
take on the role of support and present an “overly rosy” picture of what is going on in the
school. The overly rosy perspective of the DOE liaison can cause some conflict between
the ABC Consultants as the final report is written. Most of the conflicts are ironed out
quietly and internally, but it can be a challenge for the consultants.
Admitting that he may take an overly supportive role toward the underperforming
school, the DOE liaison explained that during the Fact Finding Review exit interviews,
he really likes coming in at the end and playing the good cop to the ABC Consulting’s
bad cop. The exit interview is an opportunity to improve or establish the DOE liaison’s
working relationship with the principal and educators in the underperforming school, and
the DOE liaisons tend to take advantage of it. Caitlin explains the dynamic of the exit
interview being a “stepping stone” toward developing a positive relationship with the
underperforming school.
[D]oes [the DOE liaison’s] presence there help in building a
relationship with the school? I think it should be a stepping stone.
I mean at this point [the school is underperforming]. ...You’ve
been determined underperforming, and you don’t have a choice but
to work with the state for the upcoming year plus. So, is that a
good first stepping stone in establishing a relationship? I think it
could be a very good stepping stone. (Caitlin, ABC Consulting)
The Underperforming Schools
Differences between the two schools are most striking during the Fact Finding
Review. Because of changes in implementation, Alfred Elementary’s new principal and
staff had been through the state’s PIM training prior to going through the Fact Finding
Review. The team and school were therefore acutely aware of the tools, strategies and
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expectations the state had for them and their school. Babson Elementary’s old principal
and staff did not have as clear a picture about what would happen to them and the school.
In fact, the district announced that the principal would be replaced during the state visit,
which added to the confusion among teachers.
Both schools’ teachers reported responding honestly to the panelists who
interviewed them and observed their classes. In each school, the faculty believed they
should “tell it like it is.” They felt as though the Fact Finding Review posed an
opportunity to make some real changes in the school. According to teachers, they hoped
the changes they had been clamoring at the district for would be heard by the state and
their interviews with panelists gave them the opportunity to tell them what had not been
heard by the district.
The degree to which the teachers felt nervousness was different between the two
schools for reasons stated previously. When the Fact Finding Review team visited,
Babson Elementary participants reported that “they were nervous” (Brenda, teacher,
Babson Elementary), but were still forthcoming with the state team.
...[People in the school] were very honest. I know that. They
were like, ‘Look, I’m going to tell it how it is, and this is what I’m
upset about.’ They talked about the district. They talked about the
principal. And, you know, some people were really willing to get
their feelings out and let’s bring everything to the table here,
because it needs to be told.
This is why the school is
underperforming. (Brenda, teacher, Babson Elementary)
Babson Elementary teachers were nervous, but according to Brenda, they were still
willing to take a chance. They saw the opportunity and took advantage of it.
The nervousness level was much higher at Babson than at Alfred. The teachers at Alfred
Elementary had greater familiarity with the DOE, having already been through the PIM,
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and had begun to implement changes within the school. Therefore, they felt less
threatened by the visit as the comment below indicates.
Well we, the building always welcomed the DOE and anybody
involved in the process. There was never any anger or contention
from the teachers toward them. We felt good about it because we
wanted help. We wanted somebody to say, to do something. We
welcomed them. (Anita, teacher, Alfred Elementary)
As with the School Panel Reviews, participants found the Fact Finding Review
team to be professional and pleasant. Brenda states, “I mean when I was interviewed, I
was very comfortable. The people were very nice and I told the others too.” The word
about what happens during the interviews and observations spreads fast around the school
as with Brenda’s experience. So, while the principal and staff were nervous during the
review, the style and manner of the state team did allay the nervousness enough for those
in the school to be honest and comfortable with the state team. Alfred Elementary
teachers reported the same. Again, their expectations were low, and when they found
that the panelists “weren’t demeaning” (Anita, teacher, Alfred Elementary) or “grumpy”
(Adeline, teacher Alfred Elementary) they were happy with them.
In both schools staff expressed doubt about how much of an understanding of a
school’s issues a state team could get when the team is only in the school for a few days.
In Alfred Elementary the visit was conducted in October after Mr. Arnold, the new
principal, and the school team had been through PIM. Mr. Arnold felt the feedback from
the state team was valuable, but the timing of the visit was awkward because so many
dramatic changes (e.g. new principal, implementation of a new improvement plan) had
already occurred. At Babson Elementary the school was visited prior to PIM, however
the timing of the visit still posed a big issue for those in the school. The team visited in
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June during the last few weeks of school. Teachers felt that arriving a few weeks before
school ends is not representative of what is actually going on in the school. For both
schools the timing of the Fact Finding Review was awkward for different reasons, and
timing of visits turns out to be an influential factor in how the state is perceived by school
principals and teachers.
The state team met with district representatives over the course of the Fact
Finding Review. A teacher commented about the district during the Fact Finding
Review,
I remember walking by going, ‘What are [the district
administrators] talking about? They have no idea about this
school.’ ...I remember saying that to myself. I looked and I just
went, you know, I kind of shook my head. You know? They don’t
know. They have no idea. (Brenda, teacher, Babson Elementary)
The resentment toward the district was felt strongly by staff at both schools. From the
teachers’ perspective the district had abandoned the schools up until the state expressed
interest in visiting the school, and then the district administrators seemed to be acting like
they were familiar with the school. Ms. Beth and many of the teachers at both schools
expressed sorrow that it had to come to early intervention in their school for the district to
show any interest in the obvious needs of the school.
At Babson Elementary the Fact Finding Review Report identified a weak
administrator and poor teaching as the major problems within the school. The teachers
who read the report felt that it was “scathing.” Teachers explained the contents of the
report.
I mean they said that we were incompetent teachers. Almost the
whole staff, how did they phrase it? Not non-professional, but
they really degraded us I thought. It was awful. It was an awful
report. It was like, and some of the things that supposedly teachers
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said were like, ‘Oh my God.’ You don’t say things like that in
front of [the state]. (Bridget, teacher, Babson Elementary)
I remember reading [the Fact Finding Review Report], and I
remember going through. I’m like you know what? This is really
taken out of context... They didn’t name names.
[T]he
performance it said was very, very low. I mean they said teacher
performance was just inadequate.
(Brenda, teacher, Babson
Elementary)

The teachers who remained in the school felt shame about the things in the classroom that
were reported. Though the report “didn’t name names,” the teachers felt awful about the
results of the report and were embarrassed to be reading it with a new principal who was
making judgments about the school and their teaching.
Interestingly, teachers from Alfred Elementary, teachers had a less negative
impression of the report.
We thought [the report] reflected what we all talked to them about.
We knew. You know? Everything that they said from the
atmosphere, you know to lack of resources. We all knew that and
so we felt it really reflected our discussions with the Department of
Education. (Anita, teacher, Alfred Elementary)
...[W]hen they did do criticism, it was very truthful. When they
said, ‘You know what? You have these three things to correct in
one year. You need to nail it down...’ It wasn’t harsh. (Adeline,
teacher, Alfred Elementary)
There are a few reasons why the comments and criticism within the report may have been
perceived more positively. First, the report did not indict the teaching within the school.
Rather, it concentrated on resources and other needs. Second, Alfred Elementary had
already been through the PIM process, had a new principal, and a high percentage of staff
turnover. It was a new year for the school and many changes had already been
implemented. Teachers knew it, and the report reflected it.
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Feeling negatively about the Fact Finding Report caused damage to the teachers’
view of the DOE. One Babson Teacher reacted to the Fact Finding Report,
[The DOE staff] are in their little ivory towers. That’s how I look
at them... My feeling is that they have no idea what goes on.
(Bridget, teacher, Babson Elementary)
The teachers felt the criticism was personal, even though they agreed that teachers in
some of the classrooms were entirely ineffective. They even seemed to know who the
ineffective teachers were, but when it was written in the report, they took personal
offense to some of the things that were written about the teachers and felt that some of
the criticisms were targeted at themselves.
By the end of the Fact Finding Review, the DOE has shared the in-depth
diagnosis (report) with the underperforming school principal and staff. Unfortunately, in
a majority of the cases when a school is identified as underperforming, the school
principal is removed. In both the Alfred and Babson Elementary Schools the principals
were removed prior to attending the PIM. So, while the DOE has created a system built
around a collaborative working relationship, the time and energy spent is lost because
much the effort is primarily focused on the principal, who is removed by the district
superintendent. Essentially, the DOE staff must rebuild the relationship with the new
underperforming school principal during the PIM training.

Performance Improvement Mapping (PIM)
Performance Improvement Mapping (PIM) is the state’s corrective intervention
into the underperforming school. The PIM is DOE’s professional development for
underperforming school teams, used to analyze the weaknesses and strengths within their
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schools using a data driven methodology. During the PIM training, the underperforming
school team is empowered to customize improvement efforts for the unique context of
their school. No matter how effectively the message that early intervention relies on the
work of the underperforming school staff is communicated prior to PIM, the training
session serves as the final opportunity for the DOE to clearly articulate this message and
for the school to internalize it. The PIM is the catch all for driving that message home for
the school team.
The PIM portion of early intervention has several different stages that culminate
in a workable school improvement plan to be approved by the Massachusetts Board of
Education (BOE). First is the PIM training, which is composed of several facilitated
training sessions where the principal and school team members go through a process of
looking at their students’ MCAS results and making determinations about areas of need.
More than data (MCAS) analysis training, it is a model for making decisions about the
school based on data, rather than a gut feeling about what is working or not working in a
school. Second is the improvement planning the school team does outside of the PIM
training. Last is the school team working with the DOE to finalize a school improvement
plan that accomplishes the immediate priorities within the school and that is in shape to
be reviewed and approved by the BOE. Once a school’s plan is approved, the school
exits the beginning of intervention and enters into a relationship with the DOE monitors
for a period of two years.
Performance Improvement Mapping (PIM) training is provided by the DOE for
underperforming school teams comprised of members (teachers) selected by the school
principal. The previous points of intervention emphasize the need for the
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underperforming school principal and teachers to understand that early intervention is
intended to be an enabling system rather than a deterrent one. PIM is the last point of
early intervention. The DOE has to make it clear that school improvement is in the hands
of the educators in the underperforming school with support from the state. The amount
of work the school teams are required to put into the analysis of data and improvement
plan makes this clear. This is a remedy for the issue O’Day (2004) identifies: that
schools will respond unevenly to state intervention. State level participants recognize
that the underperforming school teams are coming from different starting points
depending on where they are in the “grief cycle” (Daphne, DOE). Those teams that are at
the point of acceptance are able to break through and make changes quicker than those
school teams that are still feeling angry about the state designation of underperformance.
The State Level
According to the DOE, the PIM training is professional development and support
for the underperforming school teams aimed at providing them with the tools to take
improvement into their own hands. Dianne addresses how the PIM training is different
than other aspects of early intervention.
Well, I think that there is quite a burden on the PIM process.
...[Y]ou know a lot of what happens in the early stages of that is
very difficult for these schools and their teams. They have to
break through...a lot of different things that are happening in the
school. And, there are...a lot of different dynamics among the
staff. ...They have to at some point say, ‘Look here’s where we
are. Here’s where we have to get, and we have to do that. There’s
something we’re not doing right, or we’re not doing well for our
kids, and we have to do better.’ And that’s not an easy thing for
most people to come to... You know they start in different places
and some of it’s really just a question of having a good process for
them to work through to get a plan. Others have a lot further to go.
So, I think that ownership takes time. I think it starts in the PIM
process. (Dianne, DOE)
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The “burden” Dianne refers to is that the PIM is when underperforming school teams, no
matter where they are starting from, must use the tools they are trained by the DOE to use
to plan for their own school improvement. “Ownership takes time,” no matter how
underperforming school teams enter the PIM training, but by the end, when they are
presenting before the state Board of Education, they definitely realize that the state may
help them, but they are going to be doing the work.
There are several aspects of the PIM process that contribute to a change in the
school team’s perception of new school accountability policy as an enabling approach
rather than a deterrent one. PIM requires active participation of the school teams and
reinforces that it is not about blame; it is about objectively looking at how to make
improvements in the school. Dianne discusses how the PIM training and method are
designed to objectify things in order to move the underperforming school team forward.
I think what the PIM process does is it objectifies things a bit
because it doesn’t say, ‘What aren’t you doing right?’ It says,
‘Let’s look at this data and let’s figure out from this performance
from these performance results, what’s going on here.’ And, it
really brings the focus down to on the one hand, down to the data,
but on the other hand on a school wide level. So, I think.. .there
really is something that happens with a team that has never really
done that - never really investigated the data - that is in a sense,
um, empowering and also it doesn’t feel like a personal attack on
them. (Dianne, DOE)
Equipping the underperforming school teams with the tools to analyze the needs in the
school empowers them to make small and big systematic changes. Rather than focusing
on personal talent, it makes a team look at what they need to change to make
improvements. By providing concrete methods and targets, the underperforming school
team is focused and not overwhelmed. Daphne reiterates that point,
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...it’s not about blame. It’s about: is it not in your curriculum? Is
it because your teachers don’t feel comfortable teaching it? What
is it? Why is that happening? And, when the shift begins to take
place away from ‘it’s not bad teachers’ necessarily, it might be a
lot of other reasons that you can do something about. And, they
begin to build on the understanding that there are things they can
do. And, if it is teachers that don’t know then we’ve got to get
them the right professional development. (Daphne, DOE)
The “bad teachers” idea is a concept that comes out of the “distrust” of education reform,
and new school accountability policy. PIM alters that understanding. For the first time
the underperforming school staff are shown what they can do to make changes in the
school, so frustration can turn into “empowerment.”
Support from the DOE staff and district staff help to move the teams during the
PIM training. Daphne describes how the DOE works with and facilitates the PIM
training with the underperforming school teams.
PIM is a facilitated process, so they get help all the way through.
We don’t do it for them. We do it with them. Our hope is that in
addition to the end product, which is a viable school improvement
plan, we are building their capacity to understand a process that we
are expecting them to continue and get better at. (Daphne, DOE)
The consistent message communicated by the state throughout the process is that the
DOE is going to be working with you and that it is going to be a partnership. In the PIM
training, the school team can actually see how it can be helped by the DOE and the help
is put to the test.
Finally, after what is admittedly a lot of hard work over the summer and the
beginning of the school year, the DOE reviews the underperforming plan and begins to
prepare them to present it before the state Board of Education (BOE). In yet another
example of sincerity, respect, and a desire for cooperative working relationship, the DOE
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staff assures the school that they will not go before the BOE until they are ready and have
a solid improvement plan in hand. Daphne explains,
We [DOE] will never say, ‘OK, you’re scheduled to come to the
[BOE] meeting,’ and let [the BOE] decide your plan isn’t good
enough... ‘You’re only going to go there when we all agree it’s
strong enough for them to approve.’
[We are] always there with [the underperforming school principal].
So, I make all of the arrangements with them, schedule them on the
Board agenda...I work with them on that so they are feeling as
prepared as they can. (Daphne, DOE)

The DOE’s hand holding of the underperforming school team during the presentation
before the BOE, shows the school team the value of having DOE involved, and that the
working relationship is a partnership, even if they had not seen it this way before.
Underperforming Schools
Universally within the schools, staff expressed frustration that the PIM process
did not leave room to look at the whole school. The “narrow” approach to school
improvement planning left out what are significant contributors to their students’
performance (e.g., LEP, no parental involvement, poverty). Teachers expressed a feeling
that not looking at some of the uncontrollable factors makes it look like they are just not
doing their jobs. The new principals within the schools agreed with the frustration.
However, they also felt they were responsible for focusing the staff on what they can
control within the school and making improvements based on these areas.
The Babson Elementary principal and teachers were in the midst of PIM training
during the study. One of the Babson teachers (Bridget) described the PIM as “very long,
tedious, and tiring.” Principals and teachers in both schools found it to be long and
involved. Barbara noted that, “.. .even though it was long and involved, and we had to
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spend the summer doing it. We had to go. It seemed as though, this PIM process is
better than the process I went through before [with the district].” Adeline described the
long hours and hard work required of her and her school team during the PIM training,
When we were in PIM, it was a lot to do within the first, I think it
was two days. And, yes, we did stay over night but we were
working until 9:00, 10:00, 11:00, but then we had to be right back
the next morning at 8:00... But, I really thought that it was really
informative. ... it’s very monotonous. It’s very time consuming.
(Adeline, teacher, Alfred Elementary)
Principals and teachers find the process to be intense, long, and hard, but in the end, they
have a plan that is backed up by data to improve their school. The training equips them
with the knowledge and the planning allows them the freedom to build on existing
strengths within the school. During the hard work of PIM, it did seem that the school
teams began to recognize that they are responsible for their school’s improvement and
they are empowered and enabled to do take on the responsibility.
Surprisingly, the teachers did not find the DOE to be as much of a support during
the PIM training as they found the district/school support specialists to be. Teachers
described the role of the DOE during the training as a person who stopped by their team
infrequently and either encouraged them or asked them to change direction. The district
had a more influential role, with the specialist acting as a facilitator of the school team.
The involvement level of the district along with the level of expertise the specialist
brought to the team about the process really marks a change in how the school team sees
the district.
The last step of the PIM process is to present the school improvement plan they
have developed using the tools learned at the PIM training to the state’s Board of
Education. Principals are the presenters of the plan, and it is the point where they truly
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feel responsible for improving their school. Being new to the school, the principal faces
many new challenges and starting off one’s tenure at a school by presenting before the
state Board of Education is a trial by fire. It is rare for a principal to ever present to the
BOE, and to be defending a new school (at least to the principal) is without a doubt a
situation that feels tense and would make any principal nervous. Mr. Arnold says of the
experience:
It was nerve wracking. You know? You’re sitting next to your
superintendent, and you’re just fielding questions about your plan.
I can’t remember how long it lasted, but it was just...it wasn’t
easy. But, they asked what was in your plan, but they just asked
general questions as well. That made things easier. You know,
one question they asked was about the kind of services that you
offer students, did you offer parents, that wasn’t in the plan? I just
talked about the cultural changes, and you know, appointing me,
and you know what a great job the superintendent did in
appointing me. (Mr. Arnold, Alfred Elementary)
The presentation before the Board of Education is the point when the DOE administrators
felt they provided the most support to the principal of the undeiperforming school. When
asked about supports, Mr. Arnold replied,
I think Stan [the district school support specialist] was very
supportive. .. .1 think the superintendent was kept abreast of what
was going on. I don’t know if he could speak to what we were
doing himself. He could just talk about what he did. You know,
change in administration. But, he was there [at the Board of
Education meeting] next to me. (Mr. Arnold, Alfred Elementary)
More than the busy superintendent, the specialist really becomes the district and the state
at the same time by truly making a strong connection with the underperforming school
principal.
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Conclusion
The point of view of the state upon the working relationship between the state and
the underperforming school is longer term and reveals the evolution of the beginning of
intervention. A few things stand out as important facets of the beginning of intervention.
First of all, district staff and superintendents are really important to the beginning of
intervention. At every turn before any decision was made about a school, the DOE
Director contacted the superintendent prior to contacting the school. Though new school
accountability policy directly connects the state and the school, Daphne from the DOE
had clearly decided to utilize the traditional hierarchy in order to expand their capacity
and motivate the district to take on the responsibility of addressing the needs within the
underperforming schools within their districts. The school support specialists, who reside
within the district and are veterans of the district, are designated to build the district’s
capacity to provide support to underperforming schools. In the end, the DOE believes its
responsibility is to develop a support infrastructure, but it is the districts that must do the
work to improve schools.
Second, the removal of principals in the midst of the beginning of intervention
can prove to be disruptive to the building of a working relationship between DOE and the
underperforming school. The DOE-designed early intervention process has evolved into
a design that builds the working relationship with the school by giving DOE liaisons
regions, conducting preliminary preparation visits, setting up logistics, and using the
liaisons as a point of contact at the state level. All of the interaction occurs primarily
between the DOE liaison and the principal. When the principal is removed (by the
superintendent) at the end of the school year, and prior to the PIM training, much of the
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relationship building is lost. The loss of the principal may contribute to the sense of not
knowing the “big picture” among teachers in the school and may partially contribute to
the high turnover of the staff.
Although using the principal as the DOE’s primary contact causes a disruption in
the development of the working relationship because in a majority of the cases the
principal is removed, the PIM serves as an opportunity for the DOE to connect with the
new principal and school team. The connection is supportive to the school, and it allows
the school principal and teachers to strengthen their relationship with district
administrators (specialists). The PIM is the catchall point where the DOE delivers the
message to school teams that it is the principal and the teachers within the school who
will plan and successfully implement improvement strategies. The schools have been
declared underperforming, but the team is empowered to make their own improvements
to the school, under the guidance of the DOE. Empowerment removes any notion of a
deterrent understanding of new school accountability that the school staff members may
have had.
Third, the environment that the DOE Director has developed is one that is
supportive of schools but balanced with being firm about improvement that needs to take
place within the schools. Over and over throughout the interviews, it is clear that the
state level participants believe schools can improve and do improve. I say this because
there are some who believe the intent of new school accountability policy undermines the
public education system in and of itself. I do not disagree that there are people who
would like alternatives to the existing system, but I did not find those people or beliefs
among those who participated in the study. Every effort, whether it be selecting a
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contractor that places personal relationships as a top priority or selecting liaisons that
have an understanding of the school because they have worked in schools, was made to
strengthen the connection between the underperforming school and the DOE within the
organizational capacity limitations.
Fourth, expanding capacity drives the implementation process, and rather than try
and do it all, the DOE has decided to address a smaller number of underperforming
schools relatively well. Using a district relationship to share information about the state
strategies, the implicit hope is that the districts will take on the other underperforming
schools before the DOE has to visit them. Another way the state manages its capacity
limitations is relying on the “right people.” The staff, practitioners, and contractors all
reported that they had worked with really talented people who were able to balance the
role of evaluator with supporter of the underperforming schools. Though anecdotally
there were a few stories of personality clashes between the state team and the school
staff, for the most part the level of skill and expertise the state level people brought with
them made for a smoother process that increased the likelihood of a cooperative working
relationship between the state and the school.
Fifth, the DOE has a respect for the different places and contexts an
underperforming school may be coming from or living within. Rather than try to impose
a one size fits all early intervention process upon the underperforming schools, the DOE
designed a uniform protocol and process with built in flexibility to accommodate the
needs of a particular school. Because of the uniqueness of each underperforming school,
it is difficult to typify the working relationship between the DOE and the school during
the selected points during the early intervention process.
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In the end, it is apparent that the involvement level between the DOE and the
underperforming school has increased. From the perspective of those in the
underperforming school, the relationship between the underperforming school and the
DOE changes over the course of early intervention, although throughout, the expectations
the school participants had for the DOE staff were low. Involvement between the two
naturally increases through the early intervention process. When you are coming from
virtually no involvement to even a little involvement, it has to go up. I have to doubt that
at any point the underperforming school feels the involvement level of the DOE is high
because it seems they rely on the district for every day involvement with the
underperforming school.
As far as the trust level, the sincerely supportive nature of the DOE during the
beginning of intervention is communicated to the underperforming principal and staff
over a period of months of early intervention and by the time they are presenting before
the Board of Education has likely reached its peak. I would have to conclude that the
working relationship is a moving target between “coming apart with avoidance” and
residing closer to “cooperative but autonomous.” The working relationship between the
school and the DOE improves or begins during early intervention, but it never gets to
“pulling together and synergistic” (Scheberle, 1997). Mr. Arnold describes a working
relationship that sounds more like a “cooperative but autonomous” (Scheberle, 1997)
relationship.
Only with the DOE [liaison]- I’d call him if we had some issues
with the report, or we needed information, and [the state] came
down for a visit, and we would email each other and say, ‘This is
accurate. This isn’t accurate.’ Before he would write the report,
he would have me look it over and say, ‘Any factual things that I
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need to change here?’ So, that’s what we’d do along those lines,
but no, I wouldn’t call him. (Mr. Arnold, Alfred Elementary)
Evidently there is a level of trust and comfort, but Mr. Anthony does not feel comfortable
calling him for a question or support, for that sort of thing he relies on the district.
I believe that ideally, the DOE would likely want a “cooperative but autonomous”
relationship with the underperforming school. At first this seems wrong. Why not have
high levels of trust and involvement? The truth is the DOE does not have the resources
or capacity to achieve any more than a low level of involvement with the school.
Consequently they leave the “pulling together and synergistic” type of working
relationship to the traditional (local) partners in the public education system: the district
and the school.
This brings us to the last facet of working relationships during new school
accountability policy implementation. It is clear throughout all of the state level
interviews that in the face of early intervention, the district is ultimately responsible for
improving the delivery of education within an underperforming school. After reviewing
the interviews, one of the implicit goals of early intervention emerged. It is to improve
the working relationship between the district and the underperforming school. The staff
members of the DOE do not want the most effective working relationship between
themselves (DOE) and the underperforming school.
The DOE wants to reinvigorate or rehabilitate the working relationship between
the district and the underperforming school. The district and school should have high
levels of involvement, and more than likely do have increased levels of involvement with
the institution of the school support specialist strategy. Trust may prove to be a challenge
because they do work closely with one another and certainly do have a past that at least
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from the perspective of those in the school that is neglectful. Once again the supportive
nature of the specialists is a strategy that can improve and rehabilitate levels of trust and
set the district and the school on their way to a “pulling together and synergistic” working
relationship.
The real relationship story is the dramatic change that occurs in how the school
principal and teachers feel about the district administrators. In both schools the
schoolteachers felt the relationship between the school and the district was marked by
little to no level of involvement and extremely low levels of trust. Scheberle (1997) calls
this “coming apart with avoidance” and finds the relationship to be shallow and full of
misunderstanding and misperception of one another.
The PIM training is a new beginning for schools and their districts. It becomes
the arena for the new principal to learn about the school he or she will be running and to
meet the team of teachers from the school. Also, the principal has an opportunity in a
smaller planning team to set his or her agenda through improvement planning. It serves
as an opportunity for the principal to develop a positive working relationship with the
district (school support specialist), and it allows the teachers on the team to rethink their
negative feelings toward the district. Through small acts of support, guidance and
sharing of expertise the district specialist has a chance to chip away at the old idea of how
the district and school working relationship once was and to start anew. Though the
relationship remains tenuous, with the help of the specialist, it hovers closer to a “pulling
together and synergistic” type of relationship characterized by a mutual understanding
between the two organizations toward reaching a common goal of school improvement.
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CHAPTER VIII
THE “FIXER” DISTRICT

Bardach (1977) first identified the “fixer” role in policy implementation and
describes it as a policymaker who oversees, monitors, and cares about how a policy is
implemented, and thus is there throughout the cycle of implementation to make
adjustments so that the policy’s end goals are achieved. Lin (2000) takes a slightly
different approach to the idea by delegating the “fixer” role to any entity that is
negotiating and fitting the policy into the context of the organization. The “fixer” is
anyone, a policymaker or a person implementing the policy who has the power and
influence to negotiate implementation. Early intervention in Massachusetts places the
“fixer” role at the district level and with the addition of school support specialists located
at the large urban districts, they are wholly secured as the negotiators of policy.
The school support specialists’ role in new school accountability policy
implementation is not easily categorized as “state” or “local.” The position is funded by
the state. However, the specialist is required to have experience working in the district.
Specialists work in the superintendent’s office, and in the eyes of colleagues and other
educators in the district the specialists are employed by the district, not the DOE. With
the exception of regular meetings and trainings with DOE administrators, and the fact
that DOE has final approval on who is hired to work as a school support specialist, many
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of the decisions about the work of the specialists are made by the superintendent. The
sense from the DOE is that the superintendent is the best judge of how the specialists’
time is best allotted, as long is it is used on school improvement initiatives. Without a
doubt, the school support specialists are a strong connection between the
underperforming school, the district, and the DOE. However, because they reside at the
district, are from the district, and for the most part are perceived as district administrators,
it is most appropriate to think about them as coming from the local or district level.
Specialists are working and meeting with the DOE regularly to continuously
refine the policy and ensure a common understanding of the outcomes, and they are
working with the underperforming schools to accommodate their unique challenges and
contexts and helping principal makes sense of the early intervention strategies for his or
her particular underperforming school. The district and especially the school support
specialists are designed to be the middlemen during the implementation of new school
accountability policy.

Working Relationship between the District and the DOE
The selected points in time during the beginning of intervention for examining
working relationships are less relevant to the district and DOE relationship because the
relationship timeframe is greater than a single underperforming school review cycle. The
working relationship variables of trust and involvement, however, are relevant and
generally applied to the working relationship.
The strength of the relationship between the DOE and the district is a surprising
finding in the study because new school accountability policy skips the district and
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connects the school and the DOE directly and because of the past relationship between
the district and DOE. Stan explains the past relationship,
I think historically [there was] almost no relationship. Sort of like
the giant elephant in the room is DOE, but you don’t have to look
at them or talk to them, unless you have to talk to them. (Stan,
Charlesburg District)
According to Stan, people in the district did not call the DOE unless it was a last resort.
They believed it was better to try and deal with things on their own rather than bring in
the DOE, which would inevitably make a bigger deal out of an issue than necessary.
Bringing in the DOE did not mean state support would be coming to the district. Rather,
it meant more scrutiny and more work for the district to comply with state demands. The
incentive to work with DOE did not exist. Rooted in the old culture of SDE’s that
focused on inputs and enforcing compliance, it is not surprising that district
administrators did not want the state to make them jump through extra hoops or go
through a detailed compliance review. No contact from the DOE was considered good
news to those in the district, and the idea of bringing the DOE into the district was
viewed as absurd.
If you take a step back from knowing how a district feels about the compliance
and administratively driven DOE, the organization of state public education systems in
and of itself should make a partnership between the DOE and the district natural and
automatic. The organization of the public education system is such that the DOE is the
organizer and data gatherer at the top, and the districts oversee the schools in the actual
delivery of education. State reliance upon the district to improve schools is natural
within the existing context of state public education systems, because the educational
knowledge and expertise resides at the district and school levels. It is also natural for the
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district to play the role of supporting and implementing the mandates of the state into the
school because the district is closer to the underperforming schools. However from
Stan’s assessment, it is clear that the “natural” assumption that the DOE and district
would work together is not necessarily true.
Logically it makes sense for the DOE to work with the district to support
underperforming schools when considering the organization of the public education
system. The DOE has had to make an effort to create a partnership with the district as it
implements new school accountability policy. As the more dependent party, the DOE,
started off by making a few “magnanimous gestures” (Weber, Malhotra, & Mumighan,
2003) toward the district. The include consulting with the district superintendent about
the potentially underperforming schools within his or her district and providing targeted
funding for school support specialist who are from and reside within the district. These
have led to an improved relationship between the two.
Specifically, the new working relationship between the DOE and the district has
been evolving since the interventions commenced in 2000. The first gesture was when
the DOE began holding regular meetings between the urban district superintendents and
the associate commissioner of Accountability and Technical Assistance at the DOE. The
regular meetings are ongoing and have contributed to the evolution of how new school
accountability policy is implemented in Massachusetts. The school support specialist
strategy is one of the most influential components of implementation, and is a DOE
innovation, but certainly sprang out of a need identified during the regular meetings with
superintendents.
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The second gesture was the decision for the school support specialists to be a
respected veteran of the district where the underperforming schools they are supposed to
help are located. Rather than having the schools look at the specialist as a “carpetbagger”
(Stan, Charlesburg District), the DOE’s support of allowing experienced district level
people to in turn provide support for their schools showed respect for the district and the
importance of educational context in which each of the underperforming schools
functions. As Stan states,
What [DOE] could do is...grab some people, call them school
support people, and put then in your urban centers. And, what
DOE... decided to do is... go to Charlesburg, and [other
Massachusetts urban districts]... and all those different places, and
we’re going to find people, and ask the superintendent who might
be the best at doing this job and then hire them there. I think that
was a stroke of genius by Massachusetts. (Stan, Charlesburg
District)
The DOE gathers the School Support Specialists together on a regular basis to
work as partners, provide training, and hammer out the early intervention process with
one another. Allowing the districts (through urban superintendent and school support
specialist meetings) a forum to discuss the challenges of early intervention and to develop
a place for two-way, informal communication makes district administrators feel
supported and connected to the process. Rather than having early intervention be
something that is done to the district and the underperforming school, it is a partnership
or collaboration in which both want to achieve the common goal of improving
educational outcomes in the schools. The regular meetings have “opened the door”
(Sandy, Charlesburg District) between the district and the DOE and are the place where
trust, sincerity, and reciprocity between the two occurs. The gesture naturally allows for
the relationship to strengthen.
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Both school support specialists sincerely felt supported by the DOE in their
efforts to improve the schools within the Charlesburg district. Fully integrated into the
district, the school support specialists began to disseminate their newly gained expertise
by working with all the district’s schools and by training them in a PIM style school
improvement planning process. The school support specialists have a priority to work
with the state declared underperforming schools, then the schools not visited by the state
but designated in need of improvement by NCLB standards, and then the remaining
schools within the district. Stan describes his experience as a school support specialist as
“the best group of professionals I have ever been associated with.”
The working relationship between the district and the DOE has improved as a
result of the school support specialist strategy. The district specialists are critical players
in connecting with the DOE, playing the role of fixer between the DOE, the district, and
the underperforming school. The specialists facilitate and smooth out the process of
understanding new school accountability policy and implementing the policy.
The relationship between the DOE and district has changed since the beginning of
intervention of new school accountability policy was implemented in 2000. Prior to
implementation, the relationship between the DOE and the district was marked by low
levels of trust and involvement and can be described as “coming apart with avoidance”
(Scheberle, 1997). Often found in loosely coupled systems, Stan states that there was
virtually “no relationship” prior to new school accountability policy.
Changes to the relationship occurred when the DOE made gestures to the district
about wanting to partner to improve public education in their districts. Sandy explains,
“[DOE staff] have tried to team with us.” Involvement and a sense of partnership have
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increased through regular meetings with superintendents and the DOE. The school
support specialist strategy enhanced the involvement levels between the state and the
district and increased the levels of trust that the district had for the DOE because the
strategy was aimed at achieving a common goal of improving the schools within their
districts.
The state level administrators have shown their willingness to negotiate policy
implementation aimed at the common end goal throughout the process. Sandy discusses
one of the ways in which DOE negotiates with the district. “They try to work with us to
streamline [early intervention] to make it better each and every year, to be clear about the
communications about what the steps are along the way” (Sandy, Charlesburg District).
Sincere acts of support and regular and clear communication have altered the
working relationship between the DOE and the urban district so that it comes closer to a
“pulling together and synergistic” type of relationship. The school support specialists
perceive the working relationship, by no means perfect, as characterized by regular two
way communication, a sincere understanding of the “human element” during early
intervention, a mutual respect for the strengths and expertise each possess, and an
understanding of the unique context in which each school and district operates. The type
of relationship DOE has developed with the district allows for negotiation of the policy
during implementation and ensures that the specialists will keep the policy relevant for
the district through regular feedback to the DOE and making regular judgments about
changes within the underperforming schools.
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Working Relationship between the District and the School
In the past the school district superintendent and administrators treated schools as
separate and independent entities that could “sink or swim” (Stan, Charlesburg District)
on their own. The attitude was such that, if the district administrators told the school
what needed to be done, in minds of the district administrators it was done. District
administrators rarely if ever checked on schools to find out whether it actually was
implemented or if it was not implemented. It was left up to those in the school to seek
support from the district and when support was sought, those in the school need to be
ready and willing to be the recipients of whatever support the district provided. Not
accessing resources or talking to the district was a school’s problem and not that of
anyone in the district. Sandy discusses how the relationship (or lack of relationship)
worked:
You could have interviewed a school that had [poor test scores]
and as long as the lid was on, and things were quiet and things
were safe and there was nobody complaining, you weren’t going to
be looked at closely. (Sandy, Charlesburg District)
Basically, unless a school principal was asking for help or a parent was
complaining or the local school committee had an issue with a school, students’
performance could be devastatingly low, and the district would still not be involved with
the school. New school accountability policy impels the district to take an active role in
the underperforming school. Additionally NCLB subgroup analysis of English language
learners, special education students and students by race have forced the district to look at
schools and the subgroups “in a real close way” (Sandy, Charlesburg District).
Now, the district uses the state’s underperforming designations and NCLB
designations to prioritize their interventions and connections with the schools. The
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school support specialists are critical to altering the relationship from leaving the school
alone to coming in with support during the early intervention cycle. By requiring every
school in the district, regardless of performance status, to attend training and develop a
PIM-style school improvement plan, the specialists have established themselves as
knowledgeable experts in what the DOE is looking for in the even the school is chosen
for a state visit. When a school is identified for a visit, the specialist makes contact with
the principal and works closely with him or her to prepare for the visit and review the
school improvement plan. Additionally specialists attend school faculty meetings to
explain the process and provide feedback to plans.
School support specialists specials work with the schools to “make sense” of early
intervention. Sandy discusses the reaction of the school toward the district school
support specialists.
Generally speaking, they’re happy to have us because they
recognize that we’re bringing support, and we keep trying to make
sure that every time we’re there that we leave a document trail that
helps them... (Sandy, Charlesburg District)
District school support specialists approach their work with the underperforming
schools with balance and focus. They feel empathy and provide support for all of the
diverging issues a principal is faces in an underperforming school while they hold the
school principals and staff accountable for decisions they make. The “art” of balancing
support and accountability is a common theme in the stories specialists tell about going
into schools. Sandy explains, “I’m working with a principal one day on their providing
help and the next day I’m pushing on something.” Stan talks about the “human aspect.”
You have to understand the human aspect of what you’re doing.
And, if you are talking to a principal who is so stressed at this
moment that nothing is getting through, don’t even bother talking
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to her. Reschedule and go at another time. I mean that’s the part
of what we’re doing. We have to be aware of just how much stress
everyone is under. (Stan, Charlesburg District)
Professional judgment of the specialists is critical to accomplishing school improvement.
Specialists have to work with the principals and teachers of underperforming schools to
wait for the teachable moments and to fit the demands of accountability so that they make
sense within the immediate context of the school and the needs of the school staff.
Sometimes this means the specialists must wait for the time when the school staff can
handle critiques and proactively make decisions to remedy problems. The specialists are
not interested in decimating the public education system or those within it. They are
trying to improve it, and keep the schools on track to improve students educational
outcomes.
The specialists work with the school principal during each step of early
intervention. As soon a school is identified for a School Panel Review visit, the specialist
contacts the school and tries to turn the “devastation” of the principal into action. The
specialist gives the principal the big picture and points to the areas where the state will
question the principal and staff. Specialists feel that when the state asks the exact
questions they gave the principal in advance, they gain credibility and the principal and
teachers are then much more willing to listen to them. According to the specialists, the
school principals and teachers experience a wide range of emotions during the various
stages of the process ranging from anger, to self-blame, to not feeling good enough.
Working with principals and teachers to transform what feels bad into a positive
opportunity is a priority for the specialists. They are vital in changing the school
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principal and teachers’ perceptions of early intervention as a deterrent system to one that
is enabling.
Increased involvement and support by the specialists toward the school change
the relationship between the district and the school. In the past schools were left on their
own to “sink or swim,” and were expected to comply with directives from the district
given without support. The relationship was antagonistic and isolating for the school.
Salary issues and a general lack of support have contributed to lower levels of trust
between the schools and the district and make the relationship of the past closest to
“coming apart with avoidance”(Scheberle, 1997). A relationship marked by distrust and
isolation between the two entities.
Since the school support specialists have come on board, the relationship they
aspire to with underperforming schools is a “pulling together and synergistic”
relationship, which has high levels of trust and involvement. As the district and school
move toward that ideal, they move through a “coming apart and contentious” working
relationship which has low levels of trust and high involvement levels. The specialists
must work through the remnants of low levels of trust within the school by acts of
sincerity and support. They accomplish this by sharing expertise and working more
closely with the school to reinforce data driven decision making and improvement
strategies. Most importantly, the specialists make the underperforming school a district
priority, a new and different experience for those in the school who found the district to
be neglectful and unsupportive for many years prior to intervention. The specialists
strategy to balance the support and accountability is a strategy to improve the levels of
trust between the school and the district.
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Conclusion
“Schools don’t exist on their own... anymore at all under [new school
accountability]... So, much more than ever before, we’re tied in” (Stan, Charlesburg
District). The school support specialist is discussing one of the major outcomes of new
school accountability policy. The loosely coupled public education system is starting to
become a system that has specific roles and responsibilities assigned to the school,
district, or state levels.
Most people may have assumed that these were the roles at the various levels of
the public education system; however, that is not how they were functioning. The
starting point of the working relationships between the district and the DOE and the
district and the school are evidence of the isolation of each level of the state’s public
education system. New school accountability policy has motivated each level of the
public education system to take on the responsibility for educational outcomes. By
“opening doors” between all of the levels, there is more two-way communication
between the levels. The district is critical, because it is in the middle of the
communication lines.
The district school support specialists are the negotiators of policy at the school
level. They know the district, and they have a working relationship with the DOE. They
are in regular communication with the state and the school, and therefore must fit the end
goal of new school accountability policy within the district and specific underperforming
school. Balancing support and accountability when working with school principals and
staff is a significant part of their job. Once again having the “right people” to balance
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these roles and to feel comfortable working with all levels of the public education system
is vital to the successful implementation of new school accountability and early
intervention.
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CHAPTER IX
DISCUSSION/CONCLUSION

Stone (1997) writes,

. .the political analyst who wants to choose a wise course of

action should focus less on assessing the objective consequences of actions and more on
how the interpretations will go” (p. 8). Altering how we look at a policy, Stone (1997)
shows how policy is perceived is often more important than its actual objectives. This is
true for new school accountability policy on a number of levels. The perception of new
school accountability is initially threatening to those in the school and according to DOE
professionals, and it is at least partially intended to be threatening and motivating for
educators within the schools. It is, however, most threatening to those who reside at the
district level. Without explicitly pushing or even intervening in a district, it pushes
superintendents and district administrators to realign resources and attention to
underperforming schools that have been, dare I say, systematically ignored for years even
before school accountability measures were in place.
In both schools, when participants were questioned about whether these changes
in leadership, as well as in the classroom, would have occurred without school
accountability, the answer was no, with a caveat. Educators in both schools recognized
problems within the school, and seemed to have an understanding of what it would take
to improve. However, the changes that required a district response were either slow in
coming or unlikely to occur because of issues that were beyond the control of the
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educators within the schools. Principals and teachers believed the district may have made
changes eventually, but felt as though their schools were languishing as they waited for
the changes to be made. Once the caveat that the district might have eventually made
changes to better the school was put out into the open, there was general agreement that
the speed and number of changes would not have occurred unless new school
accountability policy existed. The principals and teachers believed that the state’s
decision to intervene in the school and triggered a new level of support and attention
from the district.
This is an interesting proposition. From the outside it appears that new school
accountability policy will solely impact the school. Because new school accountability in
Massachusetts is part of comprehensive reform legislation, the school accountability
system is part of a larger statewide accountability system that includes holding districts
accountable. For the underperforming schools the threat of state intervention is over at
the point of early intervention, and the DOE works to transform the perceptions those in
the underperforming school have about the policy. The transformation is intended
change the local understanding of the policy as an enabling system in which the DOE and
the school to engage in a working relationship that is at best “cooperative but
autonomous.”
Once intervention begins, policy has a less deterrent effect on the school.
However, the district, still under the threat of the state’s district accountability system, is
still motivated by the policy’s deterrent nature. The threat to the district, combined with
the supplemental resources provided by the DOE in the form of school support
specialists, provides the district superintendent with the targeted resources to work with
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the underperforming schools in partnership with the DOE. The results of early
intervention are in fact changes that come from the district level: selecting a new
principal as leader, making new resources available, and developing district-wide school
improvement programs and technical assistance aligned with the type of support provided
by the DOE to underperforming schools.
“Locating authority in many small jurisdictions leads to domination by local
elites, policies that maintain the status quo, enactment of racial and other prejudices, and
little or no redistribution of either power or wealth” (Stone, 1997, p. 366). The
domination of local authorities over schools in which resources are not equally,
adequately, or appropriately allocated to schools is the underlying reason for adding an
external accountability system to the public education system. The tension between local
school (and district) internal and state’s external accountability is the environment in
which new school accountability policy is negotiated.
Early intervention throws in a dash or more of external accountability into the
context so that new school accountability in fact changes the recipe within the public
education system and motivates changes in the distribution of resources towards schools
that are underperforming. Within the tension between internal and external
accountability systems lie many truths. It is true that the internal accountability system is
lodged in the idea of decentralized government emphasizing customization of the
resources to meet the needs at the client level. It is also true that an external
accountability system is found within the idea of a more centralized government, which
relies on the expertise of those far from the client, who are less likely to be prejudiced by
local connections and politics. Therefore, external accountability is universally applied,
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and helps to identify those areas that are either being underserved by or in need of more
resources, attention, training, etc. Rather than moving from the pole of internal
accountability to external accountability, Massachusetts new school accountability policy
during early intervention changes the tension, without eliminating either.
Negotiation of early intervention is about communicating the need for both an
external and internal accountability system rather than eliminating one (external) for the
other (internal). Having both has the potential to create balance. In a critique of new
school accountability policy, O’Day (2004) states that one of the biggest problems with
new school accountability policy is that it increases the bureaucratic control over the
loosely coupled public education system, making those at the bottom, the principals and
teachers less likely to take risks and develop an “adaptive learning system” (p. 32).
Interviews with school level participants did not entirely support the notion that
principals and teachers in underperforming schools felt early intervention would limit
their ability. Rather, underperforming school principals and, more so, teachers believed
that they needed more involvement of the district. Those in the school often welcomed
state intervention in the hope that their voices and their professional insights about the
problems within the school would be heard by the district.
The capacity in the underperforming schools was not conducive to “adaptive
learning systems” because of the problems within the schools. The teachers in the
underperforming schools were trying to get by each day, and do the best job they could
with the limited resources of text books, supplies, technology and appropriate learning
services for students. By all accounts, teachers wanted the DOE to come in and see what
they deal with on a daily basis, and they believed that the state involvement might just
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gamer the attention of the district, which each principal and teacher in each
underperforming school characterized as neglectful at best prior to early intervention.
Much like a guitar being tuned, you need the bridge and the tuning peg
connecting the guitar string to be able to play. Without the poles of internal and external
accountability, the education system does not function. The idea is supported by
O’Day’s (2002) assertion that a school cannot have state external accountability at the
cost of its own internal accountability system. Instead of all or nothing, new school
accountability policy is an attempt to retune a school and a district by adjusting the
distribution of resources (encompassed by funds, training, district attention, principals,
and teachers) to the school. Early intervention is an effort to strike a balance between the
local authority and the adequate distribution of resources within the DOE’s early
intervention framework.

One Best Framework
Each DOE participant emphasized the important role of the district during the
implementation of new school accountability policy. At first it was difficult to
distinguish where the DOE or the district responsibility for improving the delivery of
education in underperforming schools began and ended. Debra clarified the roles:
There’s a huge need for us to be helping low performing schools,
and in fact, the responsibility is on the state to develop an
infrastructure - a statewide infrastructure of support. NCLB
requires us to do that. So, we knew that..., it made more sense for
us as a state to build capacity at the school district level rather than
for us to have any relationship between the state and the school and
bypass the school district. (Debra, DOE)
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The state develops the framework and the district is responsible for ensuring school
improvement.
Part of early intervention for the DOE is to strengthen and clarify the roles of
educators at every level of the public education system. In the loosely coupled system
the roles and responsibilities were not as clearly defined in the past, and the expectation
was that when a directive was sent out from the DOE, the district or school complied
(similar to the expectations between the district and the school). If a problem arose and
was brought to the DOE’s attention, then a district or school risked being exposed to the
scrutiny of a state compliance review. Now, the role of the DOE is to develop the
framework in which the expectation is that policy implementation must be negotiated and
fitted to the local context. The role of the district is to be responsible for school
improvement and the role of the school is to use the frameworks and resources in the
district to improve educational outcomes. Even though they did not have to by law, the
DOE staff incorporated the district because they had a pre-existing relationship with the
state and with the school. As Debra explains,
The districts are there to stay.... [I]t is their job both under NCLB
and state requirements to make sure that their schools are
providing appropriate instruction for their kids. So, we really
wanted
to
make
sure
that
they...took
on
this
responsibility...(Debra, DOE)
At first it is surprising that all of the responsibility for school improvement is the
district’s responsibility. What about new school accountability policy and the state and
underperforming schools’ direct connection? What about the state’s constitutional
responsibility to provide an adequate education to children within the state? During early
intervention the responsibility, in the eyes of the DOE, remains in the hands of the
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districts. Early intervention is only a mild intervention in which the local control is not
taken away, but threatened with future interventions. By clearly holding the district
responsible the DOE is fitting the policy, which some could argue places the
responsibility in the hands of the state (DOE), into the existing organization of the public
education system and may be attempting to strengthen the district and school relationship
with the additional support of the district specialists.
Rather than imposing one best system upon the schools that are underperforming,
the DOE has developed a strategy that takes into account the unique local context. By
allowing the district and the school to develop a strong working relationship ideally
approaching “pulling together and synergistic,” the DOE administrators are allowing the
two to “make sense” of new school accountability policy within the district’s and
school’s unique, local context. In other words, the DOE has developed “one best
framework” for early implementation that aims to enhance the roles of the district and the
school through in-depth diagnosis (Fact-Finding Review), professional development
(P1M), targeted resources (school support specialists) and continuing involvement (DOE
liaison).
Another interesting facet of the DOE’s relationship with the district is that in
Massachusetts there is also a district accountability policy. The responsibility for district
accountability resides outside of the DOE, but similar to new school accountability
policy, district accountability is primarily focused on educational outcomes. So, while
the school may have been declared underperforming and losing the “threat” of the
deterrent policy, the district is still being threatened by a similar district based
accountability policy. It is in the best interest of district superintendents to work with the
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DOE to improve the district’s underperforming schools because it directly impacts the
determination about whether the district needs to be taken over by the state. The
motivation for reinvigorated relationships between the DOE and the district and between
the district and the underperforming schools, therefore, is at least partially driven by the
deterrent district accountability policy that threatens each time a school within the district
is declared underperforming.
During early intervention, it is easy to understand why the DOE focuses on the
district as the unit responsible for the improving the underperforming schools because the
district is still being held accountable by the state. In the context of district incentives to
improve schools and cooperate with the state, the DOE staff must redefine their
relationship with the district. Conveniently, the DOE is able to expand capacity through
new relations with urban district superintendents and has helped the districts in their time
of need by providing them with a designated person or persons to focus entirely on
school improvement efforts, and consequently expanding the district’s capacity to
improve.
New school accountability policy is based on the premise that schools are the unit
of change. Consequently, “[M]uch of the basic research on characteristics of effective
schools ignored the role of the district or identified districts as partly to blame for
allowing ineffective schools to exist..(Anderson, 2003, p. 1) Thus, in many states, like
Massachusetts with “first generation accountability systems1” (Mintrop & Trujillo, 2004,
p. 1), having the district play such an active role in the implementation of new school
accountability policy implementation and partnering between the SDE and the district is

1 First generation accountability systems are those in which states had pre-existing accountability systems
before the passage of NCLB in 2001.
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unusual (Bowles, et. al., 2002; Mintrop & Trujillo, 2004). The original idea behind
school accountability policy was to skip over the district and directly connect the school
with the state. However, the Massachusetts DOE’s efforts to have the district become
such an active partner during early intervention have served the DOE well. First, it
expands the limited capacity at the state level. Second, it improves DOE’s relationship
with the district, which improves the chances for best practices and improvement efforts
to be disseminated among schools district wide. Third, it gives the district additional
capacity during their time of need and while still under the threat of the state’s deterrent
district accountability policy. Fourth, it forces the district and underperforming school to
partner and cooperate in a new way by modeling a supportive, respectful and accountable
process of intervention and partnership. Regardless, the DOE participants declared the
relationship with the district to be one of the most significant factors in forging a positive
working relationship with a school. As Debra describes it,
It is about respecting each other’s vantage point, listening,
hearing... hearing what’s working and what’s not working and
trying to adapt and adjust the way you work together to make sure
it actually accomplishes what you’re trying to accomplish. And, I
think because we meet all of the time, because we have open
relationships with them, we can accomplish a whole lot more.
(Debra, DOE)
Because of the “open relationship” Debra speaks of, most of the negotiation of the
implementation of new school accountability policy occurs between the DOE and the
district. Negotiation between the state and the district is engrained in the early
intervention process. A formal example of the state and district negotiation is described
by Daphne,
First I make calls to the superintendents... Now, what we typically
do is, in the conversation with the superintendent, I will say, for
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example, in Charlesburg, we picked six schools there to visit.
When I talk to the superintendent, I say, ‘Here are the six schools
we are going to visit. What do you think about this list? Do you
think there is a school or two on this list who would not benefit
from having a School Panel Review?’
Often superintendents will say to me, ‘I think you should definitely
go to this school. They need a wake up call,” or, ‘The principal is
working really hard. The staff is not on board with really
supporting improvement work in this school. They need a visit.’
Or, ‘I’ve been working with this school for a while, the principal I
really don’t think is cutting it. Definitely go for a visit.’ Or, they’ll
say, ‘You know what? I just put a new principal in that school...
he’s made some inroads with the staff. They’re working well. I
think a panel review would be really disruptive.’ (Daphne, DOE)
Prior to the any underperforming school visit Daphne consults with the superintendent of
the district in which the school resides. The superintendent is given professional respect
and courtesy by Daphne by giving the superintendent discretion about which schools are
visited within his or her district.
The DOE participants characterize the state’s relationship with the district as a
positive one. It certainly has been influenced and developed over many years of new
school accountability implementation. Christie described the changes since the early
years of new school accountability policy and said that the district should be a “hand in
hand partner” during early intervention. She went on to say.
In fact... [i]n the past the principal was hung out to dry [by the
district]
[T]he principal was considered fully and totally
responsible for any... gain or failure that came across in their time
in office. So, that was the original belief. And, more so, and I
believe this is probably due to [the Accountability and Targeted
Assistance Associate Commissioner’s] influence, the districts are
being held to a much higher standard of support for their schools.
They’re being held accountable too. So, we’ve seen in the more
recent years a greater involvement of the district staff in support of
the schools. (Christie, ABC Consulting)
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Christie provides evidence that the relationship between the state and the district has
changed and led to a rehabilitation of the relationship between the school and the district.
Over the years of new school accountability policy the role of the district has been
defined and clarified and the “greater involvement” of the district is a result of the change
in the state and district relationship, leading to a change in the relationship between the
district and the underperforming school.
Regular superintendent meetings and the bridge of the school support specialists
provide a forum for the district and the state to hash out new school accountability
implementation issues. The formal and informal feedback mechanism created by regular
contact between the two has in the eyes of the DOE staff allowed them to clarify
misunderstandings quickly and informally, and accommodate the unique context in
which new school accountability policy is being implemented.
Put simply, the district superintendents and school support specialists have
informed the DOE’s “one best framework” and continue to add to the refinement of the
framework as the partners who are responsible for school improvement they in turn have
received support, cooperation and respect from the state. The new working relationship
between the state and the district is the medium for redefining the state-local relationship
to be less focused on compliance and top down mandates and more focused on mutual
problem solving and support toward a common goal of improving the delivery of
education within the state.
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Results of the Beginning of Intervention

In both schools there are short-term results of early intervention and new school
accountability policy. The teachers (and new principals) do agree on one thing. The
district would have never put in a new, effective principal in the schools had they not
been identified as underperforming by the state. Also, the restructuring and positive
administrative things that are going on in the school would not have occurred. In many
ways these schools had been neglected by the district for years (over five years in each
school according to teachers). Without state intervention, change appeared unlikely, and
the teachers seem to recognize this. For this the teachers expressed gratefulness for the
state intervention.
Changes in the relationship between the district and the school and the support
from the state helped to build morale within the school. Inside the schools major changes
occurred with the primary and most influential facet of schools: the human factor. Each
school had new and seemingly better respected (by the teachers) principals along with a
major turnover in the teaching staff.
When teachers were asked to compare the current situation within their schools
versus when they were declared underperforming, they found it difficult because these
staffing changes made it an entirely different school. All reported improvement in
morale and indicated feeling of being empowered to make change. The Alfred
Elementary principal and teachers had made some gains and were certainly more positive
than the principal and teachers at Babson Elementary, who were still in the thick of
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completing their PIM (school improvement) plan. More than anything I attribute the
difference to the point in early intervention that they were facing.
Clearly one of the fundamental changes that occurred in the schools as a result of
new school accountability policy is the additional attention they receive from the district.
In each school, teachers claimed that the troubles the school faced had been going on for
five or more years with no intervention by the district. The schools’ principals and
faculties reported little to no district help occurring prior to the schools’ being declared
underperforming. Barbara describes what was going on before state intervention,
I think it’s about time. For years.. .everybody did their own thing,
unless you had a very strong leader in the school. I’ve been in
several schools where teachers have just.. .done their own thing
and very little teaching was done and kids didn’t do well, and it
was just terrible. (Barbara, Babson Elementary)
There was little connection between teachers in the schools and even less between the
school and the district. Adeline believes that state intervention led to an improvement in
the relationship between the school and the district.
Well, I think [our relationship with the district] definitely has
[changed]. [The district administrators]...see Mr. Arnold as the
best thing in the world because we’ve come so far in just a year.
And I think they realize that we really.. .weren’t lying when we
went down [to the district] and ...submitted complaints. ...I think
they feel better about us. (Adeline, Alfred Elementary)
Adeline’s comment about the district believing the teachers were “lying” about the
troubles the school was facing prior to intervention reveals the type of relationship the
district and the school had in the past. Teachers at Alfred Elementary took the risky step
of going over their former principal’s head and complaining at the district level. The
complaints were met with no response from the district, making the teachers feel like the
school was being neglected. State intervention, which resulted in a change in the
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principal and the addition of school support specialists to work with the underperforming
school, has contributed to improvements in the dynamic between the school and the
district.
The schools and district communicate primarily through the school support
specialist and the principals. Consequently, many of the teachers had a sense that there
was a change in the relationship because they saw “district people” in the school with
much more frequency, and they heard about it from their principal. District support is
mainly focused on the principal. Mr. Arnold discusses the role of the district school
support specialist and how he could depend on him for support.
So, [the school support specialist] is the one I can talk to, not only
about the school improvement process, but he also has a history.
He was also around during the Panel Review [Mr. Arnold was not
principal then], and the school Fact Finding as well as the
presentation to the Board of Education. So, he’s seen full circle.
And, he’s the one who I could really lean on because he knew what
was going on under the previous administration. He knew what I
was trying to do here and the success we’ve had of moving our
plan forward. (Mr. Arnold, Alfred Elementary)
The school support specialist provides valuable assistance to the principal and is the
primary contact between the school, district, and state.
Since the school support specialist is the primary conduit of communication for
the school, a couple of issues or questions arise. First, prior to the inception of the school
support specialist position at the district level, how did the district communicate with the
schools? Teachers felt that the district simply was not present in their school even when
complaints were filed.
Second, in both instances the former principals, who were more than likely the
main contact between the teachers and the district, were removed and teachers alluded to
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personality problems between the principal and district staff. Could it be that a personal
relationship led to district neglect even though test scores were plummeting? And, what
could lead the district to ignore complaints matched with the many years of
underperformance the teacher discussed? Is it merely because they had no mechanism or
are there other reasons? Because they change the relationship between the school and the
district, the school support specialist is a critical component to state early intervention.
In both schools, staff believed that the reason the district started to become
involved with the school was because the district felt threatened by the state intervention.
In the eyes of those in the schools the state intervention pushed the district into playing a
more active and supportive role within the school and the first sign of the push was the
replacement of the principal. In each school, principals and teachers described a sense
that the district felt threatened by the state intervention into the school, and the threat at
the district level pushed district administrators into action and engagement with the
school. Brenda discusses the district’s reaction:
It did put a scare into the district. I believe. ... [I]t’s like finally
the state is coming in and taking a look at these schools. [The
district staff are] saying, ‘Alright, well now, I guess we need to
help.’ But, what I’m saying is you should have done that a long
time ago. (Brenda, teacher, Babson Elementary)
Beyond changes in the district-school relationship, early intervention resulted in
dramatic changes within the school. Both schools received a new principal within
months of being declared underperforming. Additionally each had a major change in
their teaching staff with a 45% turnover at Alfred Elementary and an 80% turnover at
Babson Elementary. In both cases, especially at Babson, they are practically entirely new
schools.
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Both principals indicated that moving to an underperforming school was not
desirable. Ms. Beth felt like she had no choice but to move to Babson Elementary. Mr.
Arnold, new to being a principal, said the only reason he got the opportunity to be a
principal was because no one inside the district wanted the job, so they opened it up to
applicants who were not principals and who were not in the district. He does not think he
would be a principal now, if it had not been for the opportunity.
As far as the teachers are concerned, I spoke with staff that decided to stay.
Mostly they stayed at their schools because they felt they had an obligation to the school.
They fell back on their professional dedication for a reason to stay in an underperforming
school. It is not to say the teachers did not consider leaving. Some teachers talked about
transferring or leaving the underperforming school, but they decided to wait it out to see
if the new principal changed things in the school.
There is a potentially positive side to teacher and principal turnover in a
designated underperforming school. By bringing in new leadership into a school, there is
a chance to make changes in the school for the better. Also, in some cases
underperforming schools can become dumping grounds for ineffective teachers. The
natural selection process of teachers leaving after a school is declared underperforming
creates a sort of voluntary reconstitution of the underperforming school. With new
leadership and many new teachers, the climate within the underperforming school is
bound to go through a dramatic transformation.
The real difference between before and after a school is declared underperforming
is best summed up in the words of a teacher.
This is the best thing for our kids. Everything is documented,
everything with this new principal. Nothing is swept under the
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rug. Everything is right on the carpet and everybody knows what’s
going on. It needs to be. (Adeline, Alfred Elementary)

The Early Intervention Process

Continually respecting the existing public education hierarchy, the DOE informs
the superintendent and then begins to work directly with the underperforming school
principal. The transfer of information about early intervention is given from the DOE
liaison to the principal. The DOE liaison leaves it up to the principal to share the
information with the school faculty. Because all of the information is shared, the state
considers the early intervention process to be open and explicit. The DOE liaisons
believed that because the principal was not calling them with questions, the preparation
meetings and materials were thorough and effective.
However, there are a few problems with the DOE’s strategy. First, the original
principal is often removed from the school, and with him or her goes all of the
information, which was shared with the principal for the underperforming school.
Switching the principal in the midst of DOE’s early intervention challenges the
development of a working relationship between the state and the school because any
effort to build a relationship with the school is lost when the principal, who is DOE’s
primary contact, is removed. Because the relationship building efforts are not directed
toward the teachers, who are more likely to remain in the school, any goodwill or
relationship that is developed through the process goes with the principal who is
removed. Continuity of the relationship building process is therefore interrupted, though
it is not lost.
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As a new principal to the school, Ms. Beth felt that there was very little support
coming from the DOE or from the district. She was placed at Babson Elementary at the
end of the school year, about a week prior to the beginning of PIM training. PIM training
is the “catch all” point when the school team is obligated to take on the school
improvement efforts (switch from a deterrent to an enabling approach).
During the PIM, the issues facing the underperforming school are examined in
excruciating detail by the school team (principal and teachers), and those in the school
are faced with the reality that school improvement is in the team’s hands, a difficult task
for any new principal. The process can be overwhelming. The school support specialist
has a role to play in continuing the relationship between the underperforming school and
the DOE. Mr. Arnold describes one of the benefits of the support from the district school
support specialists is the “history” they provide. The school support specialist is present
during the entire process before and after the new principal comes on board. He or she is
able to provide background and valuable information about the past administration and
issues or challenges within the school to the new principal. This insight proves to be
invaluable to the new administrator of an underperforming school.
Second, the teachers interviewed felt they never got “the big picture” of the early
intervention process. They did recall receiving information about the state visits,
schedules and questions; however, because it was disconnected from an overall
understanding of the process, it was meaningless. So, even though it is considered to be
an open process, the loss of a principal in the middle of intervention combined with the
relatively “small picture” information provided to the teachers, leaves underperforming
school teachers in the lurch. A new administrator brings a certain level of the unknown
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to any school, but compiled with state intervention and being declared underperforming,
teachers felt lost and uncertain about the future.
This brings me to the last point. New school accountability policy is designed to
be a transparent process, but it is built on an assumption that those at the lower levels of
the public education system (principals and teachers) will seek the information from the
DOE. The habit of those in the school looking up to the DOE for information appeared
to be foreign to the principals and teachers in the underperforming schools. Evidence of
this was found in a survey of Massachusetts superintendents, principals, and teachers.
Nearly 68% of the respondents reported that it was difficult or very difficult to obtain
information from the DOE (McDermott, et al., 2001). This is despite the fact the a
majority of the information and documents on early intervention, including the school
specific reports, were found on the DOE’s website.
Perhaps principals’ and teachers’ understanding of the DOE is a reflection of the
traditional hierarchy, in which the DOE shares information with the district and the
district informs the school of anything it needs to know. Or, perhaps it is because those
in the school are in the habit of looking to the district rather than the DOE for
information. Explanations of how information was communicated from the DOE to the
district to the school was one in which information was disseminated from the top down.
There is very little information moving up the hierarchy. Before new school
accountability policy was implemented, the district would never think to contact the
DOE, and the teachers were hesitant to contact the district about problems with their
principal despite significant abuses occurring in the school. New school accountability
policy, and particularly early intervention, functions in an environment in which two-way
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communication is frequent and expected. The DOE seems to have changed the
relationship between the state and the districts through the specialists and communication
with the superintendents. However, they have had a number of years to change their
relationship. Prior to the beginning of intervention, the more traditional mode of
communication exists, where those in the school receive information from above, and
have no habit of asking for or looking to the district or the DOE for information.
Teachers consistently did not know where to look for information or seek to
understand the policy or the resulting reports about their school, or who was requiring a
school improvement plan. For example, the Charlesburg district staff required each
school to go through a PIM style school improvement planning process for developing a
school improvement plan separate from the state’s early intervention. Teachers
interviewed were on these teams for the district school improvement planning, yet they
were not clear on who was placing the demand upon them. One teacher explains,
...[W]e started the SIP [School Improvement Plan] plan a year and
a half ago...because we had to...
Interviewer: Who said you had to?
The district? Maybe the state? I don’t know. Somebody said we
had to write a SIP plan. It came down from whomever, and we
went to training and all of this by the district. (Bridget, Babson
Elementary)
Teachers had a limited understanding of new school accountability and were not
clear that it is even a policy. As Maynard Moody and Musheno (2004) suggest, policies
are something that happen to street-level bureaucrats, like teachers. Connection to the
policies and the idea of forming or shaping policies is not part of their professional
framework, nor are they generally engaged by policy makers. Without two-way
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communication between the underperforming school and the district or the DOE, the
opportunity to negotiate policy implementation in partnership is lost.
The teachers interviewed were all intelligent and professional, and this
observation is by no means meant to imply a problem with them in particular. It is not
surprising that the teachers who are managing the multiple demands on their time coming
from students, parents, principals, district administrators, state level administrators and
policy makers, do not find the time to understand fully what a policy means to them.
Until they are faced with early intervention, any understanding of state policy, like new
school accountability, is shaped by rumors and informal discussions among colleagues
within the public education arena.
Even as principals and teachers are going through early intervention, they are
overwhelmed and find it difficult to take the time to think or reflect upon their role or the
policy. They are working in schools with tremendous challenges and needs, and are often
running to put out one fire after another. State visits were nearly indistinguishable for the
interview participants except as they related to different months in the academic calendar.
Also, the School Panel Review and Fact Finding Review reports, which are available to
the public on the DOE’s website, were not read by the school staff members who were
not handed the reports to read as members of the PIM planning team or who were not
specifically shown the reports by the principal.
In both schools teachers described reading the reports as something that was
shared with them, but not with others. One teacher sheepishly described cleaning out the
old principal’s office to prepare for the new principal and stumbling upon the report,
which she subsequently read. Another teacher talked about the new principal sharing the
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report with herself and another teacher as if it were confidential and an act of trust. In
both schools I was assured that the other teachers in the building had not read the publicly
available reports.
Even as they were going through early intervention, it was treated like something
that other people had to deal with. Teachers in the schools were busy trying to
implement portions of a school improvement plan or deal with the relatively dramatic
changes within the school after it was declared underperforming, and they simply did not
have the time to look at the reports about why they were declared underperforming.
Teachers who are not involved in the improvement planning process rely upon the
principal and the teachers who are involved to inform them about the shortcomings of the
school cited in the reports.
I am not certain how this finding impacts early intervention. Regardless, it is
prevalent in both schools. Perhaps it is simply a product of each of the schools only
going through early intervention one time, so school staff did not understand different
parts and concepts of it as well as district and DOE administrators might. It may also be
that principals and teachers in underperforming schools are placed under enormous stress
during early intervention, a finding supported by participant interviews, and simply do
not have the time to react and think about the policy, who is requiring things of them, or
the resulting reports. Evidently, to cope with the many demands placed upon those
within the school, they depend upon a division of labor within the school in which the
principal and the teachers on the school improvement planning team are the informants
about the process and the changes within the school.
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It puts into question how much of an impact early intervention can really have
upon a school if those in the school are not paying attention to it. Developing the
working relationship with the school may be in part the development of a communication
line that is two-way, and empowers the principal of the underperforming school to reach
up to the district or to the state for the help and support it needs. However, making a
connection and developing a working relationship between the school and the DOE leads
to a new partnership that has the potential to create change.

New State and Local Partnerships
Partnerships are indicative of the positive working relationship the DOE is
developing with the local underperforming school and the district. However, there are
some informal partnerships between the different levels of the public education system
that are used to induce support and ultimately improvement of the delivery of education
to students. These partnerships include a partnership between the DOE and the
underperforming school, focused on engaging the district, as well as a partnership
between the DOE and the district in an effort to support the district’s involvement with
the underperforming schools.
The DOE and the underperforming school are obviously connected during the
beginning of intervention. More than providing a diagnosis, professional development
and infrequent supports, the partnership between the DOE and the underperforming
school is seen as a threat to the district and hence increases the involvement between the
district and the underperforming school. By simply shaking up the traditional hierarchy
of the public education system (connecting the school and the DOE), intervention causes
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the district administrators to increase their involvement in the school. Principals and
teachers in the schools articulated the fact that the district appeared to be more threatened
by the DOE visit than they were. The DOE was less explicit, though they continually
stated that the district is responsible for supporting its underperforming schools.
The principals’ and teachers’ understanding that the district administrators were
threatened by the state’s early intervention gave them a new feeling of power, when they
had previously felt powerless. The power dynamic helps the principals (and teachers) to
leverage the resources they need to improve the educational outcomes in their schools.
Simply having regular access to the district administrators, rather than being left on their
own, gave hope to the principals and teachers within the underperforming schools.
Likewise, the DOE wisely partnered with the district to support its efforts to
improve the underperforming schools. By developing regular, two-way communication
with the urban superintendents and by providing the district superintendents with the
school support specialists, the district and the DOE have created a solid partnership. The
good faith gesture of listening to the superintendents and providing them with the support
they need to improve the delivery of education within the schools is largely what the
partnership is based upon. The act is seen as supporting the district in the face of the
threatening district accountability system. Because the state’s district accountability
system is administered outside of the DOE, the partnership is more likely to flourish
because the DOE, as an organization, is seen as an ally without having to balance district
support with holding districts accountable.
Additionally, there is a sense at the district level that the cooperation and support
coming from the DOE is largely due to threats felt by those in the DOE. The threat may
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be that the DOE might have to take over a school or a district. It is widely understood by
those at the district level and many at the school level that the DOE simply does not want
to take over a locally run district. So, whether the state policy makers are going to hold
the DOE accountable is negligible compared to the threat that the DOE might actually
have to start running schools, which state level administrators fully recognize they are not
equipped to do.
In the larger picture of state education reform, the DOE functions as the “fixer.”
The DOE is facilitating the implementation of new school accountability policy
concentrated upon early intervention that results in improvement, so as to avoid having to
take over the schools and districts. By listening to those in the district and respecting the
pre-accountability hierarchy of the public education system, the DOE administrators have
placed themselves in the role of facilitator by using, developing, and strengthening the
expertise at the lower levels and focusing it using a common framework.

Underperforming Schools are a District Problem
The bond between the school and the DOE in their partnership is that they both
feel the district is truly responsible for school improvement. In the eyes of those in the
school, the DOE or the state is simply not that significant of a player during early
intervention. Early intervention for them is a means to an end. The means is the state
visits and early intervention and the end is the result of more attention and support from
the district. The relationship between the underperforming school and the DOE made the
school level people nervous initially, but generally teachers and principals became
comfortable with the process. Credit should be given to those in the DOE who have
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made early intervention a thoughtful, gentle, and sincere process that focuses on
identifying issues within the school and supporting the school staff to work to address
these issues.
The DOE administrators believe that school improvement is a district’s
responsibility in adherence with the traditional organization of the public education
system. Plus, the districts are more experienced and thus better equipped to support
school improvement than the DOE. The past district and school relationship is deficient
at best in the two underperforming schools studied. One teacher said she felt like even
though they complained that the district wasn’t hearing them, so at least by being
declared underperforming these schools have a chance.
In many ways new school accountability is just part of an overarching plan by the
states to fine-tune the organization of the public education system. They are looking at
the schools and gently pushing the district to play a strong role and take on greater
responsibility for accountability within its domain, and the states are implementing a
district accountability system which directly pushes the district participate in the
improvement of educational outcomes in all of its schools.
The state relationship was less important to those in the school, except that they
found the people who visited them to be professional and courteous and that the reports
reflected what they said. From the local perspective, a more important piece of state
intervention was the district engagement with the underperforming school. State
administrators agreed that the district’s involvement in early intervention is critical
because the district is responsible for improving the educational outcomes. The
relationship the DOE developed with the school was important only in that the DOE
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liaisons were able to monitor the school’s progress and ensure the district administrators
were playing an active role.

Conclusion
The working relationship between the SDE and the underperforming school does
change over the course of early intervention. Generally, the change is positive, because
the expectations those in the underperforming school have for the SDE are low, so any
involvement is an improvement. Still, the SDE only takes the relationship so far. The
expectation seems to be that they move from a coming apart with avoidance type of
relationship to a cooperative but autonomous relationship. It is an inexact determination
because involvement levels between the two definitely increase, but from the SDE
administrator’s perspective, the relationship remains somewhat distant despite a growing
respect and trust. From the underperforming school staffs perspective the SDE plays a
minimal role when compared to the change in relationship with the district.
The district, still under the threat of district accountability, actively improves its
relationship with the state identified underperforming school during early intervention.
Prior to state intervention, the relationship between the district and school can be
characterized as coming apart and contentious. It is a type of relationship that can only
be changed if something or someone intervenes to break the vicious, downward cycle
(Scheberle, 1997). Early intervention serves as the catalyst to change the relationship
between the underperforming school and the district. The SDE works with the district to
support its efforts, and improve their own relationship. The school support specialists are

267

a resource the SDE provides to the districts in an effort to persuade (Gormley, 1998)
them to partner with them and implement the SDE’s “one best framework.”
Consequently, the state provided and supported district school support specialists
become the “fixers” of policy implementation. They are in the middle of early
intervention. As advocates, ambassadors, and negotiators of the implementation of new
school accountability policy, they are in charge of what Lin (2000) describes as important
to the implementation process: fitting the policy into the local context. Brought in as
partners to the SDE and embedded in the district, they are the bridge between the state’s
external and the school’s internal accountability systems. The connection is a critical
component to improving the delivery of educational outcomes in the underperforming
school.
It is not entirely clear whether those in the underperforming school recognize the
SDE’s dependence upon a cooperative relationship. What is more clear is that
professional educators within the school, once they meet SDE representatives who are
sincere, courteous, and respectful, are more than willing to cooperate. Interestingly,
those in the school tended to recognize the district’s dependence upon them more than the
state’s dependence. Principals and teachers mentioned that sometimes they felt like the
district was afraid of what they would say to the SDE. That sense contributed to their
feeling of empowerment, and power over the district, especially after years of feeling
neglected by the district.
Implementation of new school accountability is constrained by limitations in the
SDE’s resources. However, the working relationship with the school, but more
importantly the district, helps to expand the state resources. Providing school support
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specialists to the district helps the state to connect to the district and to use the expertise
and knowledge that exists within the district. By adding specialists whose primary
objective is to impact school improvement, the district in turn has expanded its capacity.
The working relationship between the SDE and the district has changed into one that
approaches, however imperfectly, a “pulling together and synergistic” type of
relationship with growing levels of involvement and trust that improve over each
underperforming school review cycle.
The problem of the locals’ understanding of new school accountability policy as a
deterrent versus an enabling system was lessened for the school because the early
intervention strategy focuses on identification, diagnosis and support guided by the state.
Additionally, the teachers in the schools are professionals, and embedded in the
profession is the idea of taking the responsibility to make improvements. With direction
from the DOE and the support of the district, schools were given a focus and had a
greater feeling of empowerment, especially after major changes in staff and the change in
principal occurred. At least this is the case in the short term. How long the change or
improvements last is beyond the parameters of this study. Certainly, new school
accountability policy is a deterrent policy, but what it has going for it is the professional
educator who, because of professional training, innately feels enabled to improve the
educational situation within his or her school. Even the deterrent nature of new school
accountability cannot undermine an educator’s professional ethic.
In Massachusetts, the SDE has developed a framework for early intervention that
enhances and builds upon the pre-existing strengths within the state’s public education
system. I expected to find an SDE that was fumbling and trying to be more controlling of

269

the early intervention process, and what I found was staff in the SDE who were
abundantly aware of their limitations and who were willing to learn from the mistakes
made in other states. In other words, I found an SDE which was much more adept than I
expected at implementing complex reforms. By engaging all of the local levels the SDE
broadens its capacity, expertise and ability to implement new school accountability in the
local context, a point that is often found to be important to successfully impact school
improvement (e.g., Fullan, 2001).
New school accountability policy as part of a systemic accountability system
(including districts) and education reform package does effectively change schools in the
short term by changing district and state priorities. If understanding the working
relationship between entities influences the effectiveness of policy (Agranoff & Lindsay,
1983; Scheberle, 1997; Seidman, 1980), then the positive working relationships
developed between the SDE and the underperforming school, the SDE and the district,
and the district and the underperforming school may be helpful in improving educational
outcomes and avoiding further interventions.
When policymakers envisioned school accountability policy, it appears that they
wanted a deterrent policy that motivated schools into compliance. The idea behind the
policy seems to be that if resources were aligned at a common target then the focus would
increase efficiency within a school so that it would improve. In the cases when a school
was found to be underperforming, the DOE would intervene and tighten up the focus of
the educators within the school. Then the school could accomplish the student
achievement goals set before it, and in doing so, ensure the state was meeting its
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constitutional responsibility of providing an adequate education to all students within
Massachusetts.
Anyone involved in education knows that establishing goals and providing
increased focus are not as simple as the new school accountability policy implies. More
than that, in the process of requiring SDE’s to hold schools accountable, there was little
to no recognition of the dramatic changes it would require within the organizations that
comprise the public education system in terms of skills, capacity and culture.
Consequently, SDE’s are forced to use strategic criteria to make decisions about which
schools will receive state services and which schools will not.
Mintrop and Trujillo (2004) found that states use a number of methods to balance
their capacity limitations with the need at the local schools. In some states there are
never more schools in need than the SDE can handle in a given year. In others the state
intervention is distant and dependent upon the educators within the local school and
district. Massachusetts falls into the category of “ambitious goals” (Mintrop & Trujillo,
2004) but lacks the capacity to fully implement them. If improvement in
underperforming schools is truly the intended outcome of the policymaker, it cannot have
been their intention to water down policies so that underperforming schools were given
weak supports to improve on their own. Nor can it have been their intention to only
intervene in the worst schools and leaving the other underperforming schools to fend for
themselves.
Declaring schools underperforming without injecting capacity building activities
necessary in the mild and moderate forms of intervention is irresponsible. It places
SDE’s in a position in which they must make choices about values and priorities as to
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how they will approach school accountability measures. Will they water them down so
that the number of underperforming schools is never more than the number the SDE can
manage in a given year? Or will they prioritize the underperforming schools based on
those with the most need and work from the bottom up? Will they ever be able to truly
develop local capacity so that no student is placed in an underperforming school?
In a sense the approach the DOE took in Massachusetts is contrary to a traditional
bureaucratic approach which typically distributes its limited resources to as many of the
entities (e.g., underperforming schools) in need as it can, thus watering down the impact
any resources or interventions might have upon an underperforming school. Even more
typical in the public education system is to work with the schools that have problems, but
need the least help. These schools tend to be more receptive to outside help because
there is a level of internal infrastructure that allows them to use outside help.
Additionally, by expending resources upon the less troubled schools, fewer resources are
expended on easier to accomplish solutions (or supports) before getting to the schools in
the most need. In fact, the schools that are most in need of help are often the ones that are
least able to access outside assistance and effectively use outside support. Their needs
for resources are therefore greater and solutions are not easily found or known.
The approach in Massachusetts turns this upside down by intervening and
building capacity into the schools at the bottom first. The bottom up approach speaks to
the need for a strategy for those schools that are not the worst in the state, but clearly
performing at insufficient levels. Perhaps these schools do not need as much intervention
as the worst schools; however, they are still underperforming and are in need of some
supports and some assistance. Policymakers should allocate resources to target these
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schools specifically, while carefully avoiding temptations to water down the existing
capacity and system of DOE intervention in the worst underperforming schools. In a
way, the school support specialist position is an attempt to manage the other
underperforming schools in the state. DOE hopes that by placing the specialists in the
district, practices and capacity building strategies will be disseminated and used in other
underperforming schools not being intervened in by the DOE. The DOE has created a
framework, which is modeled for the district and the school support specialists within
them, to implement in the other schools in the area. By injecting the ongoing capacity
and training into the urban districts, the DOE has gained a partner and expanded capacity
to effect school improvement.
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CHAPTER XI
FUTURE RESEARCH

There are many directions future research on the subject of new school
accountability and the state and local working relationship can take. Potential future
research topics are varied, ranging from working relationships, roles and responsibilities,
reorganization of state public education systems and local governance.
This research shows that state intervention in an underperforming school can have
a positive outcome. In the schools studied, participants reported years of neglect from the
district, poor leadership by the principal, and little to no accountability for the teachers.
State intervention really shed some light onto these issues. Changes that were slow in
coming, if they were coming at all, began to happen very quickly. Changes in staff and
replacing the former principal, along with improved relations with the district, created a
new dynamic in the school that teachers could really feel. It would be worthwhile to see
how typical the experience of these schools and the Charlesburg district are when
compared to other states, other districts and other schools. Is the Massachusetts DOE
taking a particular approach that is more likely to lead to a positive outcome? Are the
findings a result of a change in how the district superintendent and administrators
understand their role? Further research is necessary to see how typical these findings are.
A study should be designed to answer the looming question of whether the threat
of district accountability actually does motivate a district to engage in a meaningful
relationship with the underperforming school. Is the threat of state intervention in the
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district really a motivator for the district to engage with the school and make rapid
changes in the school for improvement? One suggestion for study would be to compare
the findings in a district that has not been taken over, like Charlesburg, with a district that
has been taken over by the state. Questions about how the state taking on a strong role
with the district would impact the DOE’s relationship with the underperforming school
would need to be answered. Additionally, it would be interesting to find out how the
DOE’s expectations for the district’s relationship with the underperforming schools
would change in the circumstance when the DOE is intervening in the district as well.
Another area of interest in the area of identifying how typical these findings are
would be to compare the two Massachusetts districts designated as underperforming,
since one is urban and one is rural. The manner in which the SDE approaches these
schools and how they interact with the districts would likely be different. Such a study
would truly test the “one best framework” finding in this study. Additionally, in a
smaller rural district there may be much different results. For example, underperforming
school principals and teachers may be less likely to leave the school if they are in a rural
setting because there are a limited number of alternative opportunities. In those cases
SDE and districts would need to work with existing staff and would not have the
opportunity to “start over” as the schools from the Charlesburg district did. Also, there is
likely a lot less district capacity for a smaller rural district to become the “fixer.”
New school accountability policy and NCLB in particular provide for one policy
to suit many districts. Right now, many urban districts have an abundance of
underperforming schools, but what happens when a school is declared underperforming
in a rural district? How does the working relationship change between the DOE and the
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district, the DOE and the underperforming school and the district and the
underperforming school? Are the strategies different in an urban verses rural district?
Questions about the roles and responsibilities of the SDE, the district and the
school abound. Throughout the examination of the working relationship, some of the
ideas suggested by participants about their roles and responsibilities and those of the
organization they are affiliated with seemed self-evident. I assumed, as I suppose many
do, that the district held schools accountable and communication between them is
frequent, but at least in Charlesburg, it did not seem to be the case. As far as the SDE is
concerned, when discussing new7 school accountability the discussion about centralizing
the control of state public education systems, and taking away local authority is never far
behind.
My findings, however, indicated that there is at least some expectation by those in
the school and district that there would be some direction, focus and support provided by
the entity above their organization in the loosely coupled hierarchy of the public
education system. Could it be that local control is a way of avoiding responsibility at
higher levels of the public education system? Certainly local control could be used this
way, but it is more likely that there is an imbalance in the system that needs to be
remedied. Research on the imbalance and where local control stops and state
responsibility begins within a state would be an interesting endeavor, especially in the
context of new accountability systems imposed by the state and federal governments.
Governance structures in terms of local school boards are really not examined at
all. I have to admit that I did pose the question about the local school committee to
interview participants at the school and district levels, but the answers to the question
proved difficult to interpret. Surprisingly, this was not because the involvement of the
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school committee is so complicated. Rather there seemed to be a limited response (if any
at all) by the members of the school committee. A review of local school committee
meeting minutes hardly registered a comment about the number of underperforming
schools in the Charlesburg district. Is it simply that the local school board members do
not feel they have a responsibility toward the district and its underperforming schools? Is
it a sign of the failing of local governance in and of itself? Have local school boards
become irrelevant?
All these are interesting questions, but the role is likely more complicated than
they suggest. I believe that the members of the local school committees feel school
accountability and underperformance is something for the knowledgeable professional
educators to attack and remedy, though I did not test this hypothesis. As the lay
committee members, they are able to allocate the funds, though under the current fiscal
constraints that authority is limited, and advocate for pet projects of the community, but
they do not consider themselves expert educators, and thus leave such issues to those who
are. A study of the reaction of school committee members and what they believe their
responsibilities are under new accountability would be interesting and provide insight
into the ever evolving nature of public school governance.
This study is a first foray into understanding the beginning of intervention in the
context of new school accountability policy. Within the subtext of the policy one can see
the changing role of the SDE, and the revitalization of the district’s role as it relates to the
underperforming school. There is a different kind of focus in the public education system
because of external accountability, but its real strength is when it has meaning to the
educators in the classroom. A positive working relationship, or any working relationship
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amongst the SDE, the district and the school is a start, but it is clear that there are many
more steps along the way.

APPENDIX A
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
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Dissertation Title: The Beginning of Intervention

Massachusetts Department of Education
Interview Questions
To:
From: Susan Bowles Therriault
RE:
Interview on DATE, 2004 at TIME
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study. The following information is being
provided for your review prior to our interview. While, it is unlikely that we will address
all of the interview questions within the 60 minute time block allotted for the interview, I
have still provided you with them so that you are able to understand the direction of this
research. Please contact me if you have any questions or concerns.

Researcher:
Susan Bowles Therriault
Education Policy & Leadership
University of Massachusetts
Amherst, MA 01003
Phone: 978.369.1532
Email: sbowles@educ.umass.edu
Introduction/ Project Description:
This research is being conducted for my dissertation. I am particularly interested in the
early phases of intervention and the working relationship that develops between the state
and the school. My questions are mainly focused on understanding the intricacies and
complexities of that relationship from your perspective. Your perspective is of the
utmost importance, and I appreciate your honesty and sincerity. Please know that the
results from this research will be part of my dissertation, but all individuals and schools
will remain anonymous.

INTKVIEW QUffiTIOlS

280

Massachusetts Department of Education Interview Questions
Personal Information
1.

How long have you been working at the Department of Education?

2.

What did you do before working at the DOE?

3.

Have you ever worked in a school and/or district? If yes, how long and in what capacity?

Understanding of New School Accountability Policy
4.

What do you think of the school accountability policy within Massachusetts?

5.

What do you believe its purpose is?

6.

How well or not so well does it achieve its purpose?

7.

How well or not so well is the DOE supported when implementing school accountability?

Working Relationship
8.

If it is possible to generalize, what kind of a relationship do you (or DOE) try to develop with a
school/staff that is under review? That is declared underperforming?

9.

Having been through several cycles of reviewing and identifying underperforming schools, do you
think the “school” perceptions about the state/DOE change as they go through the panel reviews,
and the fact finding reviews, and thereafter If yes, how? If no, why?

10. Do you find your (DOE) perceptions of the school change during the review process? If yes, how?
If no, why?
11. Is cooperation between the DOE and the school important?
12. Do you find the schools to be cooperative? Does this change over time/ during the Panel Reviews
or Fact-Finding Reviews?
13. What factors increase or decrease the ability for the DOE to work with a school?
14. What are your expectations of an underperforming school that DOE is working with?

The Beginning of Intervention - Identification of the School for Review
15. What do you find to be the easiest/most difficult part of selecting as school for review?
16. How do you think the principal and/or staff feel when their school is selected for review?
17. How would you characterize the DOE’s relationship with a school selected for review?

The Beginning of Intervention - School Panel Review
18. From the state perspective, what is the goal of the School Panel Review?
19. What do you find to be the easiest/most difficult part of the Panel Review?
20. Specifically what is the role of: a) the DOE liaison, b) School Support Specialist, and c) ABC
Consulting during the School Panel Review?
21. How do you think the principal and/or staff perceive the DOE staff (review teams) when they are
going through a School Panel Review? Is this different from before?
22. What is the role of: a) the underperforming school district superintendent, b) underperforming
school principal, and c) the school faculty during the School Panel Review?
23. After the School Panel Review, how would you generally characterize the DOE’s relationship
with the underperforming school?

The Beginning of Intervention - Determination of School Underperformance
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24. What do you find to be the easiest/most difficult part of identifying a school as underperforming?
25. How do you think the principal and/or staff feel when their school is identified as
underperforming?
26. How does a school being identified as underperforming impact the DOE relationship with the
school?

Contractor Interview Questions

Personal Information
27. How long have you been working at ABC Consulting?
28. How long have you been participating in School Panel Reviews and Fact-Finding Reviews?
29. Do you come from the field of education? If yes, what did you do there?

New School Accountability Policy
30. What do you believe is the purpose of school accountability policy within Massachusetts?
31. Do you think the policy suits its purpose?
32. If you can recall, how did you find the relationship between the state and the underperforming
school during the first visit you conducted? Has this changed? How?
33. How are you prepared/trained to conduct school visits?
34. How do you think those in the school staff feel about school accountability policy before they are
visited? Did this change?

Roles
35. What do you consider your role in this school accountability process?
36. Do you think that others that work for ABC Consulting approach this role differently? If yes,
how?
37. What do you believe is your role during the beginning of intervention (school panel review,
identification of underperformance, and fact finding review)?
38. What do you believe is the role of the Department of Education during the beginning of
intervention?
39. What do you believe is the role of the district during the beginning of intervention?
40. What do you believe is the role of the Principal and school staff is during the beginning of
intervention?
41. What is the role of the School Support Specialist during the beginning of intervention?
42. Is there anyone else that has a significant role during the beginning of intervention?

Working Relationship
43. How would you characterize the relationship between the school and the Department of Education
prior to being identified as underperforming? How did this change when the school is:
1.

Visited for a School Panel Review?

2.

Identified as an Underperforming School?

3.

Visited for a Fact-Finding Review?

4.

“Diagnosed” (after the Fact Finding Review Report)?

44. What do you believe the working relationship between the Department of Education and the
school should ideally be during the beginning of intervention?
45. Is the early school accountability process (visits, diagnosis) designed to establish this ideal
working relationship?
46. What do you believe the working relationship between the District and the school should ideally
be during the beginning of intervention?

The Beginning of Intervention - School Panel Review
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47. What do you think about the school panel review and the process?
48. If you can generalize, how do you think potentially underperforming schools (principal and staff)
feel about the School Panel Review?
49. Generally, how do you think the Department of Education School Review Panel is perceived
during the review?
50. What do you find to be the strengths and weaknesses of this part of the process?
51. How would you characterize the relationship between the DOE and the potentially
underperforming school during the review?

The Beginning of Intervention - Identification as an Underperforming School
52. Do you get any information about the reaction of those in the school when they are identified as
underperforming?
53. How involved in this part of the process are you or is ABC Consulting?
54. What do you find to be the strengths and weaknesses of this part of the process?
55. How would you characterize your relationship with the DOE at this point in time? Is this different
from before?

The Beginning of Intervention - Fact-Finding Review
56. How is the ABC Consulting chaired panel perceived by the principal and staff during the review?
57. How is the DOE perceived by the school during the review?
58. What do you find to be the strengths and weaknesses of this part of the process?
59. How would you characterize the relationship between the DOE and the underperforming school
during this review? Is this different from before?

The Beginning of Intervention - Reflection/Expectations/Support
60. Do you think the school staffs perceptions of the DOE changed during the process?
61. Do you think the DOE’s perceptions about the school change during this process?
62. It seems that the DOE needs the cooperation and ownership for improvement of those within the
school and district to truly improve educational outcomes, how does or doesn’t this process
motivate/encourage cooperation and ownership within the school?
63. Does the district have a role in ensuring school cooperation and ownership of improvement
strategies?
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District School Support Specialist

Personal Information
64. How long have you been working as a School Support Specialist?
65. What did you do before this?
66. Have you ever worked in a school and/or district? At the DOE? If yes, how long and in what
capacity?

Understanding of New School Accountability Policy
67. What do you think of the school accountability policy within Massachusetts?
68. What do you believe its purpose is?
69. How well or not so well does it achieve its purpose?
70. How well or not so well is the are you supported when implementing school accountability?

Working Relationship
71. If it is possible to generalize, what kind of a relationship do you (or DOE) try to develop with a
school/staff that is under review? That is declared underperforming?
72. Having been through several cycles of reviewing and identifying underperforming schools, do you
think the “school” perceptions about the state/DOE change as they go through the panel reviews,
and the fact finding reviews, and thereafter If yes, how? If no, why?
73. Do you find your (DOE) perceptions of the school change during the review process? If yes, how?
If no, why?
74. Is cooperation between the DOE and the school important?
75. Do you find the schools to be cooperative? Does this change over time/ during the Panel Reviews
or Fact-Finding Reviews?
76. What factors increase or decrease the ability for the DOE to work with a school?
77. What are your expectations of an underperforming school that DOE is working with?

The Beginning of Intervention - Identification of the School for Review
78. What do you find to be the easiest/most difficult part of selecting as school for review?
79. How do you think the principal and/or staff feel when their school is selected for review?
80. How would you characterize the DOE’s relationship with a school selected for review?

The Beginning of Intervention - School Panel Review
81. From the state perspective, what is the goal of the School Panel Review?
82. What do you find to be the easiest/most difficult part of the Panel Review?
83. Specifically what is the role of: a) the DOE liaison, b) School Support Specialist, and c) ABC
Consulting during the School Panel Review?
84. How do you think the principal and/or staff perceive the DOE staff (review teams) when they are
going through a School Panel Review? Is this different from before?
85. What is the role of: a) the underperforming school district superintendent, b) underperforming
school principal, and c) the school faculty during the School Panel Review?
86. After the School Panel Review, how would you generally characterize the DOE’s relationship
with the underperforming school?
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The Beginning of Intervention - Determination of School Underperformance
87. What do you find to be the easiest/most difficult part of identifying a school as underperforming?
88. How do you think the principal and/or staff feel when their school is identified as
underperforming?
89. How does a school being identified as underperforming impact the DOE relationship with the
school?

The Beginning of Intervention - Fact-Finding Review
90. From the state perspective, what is the goal of the Fact-Finding Review?
91. What do you find to be the easiest/most difficult part of the Fact-Finding Review?
92. How involved is the DOE in this process? In what capacity?
93. Specifically what is the role of: a) the DOE liaison, b) School Support Specialist, and c) ABC
Consulting in the FFR?
94. How do you think the principal and/or staff perceive the DOE staff (review teams) when they are
going through a Fact-Finding Review? Is this different from before?
95. What is the role of: a) the underperforming school district superintendent, b) underperforming
school principal, and c) the school faculty during the Fact-Finding Review?
96. After the Fact-Finding Review, how would you generally characterize the DOE’s relationship
with the underperforming school?

The Beginning of Intervention - Reflection/Expectations/Support
97. Upon reflection, do you find that a school’s perceptions of the DOE change as the process moves
on? If yes, are you able to generalize about when this occurs?
98. It seems that the DOE needs the cooperation and ownership for improvement of those within the
school and district to truly improve educational outcomes, how does or doesn’t this process
motivate/encourage cooperation and ownership within the school?
99. Do you (SSS) have a role in ensuring school cooperation and ownership of improvement
strategies?
100. Has your understanding of the school’s, district’s and DOE’s role change during this process?

The Beginning of Intervention - Fact-Finding Review
101. From the state perspective, what is the goal of the Fact-Finding Review?
102. What do you find to be the easiest/most difficult part of the Fact-Finding Review?
103. How involved is the DOE in this process? In what capacity?
104.Specifically what is the role of: a) the DOE liaison, b) School Support Specialist, and c) ABC
Consulting in the FFR?
105. How do you think the principal and/or staff perceive the DOE staff (review teams) when they are
going through a Fact-Finding Review? Is this different from before?
106. What is the role of: a) the underperforming school district superintendent, b) underperforming
school principal, and c) the school faculty during the Fact-Finding Review?
107.

After the Fact-Finding Review, how would you generally characterize the DOE’s

relationship with the underperforming school?

The Beginning of Intervention - ReflectiA/Expectations/Support
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108.Upon reflection, do you find that a school’s perceptions of the DOE change as the process moves
on? If yes, are you able to generalize about when this occurs?
109.It seems that the DOE needs the cooperation and ownership for improvement of those within the
school and district to truly improve educational outcomes, how does or doesn’t this process
motivate/encourage cooperation and ownership within the school?
I lO.Do you (DOE) have a role in ensuring school cooperation and ownership of improvement
strategies?
II l.Has your understanding of the school’s, district’s and DOE’s role change during this process?
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Underperforming School (Principals and Teachers) Interview Questions
Personal Information
112. How long have you been working at this school and/or district?
113. What did you do before working at this school?
114. How long have you been in the field of education?

New School Accountability Policy
115. What do you believe is the purpose of school accountability policy within Massachusetts?
116. Do you think the policy suits its purpose?
117.If you can recall, how did you feel about the policy before your school was visited by the state?
Did this change after you were visited?
118. Where did you get information about school accountability before the school was visited?
119. How do you think the school staff felt about the policy before your school was visited? Did this
change?
120. Have you participated on a school panel review or fact finding review panel for another school
beside your own? If yes, did this change your perspective on the process at all? If not, why not?

Roles
121. What do you consider your role in this school accountability process (as part of a school that is
presently in need of improvement)?
122. Do you think that others in the school approach this role differently? If yes, how?
123. Did you talk to others that had been in this position before? If yes, do you find that your
experience has been similar or dissimilar?
124. What do you believe is your role (and the role of those within the school), during the beginning of
intervention (school panel review, identification of underperformance, and fact finding review)?
125. What do you believe is the role of the Department of Education during the beginning of
intervention?
126. What do you believe is the role of the district during the beginning of intervention?
127. What is the role of the School Support Specialist during the beginning of intervention?
128.Is there anyone else that has a significant role during the beginning of intervention?

Working Relationship
129. How would you characterize the relationship between your school and the Department of
Education prior to being identified as underperforming? How did this change when your school
was:
1.

Visited for a School Panel Review?

2.

Identified as an Underperforming School?

3.

Visited for a Fact-Finding Review?

4.

“Diagnosed” (after the Fact Finding Review Report)?

130. What do you believe the working relationship between the Department of Education and your
school should ideally be during the beginning of intervention?
131. How would you characterize the relationship between your school and the district prior to being
identified as underperforming? How did this change when your school was:
1.

Visited for a School Panel Review?
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2.

Identified as an Underperforming School?

3.

Visited for a Fact-Finding Review?

4.

“Diagnosed” (after the Fact Finding Review Report)?

132. What do you believe the working relationship between the District and your school should ideally
be during the beginning of intervention?
133. What is the role of the School Support Specialist during the beginning of intervention?

The Beginning of Intervention - School Panel Review
134. How did you feel about the review?
135. How did the staff within the school feel about the review?
136. How did you perceive the Department of Education Panel during the review? How did the staff
perceive the state panel?
137. What do you find to be the strengths and weaknesses of this part of the process?
138. How would you characterize your relationship during this review?

The Beginning of Intervention - Identification as an Underperforming School
139. What was your reaction when your school was identified as underperforming?
140. What was the reaction of the staff within the school when your school was identified as
underperforming?
141. What was the reaction of the district when your school was identified as underperforming?
142. What do you find to be the strengths and weaknesses of this part of the process?
143. How would you characterize your relationship with the DOE at this point in time? Is this different
from before?

The Beginning of Intervention - Fact-Finding Review
144. How did you feel about the review?
145. How did the staff within the school feel about the review?
146. How did you perceive the Department of Education Panel during the review? How did the staff
perceive the state panel?
147. What do you find to be the strengths and weaknesses of this part of the process?
148. How would you characterize your relationship during this review? Is this different from before?

The Beginning of Intervention - Reflection/Expectations/Support
149. Upon reflection, do you find that a school’s perceptions of the DOE change as the process moves
on? If yes, are you able to generalize about when this occurs?
150. Do you think the school staffs perceptions of the DOE changed during the process?
151. Do you think the DOE’s perceptions about the school change during this process?
152. It seems that the DOE needs the cooperation and ownership for improvement of those within the
school and district to truly improve educational outcomes, how does or doesn’t this process
motivate/encourage cooperation and ownership within the school?
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INFORMATION VOR PARTICIPANTS I^^Hg OBSERVATIONS

Title of the Study:

The Beginning of Intervention: Working Relationships between the
State Department of Education and the Underperforming School

Name of Researcher:

Susan Bowles, Doctoral Student, Education Policy and Leadership,
University of Massachusetts Amherst

ConaK Information:

Phone: 978-369-1532
Email: sbowles@educ.umass.edu

Introduction
Hello, I am a doctoral student enrolled at the University of Massachusetts in the Education Policy,
Research and Administration program. Currently, I am conducting a research project in an area of
educational policy that has captured my interest over the past four years. This study focuses on the
working relationship between the Massachusetts Department of Education and the underperforming
school as it enters into the early phases on school accountability intervention.
Objective:
To research the evolution of the working relationship between the staff in the Massachusetts Department
of Education (DOE) and underperforming schools during the earliest phases of diagnosis and intervention
under the state and federally mandated school accountability system. The project will be informed by a
combination of data gathered through observations of the school accountability process and through
loosely structured interviews aimed at gaining insight into the perceptions of the state: Department of
Education staff, School Works staff, and school support specialists that are working with
underperforming school(s) and the perceptions of the locals: underperforming school staff, and district
staff that are working with the DOE.
Study Description
This is both a study of policy implementation and intergovernmental working relationships. Essential to
both of these topics is an understanding of the context in which policy is implemented and the attitudes
and perceptions that are developed as two organizations negotiate school accountability policy
implementation. Within the study your perceptions of and attitudes toward the policy, and toward the
Department of Education/underperforming school are key to understanding this context.
This investigation will primarily consist of observations of the process of diagnosis and intervention as
well as loosely structured interviews with individuals involved in school accountability intervention at the
state level (Massachusetts Department of Education officials, School Works consultants, district school
support specialists) and individuals at the local level (School principals, school staff, and district
superintendents).
As part of the public education system within Massachusetts, you have first-hand experience dealing with
school accountability intervention. Observing the process the state and the school go through during
diagnosis and intervention is important to understanding the school accountability process. As you know,
the many mandates of the Massachusetts Education Reform Act, 1993 and the federal No Child Left
Behind Act, 2001 have brought new challenges to public schools within the state. This study will increase
the understanding of how this state law manifests itself within the Department of Education and in the
school and district.
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The results of this study will be written up as a formal research paper, for my dissertation, and will
possibly used as a reference in any future research I may conduct. During the observation portion of this
study emphasis is placed upon the process and the interaction between the state and the school.
Individual names and organizations will not be named specifically. Every effort will be made to protect
your identity when disseminating results in both the oral and written format.

Massachusetts School Accountability Stages under Observation
Stage Two:
■
■

Stage Three:

School Panel Reviews
Preparation
Visits/meetings
Wrap-up meeting
Fact-Finding Review
Preparation
Visits/Meetings

Interviewees
State
o
o
o

Department of Education Officials (Associate Commissioner, Managers,
Department of Education Liaisons)
School Works Staff (staff and consultants hired to participate in diagnosis
and intervention in underperforming schools)
School Support Specialists located in the districts and trained by the
Department of Education

Local
o
o
o

District Superintendent and staff
Underperforming School Principal
Underperforming Staff involved with DOE

Questions
If you have any questions or concerns about this study, please feel free to contact me.
Susan Bowles
Phone: 978-369-1532
Email: sbowles@educ.umass.edu

Thank you for agreeing to participate in the OBSERVATION portion of this study.

INFORMED CONSENT FOR INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS
Title of the Study:

The Beginning of Intervention: Working Relationships between the
State Department of Education and the Underperforming School

Name of Researcher:

Susan Bowles, Doctoral Student, Education Policy and Leadership,
University of Massachusetts Amherst

Contact Information:

Phone: 978-369-1532
Email: sbowles@educ.umass.edu

Introduction
Hello, I am a doctoral student enrolled at the University of Massachusetts in the Education Policy,
Research and Administration program. Currently, I am conducting a research project in an area of
educational policy that has captured my interest over the past four years. This study focuses on the
working relationship between the Massachusetts Department of Education and the underperforming
school as it enters into the early phases on school accountability intervention.
This is both a study of policy implementation and intergovernmental working relationships. Essential to
both of these topics is an understanding of the context in which policy is implemented and the attitudes
and perceptions that are developed as two organizations negotiate school accountability policy
implementation. Within the study your perceptions of and attitudes toward the policy, and toward the
Department of Education/underperforming school are key to understanding this context.
This investigation will primarily consist of loosely structured interviews with individuals involved in
school accountability intervention at the state level (Massachusetts Department of Education officials,
School Works consultants, district school support specialists) and individuals at the local level (School
principals, school staff, and district superintendents).
As part of the public education system within Massachusetts, you have first-hand experience dealing with
school accountability intervention. Your insight and voice are important to the school accountability
process. As you know, the many mandates of the Massachusetts Education Reform Act, 1993 have
brought new challenges to public schools within the state. This study will increase the understanding of
how this state law manifests itself within the Department of Education and in the school and district.
The results of this study will be written up as a formal research paper, for my dissertation, and will
possibly used as a reference in any future research I may conduct. Your participation is entirely
voluntary, and you are free to withdraw from the study at any time without penalty or prejudice. Every
effort will be made to protect your identity through the use of pseudonyms or by referring to your
comments by your position, rather than your name or organization, when disseminating results in both the
oral and written format.
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INFORMED CONSENT
Title of the Study:
The Beginning of Intervention:
State Department of Education and the Underperforming School

Working Relationships between the

Directions
If you agree to participate in this study it will require you to set aside time for an interview. The purpose
of the interview is to obtain you general thoughts, ideas and perceptions of the state school review. The
interview will take approximately 45 minutes.
You have been given two copies of this informed consent. If you agree to participate, please sign and
date each copy. This signature indicates that you have read and understand the information within this
consent form and your willingness to participate in this study. I will keep one copy of this informed
consent. Please keep the other copy for your records. If you have any questions, at any time during this
study, feel free to contact me at 978-369-1532 or email me at sbowles@educ.umass.edu.

Consent for Voluntary Participation
I volunteer to participate in this qualitative study and understand that:
1.

I will be interviewed by Susan Bowles using a loosely structured interview method.

2.

The questions I will be answering address my views on issues related to the early phases of
intervention under school accountability policy with specific emphasis on the relationship
between the state and local organizations involved in this intervention.

3.

The interview will be tape recorded to facilitate analysis of the data.

4.

My name will not be used nor will I be identified personally in any way or at any time. I
understand it will be necessary to identify participants in the dissertation by position (i.e.
principal, teacher, department of education liaison) and organizational affiliation (i.e. state,
district, school).

5.

I may withdraw from part or all of this study at any time.

6.

I have the right to review material prior to the final oral exam or other publication.

7.

I understand that results from this interview will be included in Susan Bowles’ doctoral
dissertation and may also be included in manuscripts submitted to professional journals for
publication.

8.

Iam free to participate or not to participate without prejudice.

9.

Because of the small number of participants, I understand that there is some risk that I may be
identified as a participant in the study, though every effort will be made to maintain anonymity.

Researcher’s Signature

Participant’s Signature

Date:
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Date:

APPENDIX C
CHARLESBURG SCHOOL DISTRICT
DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

Table C.l: Individual School Enrollment Report October 1, 2004
Grade
CharlesburgDistrict
Alfred Elementary
Babson Elementary

K
1980
49
53

1
2171
51
61

2
2021
44
50

3
1955
48
47

4
2041
43
60

5
2045
45
50

k-5
12213
280
321

TOTAL
26031
280
321

Table C.2: 1999 and 2003 Charlesburg Public School District and State Comparison of
Total Per Pupil Expenditures
District
State
1999
2003
1999
2003
Total Day
Program
Expenditures $177,401,550 $209,953,632 $6,395,235,205 $8,024,795,656
Number of
Pupils (FTE)
26,171
26,374
955,592
969,995
(Data Source: Massachusetts Department of Education, 2004)

Table C.3: 1999 and 2003 Charlesburg Public School District and Massachusetts
_Comparison of Per Pupil Expenditures, by Category_
District
State
1999
2003
1999
2003
Regular
Education
$5,289
$6,212
$5,487
$6,779
Special
Education
$13,062
$10,249
$13,542
$10,938
Bilingual
$6,104
$6,772
$7,495
$8,936
Education
Occupational
Dav
$9,404
$11,154
$8,118
Education
$7,605
All Day
$6,692
$8,273
$7,961
Programs
$6,779
(Data Source: Massachusetts Department of Education, 2004)
•/
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